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Abstract
A Constitution Contested:
Governors, Assemblies, and Imperial Politics in Jamaica and New York, 1675-1730
Winston Sinclair Hill
2021
This dissertation focuses on the constitutional politics of England, and then Britain’s,
transatlantic empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, through the lens of Jamaica and
New York. In those two colonies, as in the rest of the Atlantic empire, colonial elites and
imperial authorities were in perpetual political conflict. In this dissertation, I explain why the
conflict persisted without resolution. Historians, though they rarely answer this question, have
described fundamental transatlantic clashes of interests, and I take these as my starting point.
I argue that each side’s ideological and material interests interwove with and sustained
one another, and were simultaneously fundamentally opposed to those of the other side.
Moreover, the political, cultural, and intellectual structures of the transatlantic empire ensured
that metropolitan authorities could not simply impose their vision on the colonies. Instead,
British imperial government depended upon the cooperation of local elites, who would never
surrender their material and ideological interests to the crown. Equally, however, the imperial
authorities would never permit assemblies to reduce the royal prerogative in the colonies as far
as Parliament had done in Britain, nor would they suffer British material interests to be harmed.
Both sides were thus unwilling to compromise, but neither had the means to coerce the other. I
argue, therefore, that the framework of Britain’s first transatlantic empire ensured fundamental
and irresolvable constitutional conflict between colony and metropole. Only a revolutionary
imperial transformation could provide a solution.
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Introduction
In 1675, the assembly of the English colony of Jamaica passed an act “declaring the laws
of England in force” in the island.1 Sixteen years later, New York’s first assembly under the
aegis of the English crown passed their own declaratory act. Since both colonies were conquered
from other Europeans, rather than chartered and then seized from Indigenous peoples, the crown
theoretically had full license to shape the colonies’ political institutions. English colonists in both
New York and Jamaica, thousands of miles across the ocean from what many still regarded as
home, therefore yearned for statutory confirmation of their “birthright liberties” as Englishmen. 2
Like metropolitan Englishmen with the House of Commons, the colonists made their assemblies
the vehicle through which they demanded and defended their rights. In both instances, however,
the crown denied the colonists the assurances they craved by rejecting these declaratory laws.
Determined to preserve a colonial space for the crown’s prerogative to act freely, the
metropolitan authorities regarded the colonists’ claims to the rights of Englishmen as “too great
and unreasonable,” and “of very evil consequence.”3 Jamaica and New York were in many ways
extraordinarily different, with wildly disparate demographies, economies, geographies, and
societies. But their governing elites, and indeed their English-speaking White populations, shared
a self-conscious Englishness.4 And after imperial authorities rejected the colonists’ effort

1

JAJ, I, 9.

2

Brooke N. Newman, A Dark Inheritance: Blood, Race, and Sex in Colonial Jamaica (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2018), 30.
3

Representation of the board of trade to the lords justices, 11 May 1697, CO 5/1115/65; Robert Southwell to
Thomas lord Vaughan, 28 July 1676, CO 138/3/54. I have chosen to use the term “metropolitan authorities” at
times, as Jack Greene often does, because it conveys the nature of government as a collection of individuals in this
period, and sometimes interchange it with “imperial authorities.” I also use the more familiar collectives “the
crown,” “the ministry,” and “Whitehall.”
4

In this dissertation, I have defined “colonial elites” somewhat recursively as those who held enough social and
economic power to be plausible candidates for election to the assembly. This elite was much larger in New York

1

constitutionally to enshrine that identity, New York and Jamaica shared a fundamental conflict
with the crown.
The subject matter of that conflict was as poorly defined as it was crucially important. As
Alan Tully has written, the phrase “the rights of Englishmen […] referred to an unsegmented and
capacious grab bag.”5 Colonial elites demanded the formal extension of statutory rights such as
habeas corpus. However, they also wanted the nebulous and informal powers and privileges that
metropolitan elites enjoyed—particularly self-government through an empowered representative
assembly. For the colonial elites, there was no meaningful distinction to be made between these
two categories of rights, for all were inextricably part of their self-conscious Englishness.
Moreover, as Jack Greene has noted, colonial assemblies often sought “to secure checks on the
prerogative and power over executive affairs well beyond any exercised by the House of
Commons.”6 In that circumstance, not only was there “no advantage [in] attempts to enumerate”
the rights of Englishmen, but there was positive danger in doing so. 7 The idea of “the rights of
Englishmen” therefore could and did apply to almost any dispute between the colonial elite and
the imperial authorities, both as a cynical tool and as a sincere reflection of English political
thinking, without ever acquiring recognized bounds.

than in Jamaica, and New York politicians were also responsible to a significantly more sizeable electorate. But in
both places the English “oligarchical nature” of politics prevailed. See Alan Tully, Forming American Politics,
Ideals, Interests, and Institutions in Colonial New York and Pennsylvania (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1994), 321-9, 353-7, 365-9; Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in
the English West Indies, 1624-1713 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972), 338-9; Trevor G.
Burnard, Planters, Merchants, and Slaves: Plantation Societies in British America, 1650-1820 (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2015), 92-6.
5

Tully, Forming American Politics, 93.

6

Jack P. Greene, “Political Mimesis: A Consideration of the Historical and Cultural Roots of Legislative Behavior
in the British Colonies in the Eighteenth Century,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Dec. 1969).
7

Tully, Forming American Politics, 93.

2

Nor was “the prerogative” much more clearly demarcated. In England, kings and
ministers had fought bitterly to maximize the extent of the crown’s power while resisting
Parliament’s attempts to circumscribe it more neatly for decades, if not centuries, before 1675.
The metropolitan authorities strove to employ the same policy in the colonies, where
Parliament’s authority at this time only ran as far as the crown invited it. But there they
confronted colonial assemblies’ own resistance to executive power. And just as the colonists saw
the rights of Englishmen perpetually threatened by the prerogative, so too did the imperial
authorities believe that the colonists’ claims of rights invariably infringed upon the prerogative.
The sprawling, contested, and ill-defined nature of the two sides’ genuine claims of right thus
ensured that conflict lurked around every corner.
Over the fifty-five years I cover in this dissertation, Jamaica, New York, and the empire
of which the two colonies were a part underwent considerable transformations. Though its White
population of 8,000 experienced no net growth, Jamaica grew from a small colony of economic
promise in 1675 to the crown’s richest single possession by 1730. The buccaneers of its early
days were driven into irrelevance, as were the small planters. They were replaced by a
staggeringly wealthy sugar planter elite and a supporting White overseer class, perched
precariously atop an enslaved African labor force of some 75,000, and threatened by free Black
communities of Maroons in the interior.8 New York’s White population, meanwhile, increased
from about 7,000 in 1675 to over 40,000 by 1730, while its enslaved African population grew
from less than a thousand to over 7,000 by the end of the period. 9 Its diverse economy, though an

8

Trevor G. Burnard, “European Migration to Jamaica, 1655-1780,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 53, No.
4 (October 1996), 771.
9

John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 203; Census of New York population, 2 November 1731, CO
5/1055/226.

3

order of magnitude smaller than that of Jamaica, grew at about the same rate, while the colony
itself physically expanded up the Hudson and Mohawk river valleys. New York’s former Dutch
elite largely anglicized, and embraced the idea of the rights of Englishmen, but the social
complexity of British North America’s premier melting pot only grew. 10 Indeed, across
England’s Atlantic empire, wealth and population grew enormously, and societies evolved in
tandem. England had a Glorious Revolution, fought two imperial wars against France, became
Britain, and itself grew wealthier and more populous, though not at the rate seen in the colonies.
As a result of both the Glorious Revolution and decades of imperial warfare, the metropolitan
government became much larger, more complex, and much more administratively capable. This
expanded capacity came, in both the colonies and the metropole, with a commensurately vast
increase in expense.
One thing, however, did not change. In 1726, the Jamaican assembly once again passed a
bill to secure the rights of Englishmen, “which distinguish his majesty’s subjects from those of
arbitrary princes.”11 The next year, the New York assembly demanded the discontinuation of the
prerogative court of chancery, calling its establishment “without consent in general assembly
[…] contrary to the laws of England.”12 As they had for the past half-century, the metropolitan
authorities rejected these colonial attempts to claim the rights of Englishmen, preferring instead
to keep the colonists “in due obedience to the king and in a just and requisite subordination and
dependence on their mother country.”13 In both New York and Jamaica, the colonial assemblies

10

See Michael Kammen, Colonial New York: A History (New York: Scribner, 1975), 100-90.

11

Address of the assembly of Jamaica to the duke of Portland, 25 February 1726, JAJ, II, 572.

12

JNY 571.

13

Representation of the board of trade to the king, 10 December 1730, CO 5/1125/152.
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were still locked in the same conflict with the crown that had begun decades before. Time had
continued to rush by, transforming England, its empire, and the world. But the transatlantic
constitutional clock had stopped. I seek to explain why that was—why this conflict persisted
without any settlement.
Historians have given much attention to the related question of why the conflict existed
at all. There is a robust literature on the topic, with Jack Greene’s The Quest for Power probably
the weightiest contribution.14 Greene sees a conflict between a belief in Whitehall “that colonial
constitutions were static and that the lower houses were subordinate governmental agencies” and
a belief in the colonies that “the constituents of the lower houses […] were entitled to all the
traditional rights of Englishmen.”15 Historians do not always accord the issue the same centrality
that Greene does, but there is general agreement that Greene has indeed identified a genuine
conflict.16 However, they have often complicated his original argument with other factors. Some,

14

Jack P. Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies, 1689-1776
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963).
15

Ibid., 13-14.

16

For a range of broad statements of agreement, see Ian K. Steele, “The Anointed, the Appointed and the Elected:
Governance of the British Empire, 1689-1784,” in P. J. Marshall, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol.
II: The Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 111-2; David S. Lovejoy, “Two American
Revolutions, 1689 and 1776,” in J. G. A. Pocock, ed., Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1980), 244-264; J.C.D. Clark, The Language of Liberty 1660-1832: Political Discourse
and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1-9; Robert
Bliss, Revolution and Empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (New York:
Manchester University Press, 1993), 184; Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty
in England and America (New York: Norton, 1988) and, of course, Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American
Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968; e-book published by Random House), though Bailyn does not credit the
“rise of the assembly” argument with explanatory power for his own thesis about political ideas. For agreement
more pertinent to the case of New York, see Milton M. Klein, “Origins of the Bill of Rights in Colonial New York,”
New York History, Vol. 72, No. 4 (October 1991), 388-405; Paul Tonks, “Empire and Authority in Colonial New
York: The Political Thought of Archibald Kennedy and Cadwallader Colden,” New York History, Vol. 91, No. 1
(Winter 2010), 26-30; Tully, Forming American Politics; Eugene R. Sheridan, Lewis Morris, 1671-1746: A Study in
Early American Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 62; Kammen, Colonial New York, 15960. For agreement more pertinent to the case of Jamaica, see Hilary Beckles, “The ‘Hub of Empire’: The Caribbean
and Britain in the Seventeenth Century,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume I: The Origins of
Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century, ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 237; Sarah E. Yeh, “Colonial Identity and Revolutionary Loyalty: The Case of the West

5

like Stephen Saunders Webb, have reversed Greene’s preference for the assembly as the primary
agent in the conflict, instead according pride of place to the crown and its servants. 17 Others, like
Lee Wilson, have emphasized the motivating role that colonists’ material interests played in
these battles of rights, while others, like Abigail Swingen and Ian Steele, have pointed out the
salience of Whitehall’s own tangible needs. 18 And some historians have even rejected Greene’s
ideas about the conflict. Patricia Bonomi, for instance, has argued that though “the familiar ‘rise
of the assembly’ concept still has a certain schematic usefulness when applied to the final crisis
of 1776 […] it gives few clues to New York’s internal political development throughout the
greater part of the century.”19 There is, on this question, a rich and valuable historiography.
The question that guides this dissertation, however, has received much less consideration.
Few historians have sought to explain why the transatlantic constitutional conflict between the

Indies,” in Stephen Foster, ed. British North America in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 205-6; Lee B. Wilson, “A ‘Manifest Violation’ of the Rights of Englishmen: Rights Talk
and the Law of Property in Early Eighteenth-Century Jamaica,” Law and History Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 (August
2015), 544, 572-3; Newman, Dark Inheritance, 10, 28-31; Alvin Rabushka, Taxation in Colonial America
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 102-4.
17

Stephen Saunders Webb, The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of the Empire, 1569-1681
(Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979); Stephen Saunders Webb, Marlborough’s America
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013). For a different view of assertive crown agency at the end of this
period, during the era of so-called “salutary neglect,” see Amy Watson, “The New York Patriot Movement:
Partisanship, the Free Press, and Britain’s Imperial Constitution, 1731-39,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol.
77, No.1 (January 2020), 33-64; Steve Pincus and James Robinson, “Wars and State-Making Reconsidered: The
Rise of the Developmental State,” Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales: English Edition Vol. 71, No. 1 (March
2016), 9-34; Pincus, The Heart of the Declaration: The Founders’ Case for an Activist Government (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2016), 9-16.
18

Wilson, “A ‘Manifest Violation’”; Abigail Swingen, Competing Visions of Empire: Labor, Slavery, and the
Origins of the British Atlantic Empire (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015); Steele, “The Anointed,” 115,
117-9. See also Kammen, Colonial New York, 189; Tully, Forming American Politics, 377; Patricia U. Bonomi, The
Lord Cornbury Scandal: The Politics of Reputation in British America (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, 1998), 174; Mary Lou Lustig, Robert Hunter, 1666-1734: New York’s Augustan Statesman
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1983), xiii. Bonomi and Lustig both lay particular emphasis on “salutary
neglect” and “Walpole’s economically determined provincial policy” in causing a slackening of conflict.
19

Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1971), 13.

6

crown and the colonial assemblies remained fundamentally unsettled by 1730. In part this is
because historians generally do not favor this period in either British North America or the
Caribbean, instead concentrating either on the founding years of England’s Atlantic empire or on
the decades preceding the American Revolution. Moreover, the scope of the question is quite
broad. Considering just four colonies over an eighty-year span took Greene well over four
hundred pages, and he did not even consider a fourth of all the colonial assemblies in the British
Atlantic. Examining all of them exhaustively is evidently impracticable; doing any less opens up
a historian to charges of excessive generalization. I suspect there is also a sense that the whole
“rise of the assembly” idea has been “done,” and in any case belongs to an earlier era of narrow
concentration on an institutionally driven history of constitutional politics. 20 Even those
historians who might otherwise be tempted to test the waters may believe that there is little to
add to a field in which some very prominent historians have already engaged themselves at some
length. And, lastly, the question I have posed is of a slightly unusual nature for historical inquiry.
It does not ask about change over time, but rather about the absence thereof; why did something
not happen, as opposed to why something did. The Scylla of counterfactuals lurks to one side,
the Charybdis of determinism to the other, and most historians presumably see little to be gained
by risking the passage.
Some historians have, however, suggested or implied answers to the question of why
there was no settlement of this transatlantic constitutional conflict. Edmund Morgan has argued
that no settlement was in fact necessary. Though he has acknowledged the conflict, he has
asserted that “the political system within which they operated, despite its tensions, did work” and

20

Greene himself suggests as much. See Jack P. Greene, Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and
Constitutional History (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994), xvi-xvii.

7

therefore that “both sides could and did take considerable pride in it.” 21 Bernard Bailyn has taken
a different point of view, advancing a two-part theory in The Origins of American Politics. He
has contended that “the area of prerogative power that had been severely reduced in England in
the settlement after the Glorious Revolution […] was reproduced in many of the colonies in all
its archaic force.”22 Colonial elites resented this Atlantic asymmetry deeply, and sought to
strengthen their assemblies to restrain the theoretical powers of the imperial executive in the
colonies. Governors, Bailyn has argued, lacked the independence, the authority, and the
patronage to apply the techniques of parliamentary management in Britain, and so could not
calm the “bitter, persistent strife” in the colonies. As a result, “conflict was inevitable […]
conflict that had no easy resolution.”23
Jack Greene has taken issue with Bailyn’s emphases in this argument. Instead, Greene
has argued that the overriding issue was that the colonists had “powerful mimetic impulses” that
impelled them to mimic the House of Commons in their assemblies. 24 Greene makes the
Glorious Revolution even more central than does Bailyn. The pro-Parliament, anti-prerogative
settlement of the Glorious Revolution in England was not applied to the colonial assemblies,
which “directly frustrate[d] their memetic impulses” and left the colonists in justified fear of “the
most pernicious form of tyranny” that had prevailed at times under the pre-revolution Stuarts. 25
Crown and colonists were therefore caught in a long struggle between “the Crown’s exaggerated
claims for prerogative in the plantations and the immoderate responses those claims evoked from

21

Morgan, Inventing the People, 144-5.

22

Bailyn, Origins of American Politics, location 948 in Kindle e-book.

23

Ibid, l. 1514.

24

Greene, “Political Mimesis,” 343.

25

Ibid., 351.

8

the legislatures.”26 Greene expands on this argument in Peripheries and Center, arguing that the
incompatibility between colonial insistence on their rights as Englishmen and the crown’s
prerogative claims “meant that the colonists would never be able to extract […] formal and
explicit guarantees from metropolitan authorities.”27 The conflict, he argues, therefore persisted,
and “remained a source of deep anxiety for both colonial leaders and metropolitan authorities.” 28
I believe that the repeated anger of confrontations over rights between the crown and the
Jamaican and New York assemblies belies Morgan’s assertion that the imperial constitution was
essentially satisfactory. Instead, I believe that Bailyn and Greene have both described a crucial
part of why there was no settlement of the constitutional conflict between the crown and the
colonial assemblies in this period. However, the two together cover only a part. 29 Neither Bailyn
nor Greene gives much explicit consideration to the role of the material interests of both parties
to the conflict. They also do not accord the crown the agency I believe it is due, instead looking
at a transatlantic conflict from a very American perspective. Though both give great credit to the
Glorious Revolution as an inflection point in the conflict, neither accords full weight to the other
inflection point of the 1690s—the beginning of two decades of imperial warfare that strained
existing institutions in the metropole and in the colonies. By marrying these insights from other

26

Greene, “Political Mimesis,” 353.

27

Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British
Empire and the United States, 1607-1788, paperback edition (New York: Norton, 1990), 43.
28

Ibid., 44.

29

I do not go so far as Alan Tully, who calls this a “single-strand interpretation of colonial politics.” Tully, Forming
American Politics, 441. That seems to me to be fundamentally unfair, since Greene is careful to point out that there
were other interests and questions that animated colonial politics. A fairer statement would be that Greene perhaps
should not have left it to others to describe those mechanisms if he wished to offer “an alternative general
framework of interpretation.” See Greene, “Political Mimesis,” 338, 354-5.

9

segments of the historiography with Greene and Bailyn’s interpretations, I hope to present a
more complete analysis.
Three factors prevented the settlement of the constitutional conflict between the
English/British crown on the one hand, and the assemblies of New York and Jamaica on the
other, in the period 1675-1730. First, as Greene and Bailyn have pointed out, both sides had
ideological interests that were fundamentally opposed to one another, which only worsened after
the Glorious Revolution brought institutional dissonance to England’s Atlantic empire. Despite
the vicissitudes of politics, across this half-century the colonial assemblies consistently
demanded the rights of Englishmen for their constituents, at the expense of the prerogative. The
metropolitan authorities, on the other hand, were determined throughout these fifty-five years to
use the prerogative to maximize freedom of action for imperial government in New York and
Jamaica, at the cost of colonial exercise of the rights of Englishmen. The conflict was further
intensified by both sides’ mixture of ends and means. For the colonists, the assembly was not
only the guardian of their rights, but a crucial—perhaps the most crucial—right of Englishmen in
itself. For the imperial authorities, the prerogative was not only a tool to ensure control of the
colonies, but also something to be preserved for its own sake. These ideological interests also
prevented both sides from turning to Parliament to settle the dispute. The colonial assemblies did
not want parliamentary interference with their powers, and the crown, though tempted by the
massive resources Parliament could offer, could not simultaneously uphold the prerogative and
invite Parliament to legislate.30 There would be, in this period, no outside intercession in the
principled antagonism of crown and assembly.

30

See Morgan, Inventing the People, 133 for a good statement of this disinclination on the colonial side.

10

Second, both sides had material interests that were inextricably intertwined with their
ideological interests. Contrary to Greene’s suggestion, “self-interested and sordid ambitions” did
not simply inspire behavior that colonists then transmuted into “heroic struggle.” 31 Instead,
material and ideological motives often acted in harmony for both crown and assembly. This was
nowhere more clearly seen than in struggles over the power of the purse. Fiscal power was not
only the strongest force that either side could deploy to substantiate its ideological pretensions,
but also the means by which both sides sought to enrich their adherents. However, material and
ideological interests could also work to destructive cross-purposes. When Whitehall faced the
impossible task of arbitrating between upholding the prerogative, financing imperial defense,
defending commercial concerns in the metropole, and paying imperial officials in the colonies,
some of the crown’s interests would invariably be compromised for the sake of the rest. 32 The
colonial assemblies enjoyed a distinct advantage in the struggle on this point, for both the
material and ideological interests of colonial elites tended to align with the pursuit of further
rights and powers.
Third and finally, the structural constraints of England’s Atlantic empire obstructed any
effort by either side to impose a settlement on the other. Three related structures are of particular
importance here.33 The first was a fact of geography and technology that neither side could alter.
In the age of sail, months invariably passed between the dispatch of news from the colonies and
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the arrival of a response from London. This provided ample time for intention to be overtaken by
events, either in the colonies or at home, and often confused transatlantic conversation.
Moreover, this distance of time and space constrained the crown to act through an executive
agent—the governor. This delegation of authority promoted a politics that “operated at two
levels,” as Bailyn remarks, which could work to the detriment of either side. 34 Colonial
assemblies’ deals with the governor could always be overturned in London, as the Jamaican
assembly found repeatedly in the first decades of the 1700s. 35 On the other hand, the governor’s
independent interests always imposed an agency cost on Whitehall’s colonial policy, as nearly
every governor the crown sent out to each of these two colonies in this period compromised
against its interests.36 The net effect of this two-tiered politics was to place significant barriers in
the path of revisions to the status quo, which militated against either side achieving its aims.
The second structural element primarily constrained the crown. Colonial affairs were a
tertiary concern for the metropolitan authorities. Domestic policy came first and foremost. Then,
as Trevor Burnard writes, “Europe always loomed larger than America in statemen’s
calculations.”37 Only when there were no domestic or European disturbances could Whitehall
afford to concentrate on colonial affairs. And, as Greene remarks, there was always a “press of
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domestic and international affairs.”38 As a result, the metropolitan authorities could never muster
the sustained care and interest that a long-term, stable settlement of the constitutional disputes
between the crown and the colonial assemblies would have required. Indeed, Whitehall often ran
short of attention even when crises in colonial governance demanded it. The Exclusion Crisis in
England precluded serious concentration in the metropole on the Poynings’ Law crisis in
Jamaica at a critical point in 1678 and 1679. The crown’s desperate governor, the earl of
Carlisle, therefore received no instructions, and the Jamaican assembly no discouragement, for a
full thirteen months. On a lesser scale, partisan political struggle in England and the end of the
war of the Spanish Succession left Robert Hunter, governor of New York, with no help from
London for years as he tried to secure a renewal of the colony’s lapsed revenue. The crown
simultaneously forbade governors from taking initiative and demanded that they solve their own
problems. It is little wonder that the results were incoherent at best, and outright damaging to the
crown’s interests at worst.39
Moreover, metropolitan priorities ensured that the crown was also extremely reluctant to
expend resources on the project of prerogative government in the colonies. The strategic position
of New York in imperial competition in North America prompted the crown to spend some
£9,000 per annum to sustain four understrength, underpaid, underfed companies in that colony,
while spending rather more for a larger, but equally ill-served garrison to ensure productive
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Jamaica’s internal security against enslaved Africans and Maroons. 40 This paled in comparison
to the sums expended on domestic and European concerns—throughout most of this period, the
civil list alone was over £700,000 per annum. 41 Assuming the fiscal burden of civil
administration, in order to remove the colonial executive’s dependence on the assemblies for
grants of funds, was never seriously contemplated even under Charles II and James II. After the
Glorious Revolution settlement confirmed Parliament’s fiscal supremacy, and two decades of
warfare sent the costs of empire skyrocketing, such largesse from the crown was inconceivable. 42
Instead, metropolitan authorities were determined to sustain empire on the cheap. 43
40
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The third structure was probably the most influential. Both the colonial elites who sat in
the assemblies, and the metropolitan elites who made colonial policy in London, shared a set of
assumptions about politics and society that sharply limited their imaginative possibilities. On
both sides of the Atlantic, Englishmen held that political power ought to be exercised by those
who held social and economic power; that the rule of English law was essential to their identity;
that the monarch sat atop a rightful hierarchy; and, particularly after the Glorious Revolution,
that coercion of fellow English elites not in armed rebellion was beyond the pale. 44
Each of these firmly held ideas, in its own way, fueled and complicated the conflict
between crown and assembly in Jamaica and New York. The shared conviction about
distribution of power meant, in England, that local elites were the government. In the colonial
context, this idea led the crown to establish the assemblies that continually troubled it, and then
never seriously to consider abrogating them. The colonists, on the same principle, proceeded to
try to exercise in their colonies all the power that English elites enjoyed in the metropole, at the
expense of the crown. Belief in the rule of law and the rightful hierarchy meant that the colonists,
however frustrated they were with Whitehall, did not in this period entertain the notion of
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legislating purely by themselves, let alone the thought of breaking away. The crown, for its part,
never thought of unilaterally amending objectionable colonial legislation, but neither did it
refrain from haughtily and belligerently insisting on the primacy of the prerogative. And the elite
consensus that coercing other elites was unacceptable made imperial authorities shy away from
even mentioning the possibility of the use of force to settle their conflict with the assemblies of
New York and Jamaica.
The interactions of the three factors of fundamental ideological conflict, reinforcing
material interests, and the structural constraints of empire were many, and I will not catalogue
them here. But the nexus of qualms about involving Parliament, the problem of distance, and the
low fiscal priority of colonial affairs deserves singling out, for in combination with English
common beliefs, it evened the playing field between the crown’s theoretically extensive
resources and the colonists’ comparatively meager means. In the first place, this nexus turned the
ideological preference for reliance on local elites into an absolute necessity. The crown simply
could not do without the cooperation of a critical mass of local elites in any given colony, given
these parameters. But its commitment to prerogative government, and the colonists’ equally
strong and antithetical commitment to realizing the rights of Englishmen, meant that the crown
had often foreclosed on cooperation with its measures before they ever saw an assembly floor. In
the second place, this nexus, in combination with the English aversion to coercion of fellow
elites and the colonists’ insistence on their rights and material interests, effectively precluded any
possibility of the crown using force to resolve the conflict. Neither, however, were metropolitan
authorities willing to give up their pretensions to prerogative government in the colonies. The
crown’s threats were empty, and the colonists came to know it, but still the metropolitan
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authorities could not stop. And escalation to no final purpose did little but deepen the
transatlantic antagonism between crown and assembly.
In the chapters that follow, I trace the contours of this conflict chronologically, to best
illustrate both how much and how little changed in these fifty-five years. The first chapter
examines the crown’s attempt to impose Poynings’ Law on Jamaica in the late 1670s. It was the
most explosive episode in this dispute for either New York or Jamaica, and illustrates more
starkly than any other the structural constraints that bound all parties. The second and third
chapters take up Greene’s contention about the stress of political mimesis after the Glorious
Revolution, in parallel with the pressures exerted on imperial institutions by the great wars of the
turn of the century. In the second chapter, I consider political discontent in Jamaica in the 1690s
and 1700s, provoked by a relic of James II’s government that the colonial elite thought the
Glorious Revolution would have swept away. In the third chapter, I explore the submersion of
the conflict between crown and assembly beneath New York’s own very troubled legacy of the
Glorious Revolution, and then address how that conflict burst through to claim center stage in the
early 1700s.
Chapters four and five home in on the structural problem of the governor. Robert Hunter
and Archibald Hamilton contemporaneously governed New York and Jamaica, respectively, in
the 1710s. Their divergent experiences show that the level of a governor’s competence could
make a substantial difference in imperial governance. But Hunter and Hamilton’s governments
also demonstrate that the fundamental terms of the antagonism between crown and assembly,
and the structural constraints of the transatlantic empire, precluded any individual from
meaningfully altering the course of the conflict.
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In the sixth chapter, I conclude the story of Jamaica in this period. I follow the twists and
turns of the crown’s successful journey to securing a perpetual revenue in the colony in 1729,
after having essayed it repeatedly in the previous fifty-five years. I explain how the Jamaican
elite were disappointed in their quest to secure statutory confirmation of their rights in exchange,
but I also make clear that the crown had won a hollow victory that settled nothing fundamental in
its conflict with the Jamaican assembly. Chapter seven concludes the narrative for New York. In
that chapter, I show how even New York’s famously bitter factionalism did not prevent the
assembly from battering the power of the prerogative in the colony to a low station indeed by
1731. I also illustrate how, by that point, Whitehall was out of leverage in New York and bereft
of solutions to the problem of prerogative weakness.
Two colonies, even two so different as New York and Jamaica, cannot provide the
historical basis to make a final, definitive statement about the mechanisms at work in the whole
of the English/British Atlantic empire. Nevertheless, I believe the political experiences of these
colonies between 1675 and 1730 substantiate my hypothesis that fundamental ideological and
material antagonism combined with the structures of the transatlantic empire to frustrate any
settlement of the conflict between the crown and the colonial assemblies. Moreover, I think New
York and Jamaica in this period show not only that the conflict was not settled, but that it could
not be settled within the confines of the first British empire. 45 The dispute was too vital to stop,
but the tensions it produced were too agonizing to continue. Only a radical transformation in the
transatlantic empire could resolve the crisis.
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Greene does, as seen above, come quite close to making this argument in a general sense in Peripheries and
Center, 44. Through the lens of Jamaica and New York, I intend to offer the substantiation that will allow me to be
less circumspect.
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Chapter I
The Poynings’ Law Crisis in Jamaica, 1675-1680
In 1677, the lords of trade sent Charles Howard, the earl of Carlisle, to Jamaica to impose
Poynings’ Law on the colony. Passed in Ireland at the end of the fifteenth century to “curb the
legislative initiative of the Anglo-Irish parliament, as well as that of the administration,”
Poynings’ Law stripped the Irish parliament of its deliberative powers, and allowed it only the
privilege of approving laws conveyed from England. 1 Now London was determined to do the
same to another recalcitrant colony that had repeatedly flouted the prerogative and harmed the
crown’s material interests. However, the lords of trade gave up the effort to enforce Poynings’
Law in Jamaica in 1680, after three years of transatlantic constitutional crisis. The attempted
imposition of Poynings’ Law was the most confrontational and centralizing approach Whitehall
ever took towards Jamaica, and it failed spectacularly. But why did it fail?
Scholars generally agree that the Jamaican elite’s resistance to the loss of the assembly’s
powers partly motivated the ultimate decision to withdraw Poynings’ Law. The new frame of
government for Jamaica was “stymied by colonial […] contumacy”; “faced passive but persistent
political resistance”; and ultimately made no headway against “the stubborn resistance of the
Assembly.”2 However, the Jamaican elite’s refusal to accept Poynings’ Law has rarely played a
starring role in any historian’s retelling of the crisis. For some historians, a focus on English
politicians and policymakers’ decisions and reactions in their search for a “‘Politicall solution” to
secure obedience and revenue from the colony has minimized the agency of colonial elites in this
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crisis.3 This is particularly common in works with an extensive temporal or geographic sweep,
such as Bliss’s Revolution and Empire, Alvin Rabushka’s Taxation in Colonial America, or
Richard Dunn’s “The Glorious Revolution and America.”4 The peculiar political circumstances
of 1677-1680 have also led some to grant pride of place to contingency in England. Stephen
Saunders Webb goes farther than most in arguing that the abandonment of Poynings’ Law was
“the Anglo-American outcome of the Exclusion Crisis.” 5 But Abigail Swingen’s milder
statement that “during the Exclusion Crisis, the government simply did not have the manpower,
money, or overall legal support to compel sweeping constitutional changes in Jamaica” is
typical.6 An emphasis on the legal formalism mentioned by Swingen has also reduced the
explanatory impact of Jamaican resistance to Poynings’ Law. Agnes Whitson, in 1929, argued
that “the chief cause of the lords of trade’s surrender” was that “the law officers could not find
legal support for the policy of the crown,” and in the subsequent ninety years, scholars have
often been content to repeat her thesis. 7
None of these arguments is wrong. The crown did take the initiative in the crisis, and it
did not want to jeopardize the revenue from Jamaica; the Exclusion Crisis did hamstring colonial
policymakers at a crucial juncture; and the law officers and judges did decline to support the
lords of trade’s arguments in 1680. Nor does any historian fail to include the Jamaican elite’s
3
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resistance to Poynings’ Law as part of their explanation of the lords of trade’s failure. All agree
that Jamaican resistance combined with the practical concerns of colonial policymakers,
domestic political pressures, and the lack of convincing legal arguments to move the lords of
trade to withdraw Poynings’ Law. The differences among scholars here are mostly questions of
emphasis.
In the aggregate, however, that emphasis has shifted too far away from the Jamaican elite
and their assembly. Too much of the story is told in reference to the crown, its officials, and its
governor. Some drift in that direction is inevitable, both because metropolitan elites generated
the vast majority of the pertinent surviving sources, and because it was the crown seeking to
revise the status quo with Poynings’ Law. The result, however, has been that a genuinely
transatlantic conflict now takes place, in the historiography, primarily in England. Even when the
story does shift to Jamaica, agency and initiative still belong principally to Carlisle, the
governor.8 I do not claim to have rowed against the current of the sources so far as to foreground
the Jamaican elite in my investigation of the Poynings’ Law crisis. But I have sought to push the
center of gravity of the conflict away from England and towards Jamaica. And in so doing, the
structural constraints on transatlantic constitutional politics resolve from shadowy shapes in the
background into concrete outlines.
The unified resistance of the Jamaican elite made it structurally impossible for the lords
of trade to impose Poynings’ Law on Jamaica. English government, in the colonies as in the
metropole, relied upon the cooperation of a critical mass of local elites. Poynings’ Law, however,
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threatened to eliminate the political rights and powers the Jamaican elite expected by dint of their
English heritage. As a result, there was no local support for the crown’s measures. The lords of
trade were forced to seek other alternatives, only to discover there were none. Neither hectoring
assertions of the prerogative nor haughty deployments of royal prestige could compel the
Jamaican elite to surrender their deliberative assembly. There was no will in either the
metropolitan executive or Parliament to employ armed coercion against a colonial population not
actually in rebellion. When the lords of trade quietly admitted defeat on 3 November 1680, they
did so because the constitutional structures of England’s transatlantic empire had left them no
other choice.
Jamaica before Poynings’ Law
Jamaica had only been an English colony since 1655, ever since Penn and Venables had
taken it from the Spanish as a consolation prize of Cromwell’s Western Design after failing at
Hispaniola. Despite the island’s status as a conquest of the Protectorate, and Charles II’s more
accommodating attitude towards the Spanish, after the Restoration the king decided to retain the
island. Jamaica held out promise as a colony of plantations producing cash crops, like Barbados
and Virginia, which would redound to the benefit of the king’s customs. It was also attractive,
however, to those “‘in hopes of plunder’” from Jamaica’s “geographical location ‘in the
Spaniard’s bowels and in the heart of his trade.’” 9
It was privateering, and closely allied smuggling, that took off first. In the 1660s, together
they fueled a remarkable growth in wealth that made Port Royal, the buccaneer base, the largest
and busiest port in the English Caribbean. Henry Morgan’s raid on Portobelo in 1668 took some

9

Qtd. in Nuala Zahedieh, “Trade, Plunder, and Economic Development in Early English Jamaica, 1655-89,” The
Economic History Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (May 1986), 215.

22

£75,000 in plunder, “more than seven times the annual value of the island’s sugar exports.” 10 The
island’s governor from 1664 to 1670, Thomas Modyford, was happy to connive at this valuable
evasion of international treaties and the navigation acts, especially since, as Richard Dunn
alleges, he received at least £1,000 a year “in fees and kickbacks” from privateers and illegal
traders.11 The attraction of violence and law-breaking on the high seas was such that though “the
island’s white population was fewer than 8,000” in 1670, some 1,500 were privateers based out
of Port Royal.12
1670 marked an inflection point in the fortunes of privateers and smugglers. The Treaty
of Madrid that year established a relatively unambiguous peace between England and Spain in
the Americas, unlike the 1667 treaty that “Modyford [had] blatantly ignored.” 13 Morgan’s 1671
raid on Panama could not be ignored like the 1668 Portobelo raid. Thomas Lynch, a Jamaican
sugar planter, was made governor, with instructions to curb the privateers and encourage the
planters, who had come to believe “that farming and freebooting were incompatible.” 14 He did so
with gusto, thereby touching off “a bitter internecine struggle for control of the island” that lasted
for two decades, which the planters would ultimately win. 15
In the 1670s, however, that victory was far off. Moreover, the political battles between
the “plunder faction” and the planter faction should not obscure the degree to which the two were
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intertwined.16 As Nuala Zahedieh has pointed out, starting a sugar plantation was an extremely
expensive business, requiring perhaps £3,600 in startup capital for a 100-acre plantation, and
then a three-year wait to see any profits.17 The tremendous wealth required for such planting
came from Port Royal’s “profits of trading and looting.”18 Lynch himself had derived his initial
wealth from Port Royal, as had such planter luminaries as William Beeston and Peter Beckford
senior, the latter of whom would eventually become the richest man in Jamaica. Even Henry
Morgan himself had invested his ill-gotten gains in sugar plantations, and would die one of the
largest landowners in the island. Sympathy and alliance between planters and privateers, given
the right circumstances, was by no means out of the question.
Moreover, like the privateers, the planters depended on violence and transatlantic trade
for their material well-being. Their sugar plantations depended on the labor of enslaved Africans,
who made up just over half of Jamaica’s population in the mid-1670s. 19 The Jamaican planters
were already well on their way to establishing “one of the most savage and brutally exploitative
slave systems in the Atlantic world,” in which the death rate from ill-treatment and disease far
outpaced the birth rate in the enslaved population. 20 The planters’ desire for profits therefore
required the continual importation of more enslaved Africans. This unceasing demand for
enslaved labor, and Europe’s growing hunger for sugar, wove the planters as tightly into the
transatlantic economy as raiding and illegal trading did the privateers, though in a rather different
manner.
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Immigration from England also kept White Jamaicans tied to their homeland. Given the
recency of the conquest, practically every White Jamaican man in the mid-1670s was an English
immigrant, either directly from the home country or indirectly from English colonies in the
Caribbean. Their ranks were constantly refreshed by new English immigration, on which they
were demographically dependent. The small population of women and the ravages of disease
meant that the death rate in the White Jamaican population well outpaced the birth rate. 21 White
Jamaicans were therefore self-evidently and self-consciously Englishmen. By Charles II’s 1661
proclamation encouraging the settlement of Jamaica, they “carr[ied] English liberties with them
to Jamaica,” and could pass them on to their children born in the island. 22 However, White
Jamaicans also believed they enjoyed the rights of Englishmen inalienably by birth. Importantly
for the coming crisis, they knew the language of that “long-standing political tradition,” and were
familiar with the last five decades of conflict between the rights of Englishmen and the
prerogative of the crown, particularly with respect to the powers of the House of Commons. 23
Prelude to Crisis, 1675-1677
Though Jamaica had enjoyed an assembly since 1664, when the king ended the semimartial government of the island that had prevailed since the conquest, the assembly of 1674-5
was the first to launch an expansive challenge to both the governor and the prerogative. The
governor, Thomas, Lord Vaughan, was “an inexperienced outsider” who had “an extremely
difficult time making allies of either Morgan’s privateering party or Lynch’s planter cronies in
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the assembly.”24 The planters also resented the Royal African Company’s recently established
monopoly on the slave trade, believing that the company had failed “to furnish this island
annually with a plentiful supply of negroes at a moderate rate,” and therefore preferred to buy
from interlopers, as independent slave traders were called. 25 There was also general antipathy to
a saving clause on the governor’s military authority the metropolitan authorities had instructed
Vaughan to press for in a militia bill, which the Jamaican elite worried would give Vaughan
legal carte blanche in governing the island.
The dominant planter faction in the assembly, led by William Beeston and the
Cromwellian soldiers-turned-planters Samuel Long and John Colebeck, took advantage of
Vaughan’s political isolation to redress their grievances. 26 They amended the militia bill to limit
Vaughan’s powers, appropriated the revenue “to the king for the public use of the island” rather
than simply to the king, and passed an act “declaring the laws of England in force in this island”
to secure permanent statutory recognition of their rights as Englishmen. 27 Vaughan assented to
these bills, for they were the price of the taxes that would pay his salary. Though he turned back
the re-enactment of a bill “for a free importation of negroes,” he also connived at the council’s
limitation of the admiralty’s jurisdiction to prevent the seizure of the Saint George, an
interloping slave ship.28 Not for the first time—and certainly not for the last—financial and
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political necessity had forced a colonial governor to acquiesce in encroachments on the
prerogative and the crown’s material interests.
Vaughan sent the legislation back to London, breezily recommending to his superiors “a
good body of laws […] municipal, and particularly adapted to the interest of this place.” 29 There,
in 1676, Jamaican legislation met metropolitan review for the first time. Charles II had
constituted a new committee of the privy council with responsibility for the colonies, the lords of
trade and Plantations, in 1675.30 Charged with realizing the “imperial assumptions” of the earl of
Danby, the Lord Treasurer, the committee would seek to implement “an ambitious plan of
imperial centralization and increased metropolitan control of imperial affairs.” 31 In the colonial
context, that meant “render[ing] governors and assemblies obedient by asserting the king’s
legislative power.”32 That assertion of power itself depended upon securing a “permanent local
revenue from the colonies for the support of their colonial government.” 33 Such a permanent
revenue—or “perpetual,” as it was usually termed by contemporaries—would remove the
leverage that local assemblies otherwise possessed. Instead of negotiating with the assemblies for
concessions that frequently limited the prerogative in exchange for revenue, the governor could
simply carry out the crown’s orders, secure in the knowledge that his government’s fiscal needs
would be met. The crown was already compelled to negotiate with Parliament in England in this
manner—it had no desire to see the rise of as many new little Parliaments as there were colonies.
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In that respect, the news from Jamaica was alarming. Vaughan had made exactly the sorts
of concessions that the lords of trade did not wish to see. The revenue act was “derogatory to his
Majesty’s just prerogative,” and indicated an undutiful distrust that the money would be
“employed […] for the necessary support of the government of the island.” 34 The declaratory act,
meanwhile, would restrict the authority of the governor that the militia bill had sought to expand,
“for the laws of England favor not any guards or standing forces.” 35 The committee also feared
that the declaratory act would disempower the appointed council of Jamaica, “the statutes here
hav[ing] taken away the power and authority of the council board,” and were anxious to avoid
“leav[ing] all in confusion, if everything that is law in England should […] be strictly put in
execution.”36
Vaughan’s actions with respect to the slave trade had also deeply aggravated the
committee. The duke of York, the king’s brother, took an active role with the lords of trade and
was the patron of the Royal African Company, while the members of the committee also owned
its stock. Moreover, “gaining control of a larger share of the transatlantic slave trade” would,
they believed, increase the crown’s power and England’s wealth. 37 The committee therefore were
hostile to the “encroachments on the African Company’s authority in Jamaica,” and was
determined to brook no further interference in the company’s interests. 38
The lords of trade also perceived a larger crisis in imperial affairs in 1676. King Philip’s
War was roiling New England, while Barbados was petitioning against its permanent revenue
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and the Royal African Company’s monopoly.39 Most alarmingly, Bacon’s Rebellion in Virginia
had shaken royal government there, put a major dent in the crown’s customs revenue, and would
eventually cost the crown over £100,000 to subdue.40 John Rainbolt writes that imperial
authorities believed that the Virginia house of burgesses “directly and indirectly was responsible
for the rebellion,” and were “easily persuaded that the root of the trouble in Virginia was
identical to the source of elsewhere-irresponsible legislative bodies.” 41 As a result of the
rebellion, Swingen notes, “the idea [was] growing popular in London that colonies, if given too
much autonomy, could disintegrate into anarchy.” 42 It seemed plausible to the lords of trade that
the Jamaicans, “by openly flouting laws and the jurisdiction of the crown, [were] headed in the
same direction.”43 Some, like Henry Coventry, secretary of state for the south, also bemoaned the
unwillingness in Jamaica to restrain the privateers effectively, worrying that Jamaica might
become a “Christian Algiers.”44 Some restraint of the Jamaican elite and their assembly was
evidently necessary.
It was not only these defensive concerns, however, which prompted the lords of trade to
think of methods for bringing Jamaica under closer imperial control. As Michael Braddick has
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written, “part of the equation was […] revenue potential.” 45 A colony like Massachusetts, which
produced no valuable commodities and lay outside direct royal control, could make do for a time
with “tribute payment to keep the Crown at bay,” as Mark Peterson has argued. 46 It was not so,
however, for the crown colonies that grew cash crops. Barbados and the Leeward Islands, the
crown’s other major sugar colonies, had voted a perpetual four and a half percent duty on their
exported produce in 1663 in response to pressure from the Restoration imperial government.
That revenue could have been worth in excess of ten thousand pounds per annum to the crown. 47
Virginia also produced a considerable revenue for the crown through metropolitan customs, and
had already voted a tax on tobacco to finance the colonial executive. 48 Jamaica had only
produced £1,870 in revenue in 1670, the last year for which the lords of trade had hard data, and
as yet did not bring great return to the customs. 49 If the crown could keep the island in good
order under royal authority, it might be able to secure the four and a half percent in Jamaica,
while ensuring the stability that would enable the colony to produce an ever-larger sugar crop
and commensurate customs revenue. Charles II and his ministers, desperately trying to fend off
the specter of financial reliance on Parliament, jumped at the chance.
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Enter Poynings’ Law
After the assembly re-enacted all their old laws in the spring of 1677, and moved to
impeach the king’s appointed receiver-general of the revenue, the lords of trade made their
recommendation on 13 November 1677. 50 Though Jamaica’s status as a conquered colony meant
that the king could “impose what form of constitution both of government and laws he pleaseth,”
the crown had condescended to grant the Jamaicans an assembly like those in the rest of its
colonies.51 However, “this authority derived unto the said freeholders and planters [had] received
a daily increase by the resolutions they have taken less agreeable to your Majesty’s intentions.” 52
The lords of trade therefore suggested sharply limiting that authority. The laws transmitted by
Vaughan ought to be revised in London and sent back with the earl of Carlisle, “who […] may
offer them unto the next assembly, that they may be consented unto as laws originally coming
from your majesty.”53 No further assemblies were to be called without the governor first sending
home “a scheme of such acts as he shall think fit and necessary.” 54 Only after revision in London
could the governor then call an assembly to consent to them. The end result would be “that the
same method in legislative matters be made use of in Jamaica, as in Ireland, according to the
form prescribed by Poyning’s [sic] Law.”55 The lords of trade meant to exercise the crown’s
theoretical powers over a conquered colony, and in so doing curb Jamaican infringements on the
prerogative and English material interests forever.
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An order in council three days later identified the key component of the legislative
scheme the lords of trade intended to impose.56 The order provided that the lords of trade draft “a
law for establishing a perpetual revenue in Jamaica for the support and maintenance of the
government there,” along the lines of a bill that Vaughan had succeeded in passing two years
previously, but without objectionable phrasing and restrictions. 57 This was the other piece of the
puzzle to ensure effective royal government in Jamaica. The application of Poynings’ Law would
prevent the assembly from legislating of its own accord, while the establishment of a perpetual
revenue would remove the crown’s need to depend on that assembly’s periodic levying of taxes.
The metropolitan authorities’ desires for Jamaican governance would consequently meet with no
effective interference from an assembly stripped of power. The Jamaicans would be taxed and
governed, but not represented.
The lords of trade foresaw some level of resistance, but most of them evidently viewed
the prospect without trepidation.58 Either the resistance would not be strong enough to prevent
the passage of their legislative program when first put to the assembly, or it could be broken by a
second and more awesome deployment of the authority of the crown. Even if their gambit failed,
the upside was worth the risk. True, royal prestige would be tarnished if the Jamaicans
successfully rejected Poynings’ Law, and all the other colonies would take note. However, if
Poynings’ Law became the frame of government for Jamaica, the crown stood to win much
more. Not only would it gain income, prestige, and freedom of action in one colony, but it could
use Jamaica as a model or a threat for the other colonies under its authority. The policy of
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“increasing imperial control over transatlantic colonies” would receive a tremendous substantive
boost.59
However, the lords of trade had embarked on this policy almost wholly ignorant of actual
conditions in Jamaica. Without firsthand experience of the colonies, they had relied principally
on the acts transmitted to them and a few letters from governors to form their impressions.
Carlisle, who owned a plantation in the island and had regular correspondence with Jamaicans,
was the only member of the committee with fuller knowledge of the colony. He was best placed
to appreciate the truth of Thomas Lynch’s 1671 remark that “the people here look on it as […]
their Magna Charta that they shall be governed according to these municipal laws and those of
England, and not have anything imposed on them but by their own consents.” 60 Moreover,
though the rest of the lords of trade could launch their salvoes from the heights of the
prerogative, Carlisle had to engage the Jamaicans face to face to implement the crown’s
measures.
He had therefore sought to persuade his fellows to allow the Jamaicans to continue to
“have liberty to raise money in the king’s name for the use of the said island,” to ensure that he
could secure funds in the likely event the Jamaicans refused to acquiesce to the crown’s
measures.61 But the lords of trade flatly rejected his request as inimical to the prerogative.
Carlisle also applied to have some ability to make minor changes in the laws to ease their
passage, but was again rebuffed. 62 Carlisle therefore sailed for Jamaica with no compromise in
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hand, no ability to make a compromise when he arrived, and no power to compel the Jamaican
assembly to vote itself into irrelevance.
The difficulty of Carlisle’s situation only became clearer once he informed the Jamaicans
“that the laws which were to be made for the future were to be made like as they are made in
Ireland.”63 He wrote to Henry Coventry, secretary of state for the south, in August of 1678 that
some of the council were “much dissatisfied at the alterations in the laws and manner of passing
them.”64 Nor did he have a persuasive case to present to the Jamaican elite. The best substantive
argument he could muster in September, when he met the assembly, was that since the Jamaicans
“were under great obligations to his Majesty for his particular care and extraordinary charges in
maintaining this island […] he hoped it would oblige us to such suitable returns as his Majesty
might be pleased with.”65 This appeal to the Jamaican elite’s sense of duty and gratitude did not
outweigh their fear and outrage at the prospective loss of their rights as Englishmen. Nor did
Carlisle hide his own resignation and half-heartedness from the assembly, remarking that “the
restraint that both he and we lie under in the new laws he brought over cannot be altered, for that
he had no power to do it, but should be glad if he had.” 66 It was no surprise, therefore, that
Carlisle noted that the assembly were also “so dissatisfied with the alterations in the government
that I question whether they will pass any of these laws.” 67
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Of those laws, “the first would be the act of the revenue,” and it immediately encountered
difficulties.68 Though Carlisle had disingenuously suggested that the bill was primarily intended
to pay off debts arising from fort construction, the assembly quickly noticed that it “differ[ed]
from all the former” revenue bills in nearly every respect. 69 Most worrying was the bill’s
perpetuity, which the assembly feared would make it susceptible to “be formed or diverted to
other uses.” 70 The colonial executive’s dependence on the assembly for repeated grants of funds
was a cornerstone of the assembly’s defense of the rights of Englishmen and their own material
interests. If the governor became fiscally independent of the legislature, the assembly could not
restrain any arbitrary actions on his part, rein in corruption, or exert leverage to secure his
consent to bills they wanted. Practically all of the Jamaican elite, whether planter or privateer,
had a distinct interest in making sure this never happened. Led by William Beeston as speaker,
John Colebeck, Samuel Barry, Samuel Bernard, and Peter Beckford senior, the assembly
therefore threw the revenue bill out on 25 September, despite Carlisle’s continued lobbying.
They then threw out the militia bill, with its objectionable saving clause, and all the rest of the
bills Carlisle had brought over the course of the next few days. 71
The metropolitan authorities’ program had failed in scarcely three weeks. Dissolution of
such a recalcitrant assembly would probably have been, in their view, the logical next step. That,
however, Carlisle could not afford to do. Vaughan had failed to pass a short-term revenue act
before leaving the island in 1677, and so Carlisle found himself with an empty treasury and no
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authority to fill it.72 If he wanted his salary, and any recompense for the expenses of government,
he would have to ignore the theoretical imposition of Poynings’ Law and get the assembly to
pass a revenue bill. He sought a long-term bill, but the assembly refused, “from a fear that if they
should have made it perpetual, they should be assembled no more, but be governed by governor
and council, as they were in Col. Doyly’s time.”73 The last clause was crucial. Save for those few
lucky enough to be on the council, the Jamaican elites had direct experience of taxation without
representation, and government by decree. And now they were “of a better understanding than to
give the reins out of their own hands.” 74 The assembly therefore first used the time granted by
Carlisle’s needs to organize their reasons against the new frame of government. Then they
passed a one-year revenue bill on 11 October, whereupon Carlisle promptly dissolved them. 75
By the time of the dissolution, Carlisle believed that the opposition to Poynings’ Law had
reached a dangerous pitch. The rejection of the perpetual revenue bill, he believed, was “a mark
of their disallowing the new method of government,” and the Jamaican elite were “so highly
incensed that they were near questioning the king’s power and authority to do it.” 76 Carlisle was
particularly angry with Samuel Long, now a councilor and chief justice. Long had not only held
that “it was against law and justice to […] subject her [Jamaica] to any form but that of England,
which is an Englishman's birthright,” but had broken his promise to Carlisle not to say so
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publicly.77 Long was the most prominent of a group of several men, including Colebeck and the
councilor Thomas Freeman, who had “arrived with the army in 1655 [and] end[ed] up among the
island magnates,” and now were among the leaders of the resistance to Poynings’ Law. 78 Carlisle
may well have feared they, with their Roundhead history and sympathies, formed the core of a
true antimonarchical opposition.79
Carlisle therefore demanded that each councilor and assemblyman either acknowledge
the king’s power or repudiate the prerogative by answering the question “do you submit to this
frame of government, which his majesty hath been pleased to order for this island of Jamaica?” 80
Carlisle ultimately won affirmation from all of them, though often “neither […] clear nor
cheerful,” but only after he had suspended Long and threatened others. 81 The response also
revealed that much of the council had united with the assembly, traditionally their institutional
foes, in opposition to the crown’s measures. The council would retain their judicial function as
the last court of appeal within the island, and their role as advisors to the governor. But they too
would lose deliberative legislative power, which was an essential part of their prestige and
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authority as an institution. They had little more reason to support Poynings’ Law than did their
elected colleagues in the legislature.
Carlisle told Coventry that “some [were] much dissatisfied” with his actions, and
understandably so.82 After all, he had displayed the exact kind of high-handedness on behalf of
the prerogative that the Jamaican elite feared Poynings’ Law would bring. Resentment of
Carlisle’s behavior was likely to be longer-lasting than whatever pacification he had temporarily
achieved. Nor would the Jamaican elite necessarily consider themselves bound to submit as they
had sullenly promised. Like their Spanish counterparts, who could obey without complying, the
Jamaican elite were quite capable of the rhetorical gymnastics required to acknowledge the
king’s right in theory while denying it in practice.
The assembly had laid out that case for obedience without compliance in their 4 October
address to Carlisle. They asserted that there was “nothing that invites people more to settle […]
this remote part of the world than the assurance they have always had of being governed in such
manner that none of their rights should be lost, so long as they were within the dominions of the
kingdom of England.”83 The 1661 proclamation had indeed been calculated for exactly that
end.84 Now, however, the imposition of Poynings’ Law would strip White Jamaicans of “a
deliberative power in the making of laws,” leaving them only with “the negative and barely
resolving power […] not according to the rights of Englishmen, and practiced nowhere but in
those commonwealths where aristocracy prevails.”85 In consequence, Jamaica would “disappoint
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those hopes which his majesty hath ever had,” as the loss of English rights would not only
discourage future immigrants, but encourage people to leave the island for more politically
salubrious climes.86 However, if Jamaica were “encouraged by good government and wholesome
laws […] it will effectually serve very many interests, both of his majesty’s crown and of the
nation’s trade.”87 The assembly had not explicitly argued that the king could not exercise his
rights. But they had argued that Poynings’ Law violated their own rights, and that it harmed the
material interests of all parties, therefore implying that the lords of trade could safely retreat from
it without any harm done.
To ease the path of retreat for the metropolitan authorities, the address also presented the
characteristic alternative in seventeenth-century English political culture to direct criticism of the
king: “extol[ling] the king’s righteousness while condemning the officers’ culpability.” 88 The
assembly expressed their gratitude in the address for “the princely care which his majesty hath
been ever pleased to have” of Jamaica. But they argued that the king would never have imposed
Poynings’ Law on them “had he been truly informed of his own interests.” 89 Instead, they
contended, “the false colors of interest and design” had obscured “that which at a great distance
is impossible to be known.”90 Ministers less interested in confrontation, or perhaps the king
himself, could safely pin the blame for the Poynings’ Law project on overzealous officials, and
then affairs could return to the prosperous situation of the mid-1670s.
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Carlisle had a different solution to the conflict in mind. He had “met with the difficulties
here I foresaw, but could neither avoid nor prevent in England,” but could not change course
without orders from London.91 But he did have some sympathy with the Jamaican elite’s
position. He informed the lords of trade that “the present form appointed for the making and
passing of laws, considering the distance of the place, is very impracticable, besides very
distasteful to the sense of the people.” 92 To settle Jamaica on a firmer footing, he had worked
with several Jamaican notables—most prominently the assemblyman Charles Atkinson—to
formulate a new set of draft laws, which he dispatched with Atkinson to England. 93 They
included a new declaratory act and a revenue act appropriating the king’s quit-rents to the island,
suggesting Carlisle appreciated some part of the Jamaican elite’s concern for their rights and
their fears over the diversion of the revenue. 94 Carlisle asked for instructions to call a new
assembly, which would give him the flexibility to negotiate with the Jamaicans, and thereby
“order the matter to conclude effectually to his majesty’s service.” 95 Carlisle had evidently
decided that compromise was preferable to continued conflict, probably not least because he
would never get any money from the assembly for his own use until the situation was resolved. 96
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However, despite his dispatch of the declaratory act, Carlisle minimized and derided the
rights-based opposition to Poynings’ Law. His gloss on the assembly’s address mentioned not a
word of that document’s complaints about the loss of the rights of Englishmen. Moreover, in
writing to Coventry, he had dismissed Jamaican arguments about their rights by noting that
“popular discourses prevail here as well as in England,” and so “the leading men of the assembly
rather set themselves to frame arguments against the present constitution, than to accommodate
things under it.”97 By associating principled resistance to Poynings’ Law with popularity,
Carlisle implied that those who professed the principle affected it to seize political advantage,
and predisposed the metropolitan authorities against the “leading men of the assembly.” Carlisle
was certainly correct to say that performative concern for the rights of Englishmen could endear
assemblymen to the electorate, and secure a basis of popular support for resistance to Poynings’
Law. The mere fact of performance, however, did not preclude either the assemblymen or the
electorate from sincerely believing that Poynings’ Law would trample on those rights. 98
Carlisle’s misrepresentation to the lords of trade was thus a product of unconscious biases
and conscious choices both. Unconsciously, his sympathy for the Jamaican elite ended where
their resistance to the idea of the king’s authority began. Furthermore, as a member of the
English elite, he would have been as horrified by popular appeals as those to whom he was
writing. Consequently, he probably did genuinely regard some of the Jamaicans’ ideological
opposition to the crown’s measures as illegitimate and pretended. Consciously, Carlisle was well
aware that the lords of trade were unlikely to be swayed by any but practical considerations.
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Moreover, he was trying to push a compromise of his own design. He had simultaneously to
convince the lords of trade that resistance to their measures was too great to be overcome, that
his measures would meet with acceptance, and that preferring the latter to the former would be
no great loss to the prerogative. His emphasis on the impracticality of Poynings’ Law as the
major obstacle and his characterization of the rights-based opposition as the work of a few
insincere ringleaders served those ends. Since he was, as the governor, the lords of trade’s
primary source of information on the colony, he thereby handicapped their understanding at a
crucial juncture.
The First Response in London
Domestic political priorities, however, precluded the lords of trade from making any
rapid determination on either Carlisle’s or the assembly’s proposed solutions. While Carlisle was
failing to convince the assembly to accept Poynings’ Law, the popish plot was occupying the
minds of the king’s ministers and the privy council. In fact, Titus Oates testified to Parliament
only a single day before Carlisle wrote to both Coventry and the lords of trade to inform them of
his dissolution of the Jamaican assembly. Coventry therefore wrote Carlisle on 16 November
1678, in response to the latter’s letter of 14 August, that the issue of the plot was delaying all
business, and that “we must be out of this disorder before we can maturely resolve anything.” 99 It
was not until 28 March 1679, seven months after Carlisle had first described the resistance to
Poynings’ Law, that Coventry could inform him that the privy council had considered Jamaican
affairs. By that point, the Commons had impeached Danby, the inspiration of the new
centralizing colonial policy, and had overridden the king’s pardon for Danby’s offenses. The
proponents of the royal prerogative were very much on the defensive. Coventry therefore
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cautioned Carlisle that “till we can come to some settlement in our new parliament, it is morally
impossible to take any steady measures.” 100
The lords of trade finally made a preliminary report on 2 April 1679 to the privy council,
in which they rejected Carlisle’s suggested compromise, taking especial offense at the quit-rent
and declaratory acts.101 They returned on 4 April to recommend that the Jamaicans should be
warned that “unless they consent to the laws transmitted thither, the king will govern the island
according to the commission formerly given to Colonel Doyly and others, and reduce all things
to the first principles of that government.” 102 This was a threat to revert to government without
any assembly whatsoever, and an even more strenuous attack on the Jamaicans’ rights as
Englishmen than the imposition of Poynings’ Law. In the circumstances, it was not surprising
that the full privy council were unprepared to go that far. They instead simply stated that there
was “no reason why any alteration should be made in the method of making laws according to
the usage of Ireland.”103 Coventry was to inform Carlisle that a more extensive justification for
that position would be forthcoming at a later date. In the meantime, the privy council authorized
Carlisle to continue the laws passed in Vaughan’s time by proclamation, to avoid literal
lawlessness in the island.
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The lords of trade presented their full report to the privy council six weeks later, on 28
May. They had entered into a vigorous debate on the report on 22 May, “and by reason of their
disagreement in their opinions agreed to present the same unto his majesty (without signing).” 104
This was a most unusual step. It indicated both that the issue was important enough to provoke
contention, and that some of the lords of trade, like the privy council on 4 April, had doubts
about the wisdom of escalating the confrontation—for that is exactly what the report did.
Most of the report was taken up with forceful rejections of the objections the lords of
trade understood the Jamaican elite to have made. The lords of trade claimed Jamaican scruples
about the militia bill were aired with “the greatest presumption,” since “the sole supreme
government, command, and disposition of the militia […] is residing in your majesty.” 105
Jamaican opposition to the revenue bill “hath as little ground,” especially since it was “not
suitable to the duty and modesty of subjects to suspect your majesty’s justice or care for the
government of the colony […] carried by your majesty’s tender regards and by the great expense
of your own treasure.”106 The lords of trade also dismissed the impracticality complaint,
asserting that “nor is it likely that this colony is subject to greater accidents than your kingdom of
Ireland,” blithely eliding the difference between a round trip of some seven hundred miles with
one of nearly ten thousand.107 There was no sympathy here for the Jamaican elite’s arguments,
nor any hint that the lords of trade were prepared to resolve the crisis through compromise.
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Instead, the lords of trade sought to justify harsher measures. They reminded the king and
council that “the assembly have endeavored to grasp all power,” and in so doing “entrenched
upon your Majesty’s prerogative, and exceeded the bounds of their duty and loyalty,”
particularly in their actions under Vaughan.108 Poynings’ Law had been intended “to put a
restraint upon these enormities, and to take the reins of government into your own hands,” but
“against their duty and allegiance,” the assembly had rejected it. 109 The lords of trade argued that
the Jamaicans had no right to reject any frame of government the crown imposed, nor indeed any
“farther privileges than have been granted to them” by royal action. But now, in their
determination to preserve the powers of the assembly, the Jamaican elite were “pretending a
right to that which hath been allowed them merely out of favor.” 110 This could not be tolerated,
especially since “your majesty’s resolutions in this case are like to be the measure of respect and
obedience to your royal commands in other colonies.” 111 The lords of trade therefore reiterated
their recommendation of 4 April that Carlisle should call a new assembly, who would either
accept Poynings’ Law or see the assembly wiped out of the constitution of Jamaica. This time,
the king and council accepted the lords of trade’s report, and Carlisle was instructed to “govern
himself accordingly to their Lordships’ opinion.” 112
The lords of trade, in seeking to win the confrontation with the Jamaican elite, had made
some extraordinary assertions, with equally startling implications. The Jamaican assembly, they
had made plain, was not in their view a natural outgrowth of the rights of Englishmen, but
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merely a privilege granted by the king’s favor. Nor was it a privilege with any durability, for the
king might issue new instructions at any time that could abrogate it. Indeed, the king was not
bound to extend the Jamaicans any degree of representative self-government whatsoever. He
could remodel the government as he chose, “according to the power your majesty had originally
over them” as a result of the English conquest of the island. 113
Denying the Jamaicans representative self-government deprived them, in their view, of a
right inherent in Englishmen, and therefore attacked a cherished part of their identity. 114 But the
danger did not stop there. The lords of trade’s insistence that the island’s entire constitutional
structure was merely “temporary and for probation” must have been chilling. All White
Jamaicans relied on the 1661 royal proclamation for legal surety that they still enjoyed their
rights as Englishmen, and now the crown had informed them that none of its grants were
irrevocable. They might well have asked themselves if due process were next on the block, and
the 28 May order in council would have unsettled, rather than reassured them. The lords of trade
had therefore thoroughly foreclosed on the possibility of compromise, by launching a full-scale
rhetorical assault not only on the Jamaicans’ assembly, but also on the very concepts that
assembly both embodied and defended. Bitter and unyielding Jamaican resistance to the orders
of the lords of trade, and thereby the privy council and the king, was assured.
There were two bright spots that might encourage that resistance. The first was that even
the lords of trade still evidently preferred securing the consent of the Jamaican assembly to
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imposing a new frame of government by decree. That preference gave the Jamaican elite time,
and perhaps some hope that the metropolitan authorities would see the need to obtain consent in
Jamaica for any major changes to the island’s government. The second was that the king’s letter
to Carlisle of 31 May, conveying his new orders, ameliorated the lords of trade’s position.
Carlisle was enjoined to call a new assembly and propound the laws to them once more, and “if
they should still persevere in their refusal, you will act according to the powers of your
commission and instructions, or in other cases by the advice of your council.” 115 Notably,
Carlisle was not explicitly authorized to behave as Doyly had done, leaving it unclear whether
Carlisle could make laws with the simple advice of the council. That ambiguity was probably
deliberate, showing a degree of pragmatism about the Poynings’ Law crisis in the full privy
council that the lords of trade did not display. If legislation by decree in Jamaica worked, then
the crown would be satisfied. If it did not, then the crown could disavow Carlisle’s actions and
force him to shoulder the blame for violating the rights of Englishmen. The opportunity was
there for Jamaican resistance to make the difference, while Carlisle’s situation had become even
more uncomfortable.
Carlisle under Pressure
Carlisle had received the 4 April letter, but not that of 31 May, when he called an
assembly for 19 August 1679, using the power granted him in an emergency. 116 The revenue was
in dire straits, with the bill he had passed the previous year proving unequal to the task, and
about to expire in any case. His government’s expenditure had outrun its income by over a
thousand pounds, he wrote Coventry, “so that I am very much straitened in my condition of
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living here, where everything but fruit is at excessive rates.” 117 Carlisle went on to say “that
which much aggravates my private wants is the great arrear for the two companies of foot
established here upon the king’s pay, for which arrears the people’s impatience grows greatly
upon me.”118 With the governor feeling the pinch, and the paltry armed forces on the island
practically destitute, there was no choice but to turn to an assembly—exactly the situation the
metropolitan authorities’ imposition of Poynings’ Law had been designed to avoid.
Carlisle recognized that he could not force through Poynings’ Law. He therefore asked
the assembly only for a revenue bill of eighteen months’ duration, and informed them that he had
already dispatched the councilor Francis Watson to England “to negotiate for us the ancient form
of making laws.”119 The bill needed to span eighteen months because Carlisle intended to follow
Watson and attempt the negotiation himself, and there would be no legal way to call an assembly
while he was gone.120 However, the assembly held substantial leverage over Carlisle. If he
wanted his revenue bill, he would have to make concessions.
The assembly swiftly made their demanded price clear. A committee led by Samuel
Bernard called the receiver general before them to review his accounts without first asking the
governor. The full assembly resolved to raise and appropriate a revenue for only six months, to
be paid to their own collector, and not to the receiver general. 121 The bill also included a tax
preference for Jamaican to English shipping, and made express provision for taxing imports from
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France as if that trade were legal. 122 Carlisle at first sought to resist these demands, as did the
council. But the assembly refused to allow the council to amend a money bill, in line with the
Commons’ resolutions of 1671 and 1678, and asserted “their undoubted and inherent right” to
appropriate the revenue and examine the accounts. 123
Faced with an assembly determined to press its advantage, and under the grave necessity
of securing money, Carlisle sacrificed the interests least allied to his own. On 29 August, he
passed the revenue bill as the assembly had framed it, and then ended the session. The tax
provisions were clear violations of the navigation acts and English material interests, but neither
had any negative impact on Carlisle himself. Meanwhile, the assembly’s appropriating the
money, examining the accounts, and appointing a collector were all infringements on the
governor’s and the crown’s rights as understood by the metropolitan authorities. 124 However,
Carlisle needed money far more than he cared to defend his rights or those of the crown,
especially since he had already resolved to lobby against Poynings’ Law in England. The six
months’ duration of the act probably made it easier for Carlisle to justify his consent to the
assembly’s constitutional aggression, but he had allowed a precedent to be set. The Jamaican
elite, for their part, had adroitly exploited the distance between the lords of trade’s
uncompromising position in London and Carlisle’s necessities in Jamaica to win a real, if
temporary, victory for their own interests.
Then, in September, Carlisle received his new commands from London to press for
Poynings’ Law. Though he now knew that the metropolitan authorities lacked both interest in his
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compromise and understanding of his difficulties, he nevertheless wearily undertook to put the
laws to the Jamaicans once again when the assembly reconvened. However, he cautioned the
lords of trade that he found “the same averseness as formerly.” 125 Furthermore, the Jamaican
elite now deployed a new argument against Poynings’ Law, declaring that they would “submit to
wear, but never to make chains, as they term this frame of government, to their posterities.” 126
Grotesque though this phrasing was in the mouths of literal slaveholders, the argument was a
reconciliation of the two warring imperatives the Jamaican elite felt. On the one hand, they owed
the king deference and obedience, but on the other hand, they prized their rights as Englishmen.
The new formula allowed them simultaneously to proclaim a willingness to accept the royal will
in the present, to continue to resist its permanent imposition for the future, and to affirm that the
crown was violating their rights. It also allowed the Jamaican elite to cast their opposition as
even more noble-minded than a simple defense of the rights of Englishmen, by claiming that
their real concern was for the rights of generations of Englishmen not yet born.
They were also apparently ready to resist Carlisle’s more contentious instructions.
Carlisle wrote Coventry on 15 September that his new instructions would force him “by my
order and the council’s [to] keep the revenue on foot […] of which some will make great
opposition.”127 The Jamaican elite had already petitioned Parliament against the Royal African
Company’s monopoly, “hop[ing] to take advantage of the perceived weakness of the royal
prerogative at home” to secure their material interests.128 They had further threatened to make an
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“address to the Commons of England who, tis reported here, were about making an act to punish
any levying of money but by consent of Parliament.”129 That the Jamaican elite were
contemplating involving Parliament in the constitutional dispute showed how determined they
were to reject Poynings’ Law. Positive encouragement of Parliament’s right to legislate for the
colonies in this instance could, after all, be the beginning of the slipperiest of slopes. Perhaps it
was for that reason that the Jamaican elite had not committed to involving Parliament in the
Poynings’ Law crisis, but had merely threatened to do so.
If they were bluffing, however, it was a bluff Carlisle was happy not to call. He had
neither the desire nor the means to enforce revenue collection on resisting White Jamaicans.
Their threat of appeal to the Commons allowed him to plead the “hazard […] being complained
of” for having defied Parliament, and thereby plausibly decline to carry out his ambiguous
orders.130 Instead, he implored Coventry to send him “such positive and clear orders as may
justify me and the council in our obedience.” 131 Carlisle had refused to accept the latitude the
crown had sought to permit him, and had thereby also dodged sole responsibility for exercising
“arbitrary power.” He would not use the authority granted to him by the king’s letter of 31 May
unless the crown issued him orders that would unequivocally transfer the ultimate blame back
across the Atlantic.
Carlisle tried instead to persuade the assembly, once they resumed sitting on 28 October,
to pass the body of laws with which he had been sent one more time. The assembly, however,
still had no good reason to comply. Carlisle was evidently unwilling to force the old Doyly
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government upon them, and in any case rule by governor and council would not be enormously
different from what was promised by the imposition of Poynings’ Law. Moreover, the year-long
delay between the assembly’s 4 October 1678 address and the beginning of the 28 October 1679
session indicated that there was indeed some value in resistance. Unsurprisingly, after “many
pressures from my Lord to pass the laws, and ma[king] as many delays […] at length the whole
body of laws sent from England were by degrees voted against.” 132 Nor did Carlisle succeed in
passing “a bill of revenue indefinitely” that he and the council had composed, for the assembly
threw it out on 14 November, “it not arising in the house.” 133
Instead, a committee that included Barry, Beckford senior, Bernard, and Colebeck drafted
an address ostensibly to Carlisle, but in reality aimed at the lords of trade. 134 Carlisle preferred to
focus his ire on Long, claiming that the address was “founded greatly on [his] advice,” since the
assembly “esteem[ed] him the patron of their rights and privileges as Englishmen.” 135 Certainly
the address to the king the assembly approved on 15 November 1679 gave a vigorous defense of
those rights and privileges. Much of the address, in the early modern English tradition, devoted
itself to rebutting the lords of trade’s rebuttals of the assembly’s earlier objections to Poynings’
Law. But the assembly also found room to make new arguments against “that Irish model of
government” that they “could not imagine […] was ever intended for Englishmen.” 136 In that
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vein, the address contended that the imposition of Poynings’ Law was contrary to tradition, the
proclamations of royal officers and the king himself, and even parliamentary legislation.
First, the assembly rejected the lords of trade’s assertion that Jamaica had only “been
governed by such instructions as were given by your majesty unto your governor.” 137 They
informed the imperial authorities that though former governors had indeed called assemblies “by
order of his royal majesty,” it was done “according to the method of his majesty’s more ancient
colonies.”138 Between Thomas Modyford’s arrival in 1664 and Carlisle’s in 1678, the form of
government in Jamaica had not changed, “which necessarily infer[s] the goodness and reason of
it, as well as the satisfaction of the people.”139 This was an argument inflected by the rights of
Englishmen, but based on the deep respect for custom and tradition shared throughout the
English Atlantic. The Jamaican assembly, in its relatively brief existence, had conformed to the
customs of the other colonial assemblies, some of which could plead several decades’
uninterrupted standing. That adherence to tradition had been salutary, for Jamaica’s White
people were happy and the island prosperous under the customary form of government.
Distinguishing Jamaica’s assembly from the rest through the imposition of Poynings’ Law,
however, was a dangerous break from tradition, and to be deplored as contrary to the shared
values of the English Atlantic.
Then, the assembly sought to turn the words of royal officers and the king himself back
on their authors. The address declared that “they never desired any power but what your
Majesty’s governors assured them was their birth right, and what they supposed your Majesty’s
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gracious proclamation assured them also.” 140 In support of this position, the assembly cited the
king’s letter on the proceedings in a 1672 pirate trial in Jamaica “signifying your dislike that
anything should be done that should cause any doubt in your subjects of not enjoying all the
privileges of your subjects of your kingdom of England.” 141 The lords of trade had asserted that
White Jamaicans enjoyed only those temporary privileges, including an assembly with
deliberative power, that the crown saw fit to grant. The Jamaican elite, by contrast, “partook of a
long-standing political tradition celebrating the hereditary birthright of freeborn Englishmen,” an
essential component of which was an empowered assembly.142 In their view, the crown had not
granted their rights, but had rather confirmed White Jamaicans in their enjoyment thereof.
Therefore, the assembly implied, the crown did not have the legal power to withdraw the rights
of Englishmen from the island as it presently sought to do.
Finally, the Jamaican elite contended that the imposition of Poynings’ Law contradicted
parliamentary legislation. The Jamaican elite asserted that “the reason the Parliament give in all
their Acts which concern the plantations for obliging us” was that they were “all your Majesty’s
natural born subjects of your kingdom of England.”143 If Parliament were to legislate concerning
the colonies, the assembly argued, “it is but equity then that the same law should have the same
power of loosing as binding,” and that White Jamaicans should be treated as Englishmen. 144 To
do otherwise was to forfeit Parliament’s right to legislate for the colonies, and therefore to forfeit
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the revenues the navigation acts produced for the king and the protections they produced for
English trade.
The assembly went one step further in their parliamentary argument. At the end of the
address, they declared their “hope [that] their Lordships intend not that we are to be governed as
an army, and the governor be empowered to lay any tax by himself and council.” 145 This was the
most damaging rhetorical light in which the Jamaican elite could have cast the order in council,
implicitly recalling as it did the regime that had executed the king’s father. The Jamaicans then
contended that “your Majesty […] discharged yourself and council, by an Act of Parliament, of
any such power over any of your subjects of your kingdom of England, as we undoubtedly
are.”146 And, they warned, “their Lordships well know no derived power is greater than the
primitive.”147 In contravention of the views of the lords of trade, the assembly argued that the
royal prerogative could not possibly be any more extensive in the colonies than it was in
England. In this instance, an act of Parliament, the highest law of the land, expressly protected
them as Englishmen from such actions as the lords of trade had directed Carlisle to take. This
lent some force to the threat to petition the Commons concerning the crisis, for not only was the
House at present hostile to the ministers, but the assembly could also present evidence of those
same ministers overriding and ignoring the will of Parliament. 148
These arguments in the address were founded upon White Jamaicans’ unequivocal belief
that they enjoyed, by birth, all the rights of Englishmen, and that among these was a right to an
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empowered assembly. The address, which Carlisle duly forwarded in his 23 November letter to
the lords of trade, seemingly left the committee with only one clear avenue of rhetorical
attack.149 They would have to argue explicitly that White Jamaicans were not Englishmen. 150 The
only obvious alternative was to withdraw and vindicate the Jamaican elite in their resistance to
Poynings’ Law. The attractiveness of retreat was considerably lessened by the degree to which
both parties had escalated the crisis. Climbing down from those great heights would assure that
the humiliation was seen far and wide. Contending that White Jamaicans were not Englishmen,
however, was factually dubious, risked releasing the colonists from their obligations to the
crown, and might well have a chilling effect on necessary emigration to the sugar islands.
Therefore, the lords of trade sought legal advice.
Searching for Solutions
On 11 March 1680, they directed four queries to the attorney general and solicitor general
concerning the crisis in Jamaica. Normally, questions directed to the law officers were leading in
the extreme, and the two main queries were no exception. Those two queries were also, however,
contradictory in approach, suggesting uncertainty and dissension within the ranks of the lords of
trade. The first query asked “whether, from the past and present state of Jamaica, his majesty’s
subjects inhabiting and trading there have right to the laws of England as Englishmen, or by
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virtue of the king’s proclamation.”151 Since the lords of trade had already argued for the latter in
spring 1679, this question suggested some appetite for a direct confrontation with the Jamaican
elite on the definition of “Englishmen.” The second query, however, sought to ascertain whether
“his Majesty’s subjects of Jamaica, claiming to be governed by the laws of England, are not
bound as well by such laws as are beneficial to the king by appointing taxes and subsidies for the
support of the government, as by other laws which tend only to the benefit and ease of the
subject.”152 This argument would accept the Englishness of White Jamaicans, but mirrored the
assembly’s earlier maneuver in turning the assertion back on its authors. If the Jamaicans wanted
Englishness, they would have to bear the totality of its burdens as well as enjoy its benefits.
Subsequent queries made it clear that the lords of trade were seeking to apply tonnage and
poundage duties, which had been voted to Charles II for life by the Cavalier Parliament, to
Jamaica. They would thereby win their perpetual revenue, the foundation for the exercise of the
prerogative in Jamaica, without a vote of the Jamaican assembly.
Neither propounded solution, however, was promising. The Jamaican elite would never
accept that their rights as Englishmen were determined by a revocable grant from the king.
Lynch, the former and future governor, had told the lords of trade as much when they asked him
for his opinion in December 1679. The Jamaicans, “being English […] think they have right to
be governed as such,” he wrote, “and to have their liberties and properties secured by the laws of
England or others of their own making.”153 Vaughan had agreed, noting that “the island seemed
to believe that it was their right […] to be continued under the form of passing laws by the
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governor, council, and assembly (like the Parliament of England).” 154 Even if the law officers
gave the lords of trade a favorable answer to the first query, therefore, two trusted sources had
now confirmed to the lords of trade that the Jamaican elite would not acknowledge the
superiority of London’s formal legal position. And that would leave the lords of trade back
where they started, casting around for some way to browbeat colonial elites into surrendering
political power.
The method suggested in the second query, by contrast, might be self-defeating for
prerogative government in the colonies. Though that government would be supported by a
perpetual revenue, applying parliamentary legislation to the colonies would legitimize and
strengthen Parliament’s role in colonial governance. Moreover, enforcing the body of English
laws in Jamaica would grant the colonists rights and liberties the lords of trade had denied them
in rejecting the declaratory act. The lords of trade clearly envisioned an extremely selective
application of the laws of England. But precedent was deeply influential in the English Atlantic,
and both colonists and Parliament were generally eager to use it as a springboard to attain new
heights of constitutional power. Extending laws across the Atlantic that did not explicitly include
the colonies, therefore, might leave the crown worse off than it had been at the beginning of the
crisis.
Both solutions to the problem also shared a common difficulty—the question of
enforcement. Lynch had already told the lords of trade in December 1679 that if the revenue
laws were continued by proclamation, “the judges etc. would quit, and juries constantly give
against the officers,” and that “it would be the same or worse if any order went hence to that
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purpose.”155 A sly application of the tonnage and poundage act to Jamaica would certainly face
the same obstacle of general concerted noncompliance, to say nothing of any attempt to abrogate
the current form of government completely. Nor had any exploitable fissure opened in the
Jamaican elite between buccaneers and planters, threatened as they all were with the loss of
rights and power. Depriving the Jamaicans of an assembly with the power to check the colonial
executive would require coercion from London. And in that, save in the case of actual armed
rebellion in Virginia, the crown had shown no interest. Nor, after suppressing Bacon’s Rebellion
and contending with the Exclusion Crisis, did it have the means. 156 Yet the lords of trade
persisted in believing they could dispatch Jamaican resistance to their measures, if only they
could find the appropriate legal silver bullet.
The committee were to be disappointed even in that quest. The law officers were
unwilling to commit themselves on any of the lords of trade’s four queries, saying that the
queries “were of such difficulty as to deserve the opinion of the judges.” 157 However, the
solicitor general, Heneage Finch, ruled that “the word Dominion in the act of tonnage and
poundage seems not to include the plantations.” 158 This rendered the lords of trade’s second
query pointless, since they desired only to take advantage of existing legislation, not to invite
Parliament into making new legislation for the colonies. On the other hand, the attorney general,
Creswell Levinz, opined that the Jamaicans had “no right to be governed by the laws of England,

155

CSPC, X, no. 1234.

156

John Rainbolt notes that the one thousand troops the crown sent to Virginia had cost at least £100,000, which
combined with the loss of customs revenue to produce a “shock to the shaky crown finance” of some £200,000 in
losses. Rainbolt, “A New Look at ‘Stuart Tyranny,’” 389.
157

CSPC, X, no. 1347.

158

Ibid.

59

but by such laws as are made there and established by his majesty’s authority.” 159 This partly
supported the lords of trade’s position, but not as much as they might have hoped. Levinz’s
prescription for Jamaican government would still force the metropolitan authorities to win
consent in Jamaica for their measures, which they had proven utterly unable to do over the past
two years.
Despite this lukewarm reception, the lords of trade continued their quest for an
unassailable legal solution.160 An order in council of 23 June enjoined the law officers and the
judges to consider the question of “whether by his Majesty’s letter, proclamation, or
commissions annexed, his Majesty hath excluded himself from the power of establishing laws in
Jamaica, it being a conquered country, and all laws settled by authority there being now
expired.”161 William Jones’s opinion as attorney general in 1676 in the Saint George case
supported this implied position, holding that “by his majesty’s acquisition of that colony he is
absolute sovereign, and may impose what form of constitution […] he pleaseth.” 162 Jones,
however, had given no guidance as to what specific rights the king had granted the Jamaicans, or
whether they were revocable. The lords of trade now sought confirmation that the king had made
no irrevocable grant of representative government, and therefore assurance that he could legislate
for Jamaica by decree, by virtue of its status as a conquest of English arms. They also attempted
to turn the assembly’s resistance to Poynings’ Law into a strength, by suggesting that the
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assembly’s recalcitrance had made the imposition of laws by decree absolutely necessary to
ensure order.
Caution once again prevailed in London in evaluating this remarkable assertion of the
extent of the prerogative in the colonies. No reply to the 23 June order in council survives in the
archives, indicating either that the judges’ reply was unfavorable, or that they never responded—
neither of which would be surprising. Jones gave his opinion in 1676, when the crown’s
relationship with Parliament was fraying but not adversarial, and when the question of ruling
Jamaica by royal fiat was far more theoretical than it was practical. In the summer of 1680, the
situation was much different. England was gripped by the Exclusion Crisis, and the crown was
readying itself to fight a desperate rearguard action in Parliament in the autumn. Now, the lords
of trade had decided to move direct royal rule of Jamaica from thought to action. The policy
would have been extraordinarily contentious at the best of times, and in 1680, it was an absolute
non-starter.
Further efforts to resolve the crisis thus waited until September, when Carlisle arrived
from Jamaica. He had departed in April almost immediately upon receiving the king’s leave to
do so, and had brought Long, Beeston, and other opponents of Poynings’ Law with him, in order
to bring a final resolution to the crisis. Long was also to be tried for treason, but the lords of
trade, giving a portent of their lack of resolution, essentially dismissed the charge against him
within a week.163 They made a last feeble effort to seize some legal high ground on 14 October.
In the presence of the king, they inquired of the chief justice of the common pleas, Sir Francis
North, whether the king had “divested himself of the power he formerly had to alter the forms of

163

CSPC, X, nos. 1511, 1517.

61

government in Jamaica.”164 North responded unfavorably six days later, but did indicate that the
revenue act passed in Lyttelton’s government in 1663 might still be in effect. 165
The Jamaicans attending the committee objected vociferously. In response, for the first
time in the crisis, the lords of trade offered a compromise. Already on 14 October they had
suggested that in exchange for a perpetual revenue, the crown might confirm some laws the
Jamaicans desired in perpetuity as well. 166 Now the committee determined to make the offer. On
21 October, Long, Beeston, and others were directed to confer with North, “to explain their chief
wants to him, whereby they may be induced to pass an act for revenue, to the end that matters
may be brought to an accommodation.”167 The Jamaicans offered a perpetual revenue for the
governor’s salary and a seven-year act for the rest of the government’s needs, in exchange for the
scrapping of Poynings’ Law and assurance “of the laws of England as concern their liberty and
property.”168 The lords of trade came to their decision on 28 October, and it was confirmed by
order in council on 3 November 1680.
By the king’s letter to Carlisle, the governor was once more empowered to call
assemblies, and those assemblies were to have “full power and authority, with the advice and
consent of yourself and the council, to make, constitute, and ordain laws, statutes, and ordinances
for the public peace, welfare, and good government of the said island.” 169 Carlisle’s new
instructions charged him only with seeking a perpetual revenue act in Jamaica in exchange for
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royal approbation of laws the Jamaicans desired, though it was privately conceded the revenue
act could be for as little as seven years. 170 After vigorously and aggressively defending the
prerogative right to change Jamaica’s institutions of government, imperial authorities had
decided to give up the point. Poynings’ Law would never come to Jamaica. By any measure, this
was a victory for the Jamaicans, and a humiliation for the lords of trade. The Jamaicans had kept
their assembly with its deliberative power, while the lords of trade had shown they lacked either
the means or the resolve—and possibly both—to impose their will upon Jamaica.
The Meaning of Defeat
In their ultimately fruitless quest to reform the constitution of Jamaica, the lords of trade
had encountered myriad difficulties. Some, like the extreme political paralysis engendered by the
Exclusion Crisis, were contingent. Most, however, were constraints that stemmed from the
structure of the English transatlantic empire. Of those structural constraints, several were
daunting but surmountable obstacles. Others, however, were insuperable barriers to the
imposition of Poynings’ Law.
The theoretically manageable challenges to Poynings’ Law in Jamaica were an
interrelated trio: the slow pace of transatlantic communications, the need to act through a
governor, and the low priority of colonial affairs in metropolitan political thinking. In the case of
the Poynings’ Law crisis, none was successfully overcome. The Exclusion Crisis left colonial
policymakers unable to compensate for the minimum three-month delay between a letter’s
departure from Jamaica and a response from London’s arrival by formulating proactive and
flexible policy. It also deprived the metropolitan authorities of the desire or the means to assert
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the prerogative as strongly as the lords of trade would have liked. Meanwhile, Carlisle displayed
the agency cost inherent to the relationship between crown and governor by repeatedly preferring
his own interests to those of the crown, and by openly exhibiting his doubts about the wisdom of
the Poynings’ Law policy. The metropolitan authorities, for their part, did not allow him any
room for compromise or accommodation, instead insisting that he continue ramming into the
brick wall of Jamaican opposition to the crown’s measures. However, in the absence of the
Exclusion Crisis, with more permissive lords of trade and a more enthusiastic and committed
governor, it is possible to imagine a slightly different course of history. Perhaps the lords of trade
and the governor could have worked in tandem across the Atlantic to retain the initiative in the
struggle, while countering and nullifying the Jamaican resistance to Poynings’ Law. Though this
sort of effective policymaking was rarely, if ever, implemented in the English Atlantic empire, it
was not out of the realm of the possible.
However, even if the lords of trade and Carlisle had overcome these obstacles, there was
one that would invariably stymie them. English government, both in the metropole and in the
Atlantic colonies, depended upon the consent of at least a significant and powerful minority of
the local elite. The imposition of Poynings’ Law precluded the possibility of winning that
consent in Jamaica. Stripping the Jamaican elite of their deliberative assembly was an open
assault on their rights as Englishmen, and therefore on their very identity. Besides Henry Morgan
and a few of his cronies, the rest of the Jamaican elite had nothing to gain, and everything to
lose, by supporting Poynings’ Law. 171 Planter and privateer alike united in defense of their rights
as Englishmen, and there was no crack into which Carlisle or the lords of trade could drive an
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effective wedge. Promises of office and threats of prosecution alike paled in comparison before a
surrender of the political powers and privileges the Jamaican elite regarded as their birthright.
Without strong minority backing at the least, there was no alternative for the lords of
trade. Even the military coercion of Virginia during Bacon’s Rebellion had relied upon the
presence of constituencies willing to support the crown’s measures, which did not exist in
Jamaica. Coercion was also extremely expensive for the royal treasury, which ran counter to the
consistent “principle of English financial policy […] that local taxation should bear the full cost
of colonial administration.”172 Moreover, coercing a colony not actually in armed rebellion was
redolent of that most English bugbear, “arbitrary power.” It would have been offensive not only
to the sensibilities of the Englishmen in Parliament, who would have to vote the funds, but
probably also to many of the Englishmen who were making colonial policy. The lesser solution
of having Parliament legislate a revenue for Jamaica would have been self-defeating for
prerogative government in the colonies, and ultimately could not have been enforced without
coercion, as would the mooted proposal for raising revenue by decree. When the lords of trade
dropped Poynings’ Law in November 1680, they were therefore not so much making a choice as
acknowledging reality.
By ordering the imposition of Poynings’ Law on Jamaica in 1677, the lords of trade had
attempted a major revision of the transatlantic constitutional status quo. But in the end, and to
their great embarrassment, the lords of trade found that they could not achieve even their original
aims, let alone substantiate the threats they made as the rhetorical flames raged higher. The
Poynings’ Law crisis therefore established an outer bound for the conflict between the rights of
Englishmen and the prerogative of the crown for the next fifty years. If the metropolitan
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authorities sought to deprive the Jamaicans of rights fundamental to their self-conception—in
this case, effective representative self-government—they would provoke the Jamaicans to unite
in defense of those rights. Once the Jamaicans were united in persistent noncompliance, the
crown would have no way to convince or compel them to do otherwise. The crown would then
find itself in a lose-lose situation, wherein the concession of defeat would mean a loss of prestige
and authority throughout its dominions, but so too would every moment the Jamaicans sustained
their defiance.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, imperial authorities never again attempted anything as bold as
the imposition of Poynings’ Law in Jamaica. However, they had learned the bare minimum
lesson from the crisis. They had not comprehended the structural difficulties inherent in their
governing project, nor had they perceived the long-term fundamental incompatibility of their
ideological and material interests with those of the Jamaicans. In consequence, though the
metropolitan authorities had learned to avoid the worst outcomes, still they had failed to realize
that the prerogative of the crown was unenforceable in the colonies without cooperation and
compromise. The conflict would not cease.
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Chapter II
The Legacy of the Glorious Revolution in Jamaica
Despite the Jamaican elite’s successful resistance to Poynings’ Law, historians generally
agree that the colonists were not able to “revert to their original political autonomy.” 1 The
crown’s legal rights to supervise the colony and review its legislation could not be ignored once
the crown had sought to enforce them. However, both elites in Jamaica and the crown
“understood the quid pro quo of empire” when they forged a compromise in the early 1680s. 2
The crown received a long-term revenue bill and acknowledgment of its supervisory rights,
while White Jamaicans as a whole received long-term confirmation of their previously temporary
basic law, and the planter elite secured a cheaper, more regular, and more voluminous supply of
enslaved Africans. The amity between crown and colony was disturbed by the autocratic
behavior of the duke of Albemarle, governor of Jamaica in 1688, and then shortly thereafter by
the Glorious Revolution. But Richard Dunn in particular has argued that in the next decade, the
Jamaican planter elite settled into a successful “close union with the mother country” after
sidelining the small planters and the plunder faction.3 In exchange for renewing their respect for
the crown’s rights and the governor’s powers, the Jamaican planter elite received military
support, “protection against foreign sugar competition,” and confirmation of their political and
social superiority in the island.4 Abigail Swingen, though more skeptical of the level of military
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support provided, agrees that by the 1690s “a concept of mutual dependence and benefit”
prevailed in the relations between Jamaica and the crown. 5
Swingen and Dunn are both quite right to argue that the Jamaican planter elite and
Whitehall had worked out an arrangement by 1700 that was much more mutually satisfactory
than that of 1677. This historical consensus is, however, thin. Dunn first formulated his
conclusions in 1970, restating them in 1972 and then again in 1998. 6 Swingen’s 2015 reexamination, with much fuller consideration given to the role of the African slave trade, is
practically the only in-depth published consideration of Jamaican politics in this period since
Dunn. Two perspectives, no matter how good the scholarship, are simply not enough. In this
instance, they fail to capture an important event to which Agnes Whitson first called attention
over ninety years ago—the passage of a perpetual revenue bill in 1688. 7 Albemarle had rammed
this bill through an assembly chosen in “the wildest election that Jamaica had known.” 8 Yet,
though the bill was won through the “arbitrary power” that Englishmen had expected William III
and the Glorious Revolution to consign to the past, the metropolitan authorities determined
instead to use it as leverage for an even better revenue bill. The Jamaican elite’s anger and
disappointment at this policy, which was the crown’s official stance between 1692 and 1704,
fueled strife in the governance of the island for that entire period.
Placing the 1688 revenue bill back at the center of political controversy in Jamaica in this
period, I argue, meaningfully reframes our understanding. Crown-assembly relations were better
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than they had been in 1677-1680. But there was no “imperial constitution of 1681,” nor anything
beyond an unstable surface accommodation. 9 Though the crown and the Jamaican elite shared a
considerable interest in profits from sugar, the two parties’ material and ideological desires
remained otherwise fundamentally opposed. The crown’s conduct in the manner of the 1688
revenue bill made this painfully clear to the Jamaican elite. The crown was evidently determined
to exclude them from the understanding of the Glorious Revolution settlement that prevailed in
England. Instead, imperial authorities would happily threaten the Jamaican elite’s rights as
Englishmen when the lure of fiscal independence for the colonial executive presented itself.
One other element of the transatlantic constitutional conflict also remained unchanged.
Even at the peak of the crown’s leverage in 1704, with the Jamaican elite mired in demographic
crisis, reliant on royal soldiers for security, and faced with the expiration of their basic laws, the
assembly refused to grant that fiscal independence to the crown’s government. They knew still
that the power of the purse was the best guardian of their rights and champion of their interests,
and would not relinquish it. With no viable alternative to governing the colony save through the
cooperation of local elites, the crown had no plausible threat in its arsenal that would sway the
Jamaican assembly from that determination. Despite the metropolitan authorities’ efforts to reap
the fruits of Jacobite autocracy in Jamaica, they remained incapable as ever of resolving the
constitutional stalemate of England’s Atlantic empire.
Jamaica After Poynings’ Law
The Jamaican elite had defeated the metropolitan authorities’ attempt to alter their
constitution wholesale with the imposition of Poynings’ Law. Long, Beeston, and the rest of the
Jamaican elite lobbying at court in 1680 then sought reforms of the island’s government that
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would secure the rights of Englishmen and defend their material interests. Most notably, they
wanted a confirmation of the terms of their declaratory act, and a marked reduction of the
governor’s prerogative powers in civil, judicial, and military matters. 10 However, they could not
compel the crown to agree to any of these requests. Webb has argued that “English political
change allowed the crown to reject the islanders’ impudent assault on its […] prerogative,” since
Charles II had successfully weathered the pressure of the Exclusion Crisis by the spring of
1681.11 It was certainly true that Charles no longer felt it necessary “to avoid the appearance of
absolutism” after dissolving the Oxford Parliament, and perhaps the Jamaican elite could have
wrung their concessions from the crown if Charles had still felt that pressure. 12 However, in all
political circumstances the crown held the useful power of framing commissions and
instructions, and the fundamental power of assenting to laws. Simply by doing nothing, the
crown could preserve the formal constitutional status quo. Just as the Jamaican elite had resisted
the crown’s attempt to make unacceptable reforms to their government, so too did the crown
resist the Jamaican elite’s attempt to do the same.
By 1681, both sides had recognized that they could not impose their will upon the other.
Moreover, both the colonists and the metropolitan authorities perceived a path to mutual profit.
As Richard Dunn notes, “the big Jamaica sugar planters were anxious to cooperate with Charles
II,” dependent as they were on “a home market guaranteed by Whitehall and a harmonious
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partnership with slavers and merchants in London.” 13 For their part, the metropolitan authorities,
as Abigail Swingen remarks, believed that “giving the planters what they wanted” would mean
“that Jamaica would once again peacefully send revenue to the Crown.” 14 The customs revenue
derived from Jamaican exports to England was only in the low thousands of pounds, but the
crown saw immense growth potential in the colony, particularly since Jamaica, unlike Barbados
or the Leeward Islands, “seemed always to have new lands to open up.” 15 Long-term stable
government in the island therefore promised long-term profit.
Consequently, Thomas Lynch arrived in Jamaica in summer 1682 to take up the
governorship for a third and final time, with a compromise settlement in hand. Lynch himself
was part of the deal, as a Jamaican sugar planter who could command “some support from within
the island.”16 The lords of trade had also caved to planter demands on the slave trade, directing
the Royal African Company to increase the supply of enslaved Africans to the island while
lowering the prices demanded.17 But the centerpiece of the deal was legislative. The crown
undertook to confirm Jamaica’s now-expired laws for as many years as the assembly were
willing to grant the colonial government a revenue. When Lynch secured a twenty-one-year
revenue in 1683, and the crown then duly confirmed Jamaica’s laws for the same term, it might
have seemed an enduring settlement of Jamaica’s troubles.
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This was not the case. The compromise had completely ignored the interests of the
plunder faction, whom imperial authorities regarded as disruptive and erratic. Lynch had
excluded these undesirables from government, seeking and winning “political control of the
island for the sugar interest,” at least temporarily. 18 But though their heyday was gone, the
plunder faction, led by Henry Morgan, Robert Byndloss, and Roger Elletson, still counted very
wealthy men among their ranks, and remained potentially powerful. In addition, the slave trade
compromise had disintegrated by the mid-1680s, while Parliament voted a heavy new sugar duty
in 1685, both of which provoked significant discontent among the planters. 19 And lastly, despite
Dunn’s assertion that the 1683 revenue bill “guaranteed fiscal independence to the royal
governor,” the island’s treasury was already empty in 1684, when Hender Molesworth succeeded
to the government upon Lynch’s death.20 Even the major and costly slave revolt of 1685, which
shook the Jamaican planter elite to their core, could not persuade them to give the governor the
fiscal independence that the long-term revenue did not. Instead, the inadequate sums the
assembly offered Molesworth in 1685-6 were aimed at regulating the Atlantic economy to their
benefit, raising taxes on the king’s darling Royal African Company and English trade.
Molesworth, who was also the company’s factor, rejected these bills out of hand. But he could
not change the structural reality of his government, and gave up seeking further revenue from the
assembly a year before the duke of Albemarle relieved him in 1687.
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Albemarle’s Government
Christopher Monck, the second duke of Albemarle, was the son of George Monck, the
architect of the Restoration, and was thirty-five when he landed in Jamaica on 19 December
1687. Albemarle was a sometime favorite of James II, but there is some uncertainty among
historians about whether he owed his gubernatorial position to James’s favor or to James’s desire
to send away “an irresponsible troublemaker.” 21 Historians generally agree, though, that “the
governorship was but the vehicle with which he proposed to revive his fallen fortunes.” 22
Albemarle had already secured considerable sums from a patent to salvage Spanish shipwrecks
in the Caribbean, and the governorship of Jamaica provided a base from which to launch and
coordinate further operations. Albemarle had also decided to ally with the plunder faction, partly
because they could aid his salvage endeavors, partly because he was related to their former
abettor Modyford, and partly because he could offer the preferment and political power denied
them by Lynch and Molesworth in exchange for funds for the government. 23 When Albemarle
arrived in Jamaica, he forged another alliance with the small planters, especially those “Irish
freemen […] on the internal frontier” whose Catholicism further marginalized them. 24
Backed by this coalition hostile to the planter elite, Albemarle came with some
determination to govern Jamaica in a more autocratic fashion. Expanding the colonial
executive’s power would not only benefit him personally, but would also further James II’s
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“imperial designs [of] promoting prerogative authority.” 25 When Albemarle met a new assembly
in February 1688, he therefore haughtily informed them that “nothing on my part shall be
wanting to answer those great ends the king my master sent me hither for, and therefore expect
your ready and hearty concurrence with me.”26 The “great end” he particularly sought was an
improvement on the 1683 act that would increase the revenue grant and make it perpetual.
Should the assembly fail in in this service, he warned them, “the ill consequences that may arise
from the contrary must be imputed your fault, and shall be at your door.” 27 Albemarle had
resolved to seek fiscal independence for the colonial executive in Jamaica, and was prepared to
threaten the Jamaican planter elite to get it.
Both Albemarle’s allies and the planter elite in the assembly understood this proposal
transactionally, agreeing on 21 March 1688 that they could not expect their laws to be continued
beyond 1704 without passing some revenue bill. Albemarle’s allies suggested it was wise to
exchange a perpetual revenue for perpetual confirmation, to secure their legal foundation forever,
and ensure that the revenue would always be expended in Jamaica. However, the planter elite
were loath to forfeit the leverage that the colonial executive’s fiscal dependence granted them.
They argued that if they passed a perpetual revenue bill, “they had not left anything to our
posterity to give,” and also worried that they “could have no assurance” that the crown would
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extend their laws in perpetuity as well.28 The planter elite’s views dominated, and the assembly
rejected the perpetual revenue bill on 23 March 1688. 29
Albemarle refused to accept defeat at the hands of “these malcontents of the assembly.” 30
He dissolved the assembly in early April. Then, in conjunction with Elletson, Morgan, and others
of the plunder faction, he resolved on a course of election-fixing unequaled in Jamaica in this
period. He informed the lords of trade of his intention, saying that “as soon as I have settled the
officers both military and civil throughout the whole island, I will order the choosing another
assembly, which I hope will prove better disposed than the last.” 31 Malicious prosecutions,
maladministration of the polls, and armed voter intimidation completed the project, which was
wildly successful. Twenty-two of the thirty-two members from the February assembly were not
elected to the assembly that met in July, an unparalleled rate of turnover in so short a gap
between assemblies.32
The new assembly did Albemarle’s bidding. They passed a perpetual revenue bill on 19
September 1688 that made no mention of the confirmation of Jamaica’s basic laws, to which
Albemarle promptly assented.33 However, even such a compliant assembly expected something
in return. They passed an act on the coinage increasing the value of a piece of eight from five
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shillings to six, which would have the happy effect of eliminating “one-fifth part of their debt.” 34
Albemarle was explicitly charged to safeguard the interests of the Royal African Company, to
whom much of that debt was owed. Nevertheless, he seems to have thought the revenue bill
worth the price, and assented to the coinage act at the same time as the revenue bill. This
“domineering and reckless executive” had secured a major victory for the crown’s fiscal interests
by exploiting dissension within his colony’s elite.35 However, Albemarle had sacrificed another
part of the crown’s interests about which he cared little to seal the deal.
A Troubled Legacy
Scarcely two weeks later, Albemarle was dead. Nor did most of his policies long survive
his death. Vociferous complaints of his displacement of officers reached London by autumn
1688, from both the Royal African Company—who disliked his appointee for provost marshal—
and the disempowered planter elite.36 In one of his last official acts, James II dispatched a letter
to the president and council of Jamaica at the end of November informing them that “we intend
to restore all things relating to the government of that our island to the state and condition
wherein it was upon the arrival of the said duke of Albemarle.” 37 After ousting James and taking
the throne as William III, the new king reiterated this position in two very similar letters in the
winter of 1689.38 The coinage bill did not last much longer, falling in October 1689 to a
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combined assault by the Royal African Company, other Jamaica merchants in London, and the
Jamaican planter elite.39
The 1688 revenue bill, however, endured. Jamaicans opposed to Albemarle had made
known his “illegal proceedings” in constituting the July assembly, and therefore asked that “all
such acts as have been there passed since the arrival of the said duke of Albemarle may be
abrogated and made void.”40 They carefully left out any explicit mention of the 1688 revenue
bill, and for good reason. Whether it had been won by fair means or foul, the bill was a victory
for the crown’s interests in Jamaica, and would provide a firm foundation for continued exercise
of the prerogative in the island. Though William might have, as a Jamaican petition put it,
achieved “happy success in the restoration of these nations to their just rights and freedom,” he
shared James’s concern for the power of royal government in the colonies. 41 Moreover, many of
those who had made colonial policy under James continued to do so under William, especially
the omnipresent “imperial fixer” William Blathwayt. 42 The opposition to Albemarle could
therefore only win a delay. After they and Albemarle’s partisans both presented their cases
before the privy council in December 1689, William decided to defer the consideration of the
laws until the new governor could “report the whole affair.” 43 He appointed the earl of Inchiquin,
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a veteran soldier with impeccable anti-Catholic credentials who had also served as governor of
Tangier, to the post, and dispatched him in spring 1690 to steer the island through both its own
troubles and the ongoing war with France.
Inchiquin arrived in July 1690 to find a thoroughly disordered colony. Morgan, the
lieutenant governor, had predeceased Albemarle, so there had been no one on the island with a
commission to execute royal authority since September 1688. The tumult of the Glorious
Revolution had compounded the apparent vacuum of authority. Francis Watson, the president of
the council, and some of his colleagues had contributed their share to the confusion by resisting
orders to restore the officers of government and imposing martial law for several months, until
receiving uncontestable royal orders. 44 Without new commissions from the crown or a governor,
the chief justice and others had refused to hold courts, and so the law had essentially ceased to
operate.45
Inchiquin concluded that the political strife in Jamaica resulted from “fifteen or sixteen
years […] of turbulent and pernicious advices,” and so took a methodical approach to restoring
order.46 He reported home that Albemarle’s prosecutions were unfounded, and the second 1688
election unfairly contested, in August 1690. 47 But it was not until June 1691 that he finally met
an assembly, having concentrated on reinforcing the island’s defenses against French attack. He
met them for the same end royal governors generally met colonial assemblies, writing that he
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found “a treasury exhausted, and a government greatly encumbered with debts.” 48 In the midst of
England’s most intense imperial war to date, Inchiquin’s need for money was more acute than
that of his Jamaican predecessors.
The large planters, led by Richard Lloyd and Edward Harrison, controlled a majority in
the new assembly, having comprehensively defeated Albemarle’s old alliance at the polls. They
were well aware of Inchiquin’s fiscal needs, just as they were aware that neither the crown nor
Inchiquin had yet proposed a solution to the problem of the perpetual revenue bill. The assembly
therefore prepared a bill vacating all the acts of the July 1688 assembly, including the perpetual
revenue bill. Seeking to guard against a repetition of Albemarle’s autocracy, they also passed a
bill establishing an agent for the colony in London who would not be responsible to the
governor. They flatly refused to pass a bill raising £5,000 for the defense of the island until
Inchiquin gave his assent to the other two.49 Inchiquin, however, was convinced that the vacating
bill intruded on the prerogative and somehow also canceled the 1683 revenue act, and in addition
regarded his exclusion from the solicitation bill as a personal slight. 50 He therefore angrily
dissolved the assembly on 30 July, flinging their address to him back in their faces. 51
He wrote the lords of trade two weeks later that the opposition extended further. The
councilors Samuel Bernard, Peter Beckford senior, and Nicholas Lawes, who were three of the
richest planters in the island, had encouraged the assembly to frustrate him. This planter coalition
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was not only determined to treat the governor “as a Judas not fit to be trusted among the other
eleven apostles,” but also sought to avoid a land tax and instead place taxes “upon trade and the
asiento, which are the life of this place.”52 Inchiquin was unsure how to deal with the growing
political power of the great planters, but he did have a solution for the revenue. Since “there was
scarce five in the 32 fairly chosen” in the second 1688 election, “I dare not advise the confirming
the laws they made,” no matter how valuable to the crown. 53 Equally, however, he could “by no
means [advise] the abrogating of them, since by doing it I fear the king would lose his whole
revenue here.”54 He therefore concluded that “his majesty has no other way to preserve his
revenue than to keep that matter under his consideration, till these people do pass the same or as
good laws.”55 In other words, the colonists were to be presented with a threat. They could either
pass a new perpetual revenue bill, or the crown would confirm the 1688 bill, won through
machinations its own governor had censured. 56
The Jamaican elite had expected more from the Glorious Revolution. They had seen
William III effect “the restoration of […] just rights and freedom” in the metropole. 57 They knew
he had formally accepted Parliament’s freedoms and powers, in particular concerning taxation,
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and had disavowed the high-handed prerogative government of James II. In consequence, they
had dared to hope that “his majesty will graciously please to do the like for us.” 58 However,
neither William nor his ministers had any interest in further limiting the prerogative by extending
idealized revolution principles to the colonial assemblies. Strong, fiscally independent
government was the end the metropolitan authorities sought in the colonies. And colonial
policymakers, many of whom were the same men as under James, were more than happy to take
advantage of the autocratic successes of the last regime.59 Though their metropolitan countrymen
had secured an irreversible ascendancy over the prerogative, the Jamaican elite would enjoy no
such victory. Instead, the conflict of rights and interests between the Jamaican elite and the
crown would continue in irresolvable stalemate, made even more unstable, as Jack Greene has
noted, by the institutional incongruity between the colonial assembly and the House of Commons
it was meant to imitate.60 White Jamaicans, in short, were not to be treated as Englishmen. The
Glorious Revolution settlement had not crossed the Atlantic.
William Beeston’s Government
The crown did make concessions to Jamaican sensibilities in the implementation of the
new policy. After Inchiquin died in January 1692, the metropolitan authorities did not dispatch
another metropolitan courtier with no experience of the colonies. Instead, William Beeston,
former speaker of the assembly during the Poynings’ Law crisis and a wealthy planter who had
spent most of the last decade lobbying in London, was commissioned as lieutenant governor. 61
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Beeston asked the lords of trade to make the exchange of a new perpetual revenue bill for
perpetual confirmation of the laws explicit. This would, he argued, “silence all the complaints
and disputes of the people about the former elections” and make sure “their body of laws will be
thereby entire.”62 The metropolitan authorities approved this approach before Beeston sailed for
Jamaica in early 1693.63
However, Beeston never had any success in implementing Whitehall’s new policy in his
ten years at the head of Jamaica’s government. At the beginning of nearly every session, he
reminded the assembly that the 1688 bill would secure the royal assent “if you do not present one
that may be equivalent.”64 Usually “the assembly, after they had read the bill of revenue, ordered
it to be laid upon the table, and never more would meddle with [it].” 65 But occasionally the
crown’s party was able to bring it to a vote, in which perpetuity was then duly defeated. 66 After
years of this, Beeston threatened the assembly in 1696 that he would write home for the 1688 bill
to be laid before the king, since there were “no hopes of prevailing with you for another bill.” 67
He had in fact already written the lords of trade that “there will not be a settled establishment of
his majesty’s revenue here” unless the 1688 bill received the royal assent. 68 However, that letter
arrived with the newly constituted board of trade, which had neither the time nor the inclination
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to consider such a fraught question while the expiration of the revenue was still some years
away. They never responded to Beeston’s letter, and by 1698 he was back to wheedling the
assembly once again for “an equivalent to his majesty.” 69
Those years of failure exposed the fundamental absurdity, and therefore weakness, of the
threat. An effective threat must establish that it is better to comply with the aggressor’s desires
than to suffer the consequences of noncompliance. But in this case, the metropolitan authorities
wanted the assembly to pass a perpetual revenue act that yielded at least as much money as did
the first, in exchange for refraining from royal confirmation of a perpetual revenue act passed in
an illegitimate assembly. Suffering the consequences of the 1688 revenue act’s approval
therefore presented the Jamaicans with no worse a material situation than if they complied with
the crown’s desires and passed a new act. Moreover, compliance would essentially legitimize the
crown’s use of arbitrary power in converting an act of a fraudulently elected assembly into a
sword of Damocles, and would set the Jamaicans up to be extorted by gubernatorial abuse of
power for the crown’s ends in the future. The consequences of noncompliance would be
unpleasant, as a possible precedent of governance by laws secured through the exercise of
arbitrary power would be set. But the odium of having violated the rights of Englishmen by
legitimating an act of the July 1688 assembly would, in that case, attach to the crown, and not to
later Jamaican assemblies. It is small wonder, then, that the Jamaican elite chose defiance. The
assembly leaders told Beeston, in language deliberately reminiscent of the Poynings’ Law
controversy, that “if they must have fittings, they had rather they should be put on by others than
by themselves.”70
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This was the major downside risk of the crown’s threat. It could certainly approve the
1688 perpetual revenue act, but in so doing it would irreparably harm Jamaicans’ trust, and make
any subsequent legislative dealings much more challenging. This would, perhaps, not be such a
terrible consequence, if the 1688 act provided enough revenue for the needs of the government.
However, though the 1688 act had probably improved upon the woefully inadequate 1683 act,
neither could come close to satisfying the skyrocketing fiscal demands of imperial warfare. If the
crown approved the 1688 act, its governor would still have to return to the assembly seeking
money, and he would face a gauntlet of hostility.
That hostility would animate most of Jamaica’s political elite. The reaction to
Albemarle’s government, and the disasters of the 1690s, had broken the power of the plunder
faction and had severely damaged the clout of the small planters. Moreover, Trevor Burnard has
dated the beginning of the rise of the large integrated plantation to the 1690s, fueled in part by
“the growth of a subaltern class of white plantation managers” thrown off by England’s imperial
wars.71 As that process advanced, the ever-growing wealth of the planter elite made everyone
else in the island, with the exception of the major transatlantic merchants, steadily less politically
relevant. This move towards a political mono-class showed in the assembly. Despite the best
efforts of Beeston and his allies in the elections, the majorities in all of Jamaica’s several
assemblies during Beeston’s government were resolutely opposed to the crown’s central
measure. Betrayal of one party’s interests could not be counteracted by siding with the other
party, because no other party ever commanded a majority.
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The quest for a new perpetual revenue bill was further complicated by the myriad and
mounting other problems of Beeston’s government. The first, utterly out of human control, was
the calamitous Port Royal earthquake of 7 June 1692. More than a thousand Jamaicans were
killed in the earthquake itself, and many more perished afterwards in the consequent epidemic.
Half of Jamaica’s most prosperous city was destroyed, which provoked a major downturn in the
island’s economic fortunes. Port Royal’s ruin also “proclaimed the final renunciation of the
buccaneers,” who had now lost their longtime base.72 The plunder faction would no longer
provide the counter to planter power that had won the crown the 1688 revenue bill.
The imperial policy of the metropole also produced difficulties for the island. In 1694, the
French invaded the island. Beeston led a successful defense, and as a result secured promotion to
full governor through the offices of his long-term patron and leading colonial policymaker
William Blathwayt.73 However, many planters sustained heavy losses, including Beeston
himself, and the colony incurred significant debt in financing its defense. The assembly passed a
massive debts and relief bill in response, but it fell thousands of pounds short. 74 The crown
sought to provide aid as well, sending thousands of pounds in relief money and dispatching a
thousand soldiers to the island, at the cost of a further £50,000. 75 The crown’s soldiers, though
they relieved many White Jamaicans from militia duty and provided extra security against both
invasion and insurrection, also burdened the colony’s treasury. Since their pay was not equal to
the tremendous expense of provisions in a colony that imported most of its food, Beeston had to
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struggle with the assembly to secure “an additional subsistence” for the crown’s soldiers.
Beeston was generally successful until the disbandment of the remaining regiment in 1698, but
he repeatedly had to expend political capital to get the additional subsistence through the
assembly.
Lastly, White Jamaicans’ commitment to plantation slavery brought demographic
catastrophe upon them. Yellow fever arrived in the island in 1694, carried by mosquitos on slave
ships from West Africa. It ripped through the large nonimmune population in Jamaica, with a
particularly devastating effect in the densely populated southeast. The planters’ continual
demand for enslaved labor diversified the mosquito population and increased the nonimmune
enslaved population, while White immigration and the movement of soldiers and sailors during
the next twenty years of war ensured there would always be more White victims as well. White
mortality soared as a result, inhibiting any White demographic recovery from the disaster of the
Port Royal earthquake. Indeed, the White population likely sank below 7,000 in the 1690s, from
a high of 10,000 at the beginning of the decade. 76 The island’s enslaved population, however,
continued to grow past 40,000, as importations through the slave trade exceeded deaths.
This ever-widening gap between the free White and enslaved Black population on the
island instilled a permanent and fundamental fear of Black insurrection in the Jamaican elite.
White Jamaicans were enormously outnumbered by enslaved people, to whom they did
extraordinary physical and psychological violence. Enslaved Africans therefore had every reason
to return violence upon those who subjected them to bondage. White Jamaicans consequently
doubled down on their brutality, while desperately seeking aid from the metropole in the form of
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soldiers or more White male immigrants to secure against the menace of Black insurrection they
had themselves created. The growth of the enslaved population, increased White savagery, and
the geographic expansion of sugar planting also led to more enslaved Africans running away into
the mountainous interior to form new Maroon communities. Probably aware of the White
Jamaicans’ military insecurity, both old and new Maroon groups began to raid more aggressively
in these decades. Beeston and the assembly sought to respond to “the frequent assaults made by
the runaway negroes in their plantations, even to murder.” 77 The “parties” they formed several
times to patrol and fight against the Maroons did little to lessen the threat, but did lay another
considerable burden on the island’s treasury. 78
Not even the fear of Blacks both free and enslaved, however, could motivate the
Jamaican assembly to pass a perpetual revenue bill increasing the fiscal independence of the
colonial executive. Instead, the effect of all these downward pressures on the colony’s population
and economy was to preclude any serious consideration of any long-term measures, let alone a
perpetual revenue bill. It seems extremely unlikely, given the Jamaican elite’s ideological
opposition, that such a bill could have been passed during Beeston’s government in any case. But
Beeston’s need to preserve his political capital to secure the immediate needs of the colonial
government made passage impossible, and the governor knew it. Despite his complaining letters
back to the metropole, and his hortatory speeches at the beginning of every session of assembly,
Beeston and his allies were generally swift to accept defeat on the perpetual revenue bill, and to
move on to more pressing business.
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Even in less weighty matters, however, Beeston’s government demonstrated both the
contradictory nature of the crown’s interests in colonial government and the agency problem of
the governor. In 1698, Beeston passed a bill for securing existing estates that effectively
prohibited the crown from collecting the quit-rents that imperial authorities always insisted were
due to the crown.79 In 1699, after railing against absentee patent officers and the fees they
allowed their deputies to charge for years, he passed a bill requiring patentees to be resident on
the island.80 Both bills were passed in concert with necessary funding measures for the crown’s
government, but both were “derogatory to the prerogative,” as the board complained in 1700. 81
Beeston also regularly permitted the assembly to direct funds, in their annual aids to the revenue,
to commissioners they named themselves, rather than to the crown’s receiver general, conceding
a vital element of the power of the purse.82 Furthermore, throughout his tenure as governor,
Beeston consistently connived at the evasion of the navigation acts. He did so, as he obliquely
informed the lords of trade, because “the dearness of all things, and wants the people of the
country are under, obliges them to assist and countenance all importers.” 83 This practice flouted
the crown’s imperial policy and parliamentary legislation, but it also aided the island’s economy,
eased Beeston’s relations with the assembly, and no doubt helped to line the pockets of Beeston
and his friends. Beeston’s government therefore served to confirm what the Poynings’ Law crisis
had already shown: the contradictory nature of metropolitan material and ideological interests,
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and the self-interest of the governor, weakened the crown’s hand in dealing with the Jamaican
elite, whose material and ideological interests tended to be mutually reinforcing.
By the end of Beeston’s government in 1701, however, the crown had leverage in dealing
with the Jamaicans once again. The 1683 revenue act was due to expire in three years, but so too
were Jamaica’s fundamental laws. Though the Jamaican elite might easily defy the threat of the
1688 bill’s confirmation alone, the prospect of having no fundamental laws along with the
confirmation of the 1688 act was a sobering prospect. Having observed Beeston’s years of
failure in securing a perpetual revenue bill, however, the board recommended a different
approach. The assembly were to have until the end of 1702 to pass a new twenty-one-year
revenue bill, which, as in 1683, would win them an equal extension to their fundamental laws. If
they refused, then the 1688 act would receive royal confirmation. 84 A letter from the king to
Beeston setting out the deal was approved in May 1701.
By then, Beeston could no longer count on even the transactional amity of the earlier
years of his government. With a new war looming, the revenue was in no condition to finance
the island’s defense, having run £8,000 in arrears, and the new English regiment sent to Jamaica
needed quarters.85 Beeston had to call a new assembly, and it was hostile both to him and the
crown’s measures. Convinced that there had been “great industry used in the election of such
which […] are against perpetuity,” he did not even bother to raise the question in his speech
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opening the assembly on 24 June.86 Instead, he asked only for a quartering bill and a short-term
aid for the revenue.87
The assembly began, however, by inquiring into the expenditure of £4,000 sent to the
island by the crown for relief of those who had suffered from the earthquake, since they believed
hardly any of it had actually been distributed.88 Beeston haughtily rebuffed this demand,
claiming that he and the council were “accountable to nobody else” but the crown for the
money.89 The assembly took this in poor part, and events thereafter spiraled downwards. By the
time Beeston dissolved them on 28 July, the assembly had not only refused to pass either an aid
for the revenue or a sufficient quartering bill, but had also resolved to send an address to the
House of Commons in defense of their privileges. 90
Beeston informed the board that these “arbitrary proceedings against his majesty’s
authority” had been engineered by one Hugh Totterdell, a recently arrived Irish lawyer, “to get
himself a vogue amongst the common people,” along with “2 or 3 more republican principled
men.”91 Totterdell’s greatest sin, Beeston argued, had been provoking the assembly “to believe
that what a House of Commons could do in England, they could do here.” 92 Totterdell probably
had been a provocateur, but Beeston’s argument was of a piece with Carlisle’s
mischaracterization twenty years before. The Jamaican elite did not need anyone prompting them
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to believe that they had the rights and privileges of Englishmen, and ought, by analogy, to enjoy
English institutions.93 They believed it of their own accord. And the crown’s failure to extend
them the rights metropolitan Englishmen had already won had only strengthened the Jamaican
elite’s resolve to bring their institutions into accord with those across the Atlantic.
Another Revenue Crisis
With the new war against France looming, Whitehall replaced Beeston with William
Selwyn, commander of the regiment dispatched to Jamaica. Like Inchiquin a decade before him,
Selwyn took over in early 1702 with the island in disarray. Beeston had declined to call another
assembly even after receiving the king’s letter, preferring instead to declare “martial law, and to
order quarters by the military authority.” 94 In addition to securing an embittered elite’s assent to
the revenue-for-laws deal the metropolitan authorities had offered, Selwyn would therefore also
have “to restore the people to the right of civil justice, who have had no law but martial for seven
months past.”95 The new assembly he called passed a six-month quartering bill and the additional
duty, but Selwyn died in early April, not even two months after his arrival. 96
Selwyn’s successor, as lieutenant governor, was Peter Beckford senior, the island’s
richest man and indeed one of the wealthiest individuals in all of England’s empire. As a longtime resident of the island, he was inclined “to support each particular in its just right,” as he told
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the assembly.97 He had no interest in pressing any unpopular measures on the assembly, and so
said not a word to them of the perpetual revenue. Nor did he and the assembly have much time in
which to work. The death of William III on 8 March meant that they only had six months from
that date before all royal colonial writs and commissions determined, and the assembly would
perforce be dissolved.98 The assembly passed short-term continuations of the quartering act and
the additional duty, as well as a bill for financing parties sent against the Maroons, who “have
been so bold to […] attack our settlements to windward.” 99
Most importantly, the assembly also voted a larger single aid to the treasury than any
Jamaican assembly would grant between 1675 and 1730. To discharge the old debts of the
colony and provide for its future defense, the assembly passed a bill intending to raise £17,808
through a property tax.100 This largesse came with a price. The bill, as the council complained,
“appointed commissioners for receiving and paying her majesty’s money and allowances for the
same, without their giving security,” and barred the governor and council from the role the
crown’s commission enjoined on them.101 Fearful of a French invasion, conscious of the fiscal
demands of war, and backed against the six-month deadline by the assembly’s deliberate delay,
the council reluctantly passed the bill “contrary to our own sense or reason.” 102 Beckford senior
gave his assent mere hours before the deadline, in direct contravention of his instructions.
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The terms of the bill were partly brought on by opportunism, given the unique legal and
geopolitical situation in which the Jamaican elite found themselves in summer 1702. But this
startling attack on the prerogative in its most crucial point was probably also motivated by the
events of the last year. Both Beeston and Beckford senior had refused to account for the money
that the crown had sent for White Jamaicans’ relief; the assembly would therefore provide for
debts and relief on its own terms, assured that any embezzlement could not be hidden under the
cloak of the prerogative. The imposition of martial law had probably stung the assembly into
providing for the defense of the island to prevent against a re-imposition, but by putting the
money in the hands of their commissioners, they had ensured that they would be involved in
defense to a heretofore unseen degree. Holding the fiscal reins of government remained the best
safeguard for the Jamaicans’ ideological interests, and the best tool for furthering their material
aims.
Equally, the crown could never accept the bill. For the kinds of sums that Parliament
raised in England—over three million pounds in 1702—the crown had surrendered much of its
prerogative power.103 Eighteen thousand pounds, however, made a much less tempting carrot,
particularly since the prerogative theoretically remained much more extensive in the colonies
than in the metropole. Moreover, imperial authorities knew that what one colony won, all the rest
might treat as precedent. And in England, there was naturally no concern that allowing
Parliament further powers might cause the people “to set up for themselves” without reference to
the crown.104 For a colony five thousand miles away, however, the fear that cutting the crown’s
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officers out of the colony’s finances might lead to excising dependence on the crown itself was
rather more plausible. The bill consequently never went into effect.
In the meantime, thanks to the disruption caused by Selwyn’s and then William’s death,
the board extended the time allowed for the assembly to pass a new revenue act until October
1703.105 Thomas Handasyd, lieutenant colonel of one of the two regiments in Jamaica, was
granted a commission as lieutenant governor. The instructions given to Selwyn were renewed: a
twenty-one year revenue act in exchange for the confirmation of the laws for the same time, or
else confirmation of the 1688 revenue act. 106 When Handasyd received this instruction on 26
May 1703, he immediately communicated it to the assembly. 107 The council attempted to insist
that the instruction only actually allowed a perpetual revenue bill, but the assembly dismissed
this out of hand, and resolved on 28 May to pass a twenty-one year bill. 108 The looming lapse of
their fundamental laws worried the majority in the assembly enough to renew the deal first struck
in 1683.
However, they did not do so swiftly. The majority pushed through a quartering bill that
significantly reduced the subsistence granted, and explicitly barred any of the regiments’ officers
from holding any government post in Jamaica. In response to the council’s efforts to amend the
bill, the assembly argued that the queen’s charge to the Commons on 21 October 1702 to
“inspect the accounts of all the public receipts and payments” not only extended to the assembly
by analogy, but excluded the council of Jamaica as it seemed to exclude the Lords. 109 Therefore,
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they contended, they could not accept any amendments to money bills. This explicit effort to
align the assembly with metropolitan institutions was led by none other than Hugh Totterdell,
Beeston’s bête noire, to whom Handasyd swiftly developed an even greater antipathy. 110
The assembly finally took up the question of the revenue again in September 1703, but
only after letting the additional duty expire, and expelling eight members who objected to these
hardball tactics.111 Though the deadline for passing the bill was just over a month away, the
majority had determined to try another anti-prerogative gambit. On 23 September, they resolved
that the old laws should be continued by a clause tacked to the revenue bill, rather than trusting
to the crown’s assurances that the laws would be continued if they passed the bill. The assembly
secured the leverage to get the bill passed in that manner, contrary to the crown’s instructions, by
withholding the final readings of the additional duty and quartering bills until the council agreed
to the revenue bill.112 Handasyd passed all three bills together in the afternoon of 2 November
1703, and then dissolved the assembly.113 He transmitted the revenue act home shortly thereafter,
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noting to the board “the great hardships and fatigue I have gone through obtaining these to be
made.”114
His letter, with the enclosed revenue act, did not arrive in England until 24 January
1704.115 Convinced the deadline had passed fruitlessly, the board had recommended on 13
January the confirmation of the 1688 act, but to extend another year’s time for the assembly to
pass a 21-year act that would supersede it. 116 These gyrations to avoid confirming the 1688 act
suggest that the metropolitan authorities feared the consequences in Jamaica of approving an act
so steeped in opprobrium. They would, of course, never explicitly say so, because the
prerogative in the colonies depended on the projection of strength and the ostensible rejection of
compromise. They therefore must have been mightily relieved to see Handasyd’s 27 November
1703 letter, which absolved them of the responsibility of trying to make good on their empty
threats. They told the queen on 3 February 1704 that “Colonel Handasyd has done your majesty
very good service, and deserves your majesty’s favor.” 117
Upon closer examination, they were less impressed. The board wrote Handasyd two
weeks later that the tack continuing the old laws “ought not to have been done […] inasmuch as
her majesty had promised to confirm the said acts as soon as the assembly should have passed
the act of revenue.”118 They warned him “for the future, to be more careful how you pass any
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such clause to the diminution of her majesty’s prerogative.” 119 Despite this censure, however, the
board evidently felt that this sacrifice of the prerogative was a price they were willing to pay.
After waiting for some months—possibly in hope that Handasyd would get a different act
passed—they represented in the 1703 revenue act’s favor in August 1704, and it was duly
confirmed.120 A twenty-one years’ truce in that particular controversy in Jamaica was once again
agreed.
But it was no more than a truce. The metropolitan authorities had risked the ire of the
Jamaican elite by threatening them with the confirmation of the 1688 revenue bill, offensive as it
was to White Jamaicans’ dearly held rights as Englishmen. But the threat had proven empty and
ineffectual. In combination with the leverage granted by the expiration of Jamaica’s fundamental
laws, it had produced only a reprise of the 1683 compromise. That revenue settlement had
proven to be insufficient for the colonial executive within a year. In 1704, with a second major
war with France well underway, the long-term provision the revenue bill provided was laughably
inadequate, and all parties likely knew it. Nevertheless, it was all the crown could manage.
The Jamaican elite also found themselves frustrated. In the assembly, they had
successfully played defense against the metropolitan authorities for fifteen years, denying fiscal
independence to imperial government in the colony. Thanks to the demands of the crown’s wars,
the assembly had also been able to ensure that their own commissioners collected the money
they voted in their annual aids to the revenue and the additional subsistence. However, the
assembly had been compelled to grant a new long-term revenue bill by the expiration of their
basic laws; had been frustrated in their major gambit to exclude the governor and council from
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any fiscal role in 1702; and had lacked the wherewithal to launch other attacks on the prerogative
in the service of their rights or interests. Most troublingly for the Jamaican elite, the crown had
denied them the rights and parliamentary powers won by their metropolitan kin as a result of the
Glorious Revolution, determined to govern in the colonies as though it were still the 1680s. For
people whose self-identification rested on their legal Englishness, this deliberate institutional
differentiation was galling, and it reinforced the Jamaican elite’s resistance to prerogative
government.
Once again, the fundamental conflict of rights and interests between crown and assembly
had escaped settlement, as both sides had shown they lacked the means and the will to force it to
a conclusion. However, the balance had shifted. The Jamaican assembly could not only wield the
rhetorical weapons of the Glorious Revolution against prerogative government, but had also
captured more of the power of the purse. No matter how piously imperial authorities had insisted
that those who reaped the benefits of security should dutifully help bear the burden, the Jamaican
elite had recognized that the spiraling costs of imperial defense gave them leverage. The
assembly had seized the opportunity to make the appointment of its own commissioners for
extraordinary levies customary. Full control of the revenue had escaped the colonial executive in
Jamaica, and it would never be recaptured. However, the Jamaican elite faced an uphill battle if
they were to parlay that small inroad into further gains for their rights and interests. For the
crown had never consented explicitly to the assembly’s appointment of commissioners. And
through its power to review laws, it retained the ability to strike down the assembly’s tenuous
alteration of the status quo at any time. The coming stresses of a second decade of imperial
warfare, and the ever-widening divergence between metropolitan and colonial institutions, would
provide both sides with plenty of crises to test which was the stronger.
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Chapter III
The Legacy of the Glorious Revolution in New York
The troubles of Jamaica’s Glorious Revolution experience paled in comparison to those
of New York. In Jamaica, William III’s overthrow of James II brought uncertainty, dissension,
and a halt to civil government. In New York, the same event provoked open revolt that
overthrew James’s government in the colony. The next two years of Jacob Leisler’s “stormy
rule” gave the revolt the name of Leisler’s Rebellion, and created, in Richard Dunn’s words,
“two fiercely partisan factions: the Leislerians and the Anti-Leislerians.” 1 When Leisler and his
son-in-law Jacob Milbourne were executed for high treason by the royal governor William III
dispatched, a lasting enmity between Leislerians and anti-Leislerians was confirmed. Unlike in
Jamaica, where the plunder faction-small planter alliance on which Albemarle had relied rapidly
declined in political and economic strength, both the Leislerians and anti-Leislerians remained
strong in New York for the next fifteen years. In Jamaica, the legacy of the Glorious Revolution
was defined by what did not happen—the abjuration of the illegitimate 1688 revenue bill and the
extension of the Glorious Revolution settlement. In New York, on the other hand, Leisler’s
Rebellion and its partisan afterlife meant that the legacy of the Glorious Revolution was defined
by the traumatic events that had happened.
So historians have argued, at any rate. Patricia Bonomi entitled her study of New York’s
colonial politics A Factious People, and has written elsewhere of “the relentlessly bitter factional
aftermath of Leisler’s Rebellion.”2 Her view is a typical one among historians of colonial New
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York, and those who write about imperial politics more broadly have tended to share it. 3
Scholars also generally agree that the existing strife was exacerbated by the “rage of party” in
England. The Leislerians in New York derived “much of their political platform” from the
Whigs in England, Amy Watson has written, and the anti-Leislerians “shared ideological
affinities” and personal connections with the Tories.4 Not all historians draw quite so close an
equation, but there is general agreement with Watson’s contention that in New York’s
“seesaw[ing] back and forth between the former Leislerians and Anti-Leislerians,” much
“depend[ed] on the currents of Whig and Tory power across the Atlantic.” 5 Tory governors sided
with anti-Leislerians, Whig governors with Leislerians, and thus politics “served to heighten old
animosities rather than diminish them.”6 The end result of New York’s bitter partisan strife was
to make the colony, as Michael Kammen writes, “unattractive to immigrants” for a decade, and
therefore “underpopulated and underdeveloped.” 7 New York had suffered greatly by the
Glorious Revolution indeed.
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This analysis is not faulty, but it is incomplete. Kammen himself suggests a different
angle, remarking that on the basis of the official documents, “political factionalism was only the
third most pressing public issue of the day, discussed less often than physical security and fiscal
responsibility.”8 This is misguided in one sense, for as Joyce Goodfriend makes clear, the
“massive cultural offensive” that the anti-Leislerian leadership launched against the Dutch in
New York after 1691 was an overriding concern, and neither principally nor openly revealed
itself in the transactions of governor, council, and assembly. 9 However, in another sense
Kammen points towards a very important consideration indeed, which historians have tended to
pass over—the interplay between New York’s partisan strife and the interests of the crown.
Moreover, in their focus on New York’s factionalism, historians have failed to apply Jack
Greene’s contention that “the specter of unlimited prerogative […] continued to haunt colonial
legislators” even after the Glorious Revolution settlement laid the issue to rest in England. 10
By considering the crown’s interests and the institutional legacy of the Glorious
Revolution, I tell a subtly but importantly different story. The “bitterly partisan political
environment” that prevailed after 1691 in New York might have been bad for the colony, but it
was good for the crown. The two decades after the Glorious Revolution were also two decades of
imperial warfare the likes of which neither England nor its colonies had ever seen, and the crown
needed funds from the colonies to sustain imperial defense. In Jamaica, where there were no
profound differences in the elite to exploit, governors paid the price for those funds with
concessions of the prerogative, or else received no funds at all. In New York, by contrast,
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governors often avoided making any significant concessions in exchange for funds by playing
upon the antagonism between Leislerians and anti-Leislerians. But New York’s factionalism
could neither consistently nor permanently sideline the colonial elite’s desire to secure the rights
of Englishmen. By the middle of the first decade of the eighteenth century, the New York elite
had followed the example of their contemporaries in Jamaica and elsewhere, and had engaged
the crown and its governor in an open battle for the all-important power of the purse, empowered
by the leverage that the crown’s imperial wars gave them. For them, as for the Jamaican elite, the
failure of the Glorious Revolution settlement to cross the Atlantic had confirmed their
fundamental conflict with the crown.
New York Before 1691
Like Jamaica, New York was a conquest of English arms, taken from the Dutch in 1664.
The Dutch population of what had been New Netherland, however, did not follow the example
of the smaller Spanish population of Jamaica and depart the colony. Instead, they stayed, and in
1691 were probably still the majority of the colony’s White population of about 14,000. 11 New
York therefore had a population “less English and more diverse than that of any other British
possession,” which was only exacerbated by the influx of French Huguenot refugees after Louis
XIV’s 1685 revocation of the Edict of Nantes. 12 New York thus had an elite divided by ethnicity,
which Jamaica in this period never did.
New York’s diversity, however, was not merely ethnic in character. Along with national
divisions came religious differences, with Dutch and French Reformed adherents outnumbering
Anglicans in New York in 1691. There were also religious fissures within the national
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populations, most prominently among the English. Dissenters from New England had settled
nearly all of eastern Long Island (Suffolk county), and were majorities in Queens and
Westchester counties, while other dissenters had come directly from England, making Anglicans
possibly a minority even in the English population. 13 New York also had, with Pennsylvania, one
of the two “best-balanced economies in colonial America.” 14 As a result, the colony was the only
one in British North America in which “both a merchant and a landed elite of roughly equal
strength emerge[d].”15 Moreover, there were further subdivisions within the two broad categories
of merchant and landowner. Some merchants were principally concerned with the transatlantic
carrying trade, some with the fur trade, and others with the provisions trade to the Caribbean. 16
Most landowners produced grain and meat for European as well as Caribbean markets, but some
concentrated instead on timber and mines, and flaxseed and potash would both provide further
variation later in the eighteenth century. 17 New Yorkers also had sectional concerns that were not
mostly derivative of these other differences. The starkest and most influential of these were the
different priorities that upstate and downstate colonists accorded to defense against the French in
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Canada and friendly relations with the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, and the rivalry between the
two urban centers of New York City and Albany. 18
New York’s political elite were thus susceptible to a dizzying array of divisions, far
surpassing anything seen in Jamaica. The multiple axes of differentiation not only permitted a
wide range of factional possibilities, but ensured that political groupings did not remain
consistent from issue to issue. A Dutch Reformed fur trader might well side with an English
dissenting grain merchant on the question of import duties, before breaking with him on the
question of the colony’s law system, and then possibly uniting with him once more on the
question of appointing non-Anglican ministers to livings. And, of course, each New Yorker had
an idiosyncratic weighting of these elements of identity, which further complicated the question
of political alignment.
These divisions were exacerbated by one of New York’s other distinguishing features—
its long lack of an assembly. There was no central legislature under the Dutch, who had first
made permanent settlement in the colony in 1614. After the English conquest in 1664, New York
became a proprietary colony under the duke of York, Charles II’s brother and heir, who was no
great friend of representative institutions. Under fiscal and political pressure in the early 1680s,
the duke granted New York an assembly in 1683. However, upon his accession to the throne as
James II in 1685, he then revoked the grant and ignored the assembly’s carefully drafted Charter
of Liberties and Privileges. For its first seven decades of existence, therefore, New York had
almost no experience of representative government, “one of the most effective forces for social
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and cultural cohesion,” and its elite lacked the rights and powers enjoyed by their counterparts in
almost all of the rest of England’s Atlantic colonies. 19
James II’s autocratic government came crashing down in England in 1688 at the hands of
his son-in-law, William. In New York, which had been subsumed into James’s Dominion of
New England, the fear of the combination of “popery and arbitrary government” combined with
the news of William III’s victory, a decade of economic malaise, and New York’s existing
pluralism to produce the overthrow of James’s government in spring 1689. 20 After New York’s
militia took the fort from the lieutenant governor Francis Nicholson, Jacob Leisler took over
executive authority in the colony, and the insurrection thus came to be known as Leisler’s
Rebellion. Leisler was not the poor, bitter Dutch chauvinist of his enemies’ later fables, but
instead “a wealthy, anglicizing […] ultraorthodox Calvinist” who ably and sincerely deployed
“vociferous anti-Catholic rhetoric.” 21 In the service of his beliefs, he relentlessly antagonized and
persecuted fellow elites throughout the colony who had acquiesced in James’s religio-political
project, to the point of open hostilities with the Dutch elites in Albany, and that was to prove his
downfall.
Anti-Leislerians versus Leislerians
Though Leisler’s adherents (called Leislerians) were mostly Dutch, William III seems
never to have contemplated trusting his rebellious countrymen with the governing authority in
New York. Instead, he dispatched two English army officers, Richard Ingoldsby and Henry
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Sloughter, as lieutenant governor and governor respectively in 1690. Ingoldsby arrived first, and
Leisler refused to acknowledge his authority, which resulted in fighting and deaths on both sides.
Sloughter then arrived in March 1691, and Leisler finally surrendered the fort at New York into
his care after some initial defiance, putting authority in New York back into the hands of a royal
governor.
The metropolitan authorities had charged Sloughter with two distinct tasks. He was to
prepare the colony for its defense against the French, and he was to inquire into the torturous
course of the last two years in the colony, with particular emphasis laid on the Leislerians’
accusations against “some of the inhabitants disaffected to their majesties’ government.” 22 Given
the circumstances of his arrival, however, Sloughter found that the second question needed to be
considered first. The governor decided quickly, arresting Leisler and his allies on charges of high
treason almost immediately. He then tried them in a court stacked with the Leislerians’ enemies
(called anti-Leislerians), who accused the Leislerians, with some justification, of “all manner of
felonies, imprisonments, and murders” in seizing power away from them. 23 The court
unsurprisingly convicted the Leislerian leadership, and sentenced Leisler and his son-in-law
Jacob Milbourne to death.
Sloughter’s sympathies certainly inclined to the anti-Leislerian side. He told the lords of
trade in May that the anti-Leislerians were “the principal and most loyal men of this place,” and
informed his patron William Blathwayt that “certainly never greater villains lived” than Leisler
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and the ringleaders of the rebellion.24 However, though the anti-Leislerians clamored for the
executions, Sloughter was rightfully fearful of the long-term consequences to political stability in
the colony if he approved them. He therefore sought royal direction before he took so fatal a
step.25 Nevertheless, the inalterable pace of transatlantic communications meant Sloughter would
have to wait months before hearing from Whitehall.
In the end, Sloughter decided against waiting, perhaps also fearing the consequences to
political stability if he deprived the anti-Leislerians of their gratification for too long. Instead, he
appears to have struck a mutually profitable deal with the anti-Leislerian majority in New York’s
newly minted assembly. Sloughter had Leisler and Milbourne executed immediately, assented to
a punitive bill against the rest of the Leislerians and their estates, and approved a bill for salaries
for the assemblymen. He also agreed to an act declaratory of New Yorkers’ rights, with the
central concession that there would be no prerogative taxation as in previous decades, but only
funds raised by legislation passed by governor, council, and assembly. 26 In exchange, the
assembly passed a bill raising £2,000 for the defense of the frontiers, a bill settling a revenue for
the next five years, and a bill granting a present to Sloughter.27 The executions were not
agreeable to the usual course of justice in the colonies, since Leisler and Milbourne were allowed
no appeal to the metropole. Moreover, as Sloughter had foreseen, the executions served to widen
the rifts in the colony, especially since “many Dutch believed that English officials were
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responsible for Leisler’s death.”28 However, Sloughter had served the crown’s interests in
defending its colony and financing its government, and had feathered his own nest.
He had done so at the cost of one signal concession. The English Bill of Rights had, in
1689, outlawed taxation by prerogative authority alone. Sloughter allowed the extension of that
provision to New York, which thereby brought New Yorkers’ rights more closely in line with
those of their metropolitan cousins. However, it is unlikely that colonial policymakers envisioned
taxation by gubernatorial fiat as a pillar of the imperial government in New York. Moreover,
since the declaratory act itself raised no money, the crown could repeal the act at its later leisure
with no impact on the fiscal strength of its government in New York. Sloughter had therefore
made a very favorable deal for the crown’s interests. And, though Whitehall professed an interest
in unanimity and calm in the colonies, only the partisan strife engendered by Leisler’s Rebellion
had enabled New York’s governor to score such a success.
Sloughter died shortly after making this arrangement with the assembly, thus escaping
any censure for the execution of Leisler and Milbourne. Ingoldsby succeeded to the executive
authority, securing votes for several thousand pounds more for the defense of the frontiers over
the next year. Enthusiasm for this service, however, had already begun to wane, with the
assembly complaining in response to requests for funds that “our neighbors, contrary to their
duty, deny to assist us against the common enemy in this time of eminent danger.” 29 Ingoldsby
and the council recognized the political and practical difficulty of further burdening their own
province, and instead wrote home several times requesting that Connecticut and New Jersey be
annexed to New York, and that the other neighboring colonies be ordered to assist them with
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men and money.30 In the meantime, the money voted by the assembly was collected slowly and
poorly, and many of the men detailed for service on the frontiers simply never arrived. 31
Ingoldsby and the council “had been obliged to engage their personal credit […] to defray the
charge” of the frontiers, and the revenue stood £3,000 in debt when the new governor, Benjamin
Fletcher, arrived on 28 August 1692.32
Fletcher was an experienced soldier who had served on William III’s behalf in Ireland,
and was also a personal client of William Blathwayt, who had retained most of his power in
colonial affairs despite the Glorious Revolution.33 Like Sloughter before him, Fletcher sided with
the anti-Leislerians. In exchange for assenting to further punitive measures against the
Leislerians, making enormous land grants to prominent anti-Leislerians, and turning a blind eye
to illicit trade and piracy, Fletcher secured a gift to himself of a penny per pound tax on property,
repeated revenue grants to the crown, and men and money for the defense of the frontiers. 34
Unlike Sloughter, however, Fletcher had made concessions to the anti-Leislerians that materially
harmed the crown’s interests. Though permitting illicit trade and piracy did enrich New York
City, Fletcher also deprived the crown of revenue from seizures, and contributed to the
heightened danger of piracy that all ships, foreign or English, faced in this period. And, as his
successor would later complain, “the rents reserved in all his grants are trifles,” which would
30
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bedevil any attempt to construct an independent revenue in New York on the foundation of quitrents.35 Like Albemarle in Jamaica, Fletcher had sacrificed those of the crown’s interests he
judged less important or practical in pursuit of immediate revenue and personal enrichment.
Also unlike Sloughter, who had scarcely had the chance, Fletcher participated in the antiLeislerians’ “cultural offensive” against the Dutch population. 36 As Joyce Goodfriend has
pointed out, the anti-Leislerians’ quiescence during the reign of James II made them “vulnerable
to charges of being too sympathetic to Catholics,” an unpleasant position in which to be given
the ascendancy of “the larger Protestant imperial cause.” 37 In consequence, they sought “to divert
attention away from religion to […] ethnicity,” seizing on the fact of “widespread participation
of Dutch residents in Leisler’s Rebellion” to change the characterization of Leisler’s Rebellion. 38
Rather than a religio-political struggle, which had motivated committed Dutch, French, and
English Protestants to bring down the colonial government, in the anti-Leislerian telling the
rebellion was driven by Dutch ethnic resentment. In order to ensure that anti-Leislerian Dutch
elites could also remain “on the correct side of the political fence,” the anti-Leislerians also
invoked lower-class economic resentments as a motivator for Leisler’s Rebellion, while praising
“most of the richest of the Dutch,” who had in this imagining aligned themselves with the
English.39 This artful reframing provided a justification to break the power of the Dutch in New

35

The earl of Bellomont to board of trade, 21 October 1698, CO 5/1041/209. There is no particular reason to suspect
that this accusation is inaccurate, given that all five of the governors who followed Fletcher down to 1732—
including the Tory Cornbury—also complained that the rates set on these grants were too low, and that the quit-rents
were consistently disappointing in the revenue they produced.
36

Goodfriend, Who Should Rule at Home?, 28.

37

Ibid., 27; Stanwood, The Empire Reformed, 145.

38

Goodfriend, Who Should Rule at Home?, 27,30.

39

Ibid., 40; Cornbury to board of trade, 27 September 1702, CO 5/1047/376.

110

York City especially, and to advance English elites’ aims. Key among these was asserting
Anglican dominance, and Fletcher, a good Tory, contributed his share. The governor helped see
a new Anglican church built, helped through the passage of an act establishing the Anglican
Church in New York City, and endowed the Anglican church with profitable land. Tory interests
in supporting the established church and Anglican English New Yorkers’ interest in establishing
dominance over the Dutch had aligned nicely. 40
Fletcher’s concessions and political alliances could not win him the ultimate prize for the
crown’s interests. Like William Beeston in Jamaica, “notwithstanding my many endeavors to
have it settled upon their majesties for life,” Fletcher was never able to secure a long-term
revenue act.41 Majorities in the assembly insisted repeatedly that “we have regard to the heavy
burthen and great poverty of the people of this province, who are ready to sink under it,” and said
they could not extend so long a revenue without the other provinces sharing the load for the
defense of the frontiers, which they well knew would never happen. 42 Moreover, the New York
elite undoubtedly shared with their Jamaican contemporaries a clear sense of their rights as
Englishmen, and the knowledge that retaining the power of the purse was both the best safeguard
for those rights and the surest foundation for furthering their interests. As Owen Stanwood
writes, the “colonists had no compelling reason to accept reforms that seemed to be against their
interests.”43 Partisan resentments could move the anti-Leislerians to make limited grants, but
never so far as to render the crown’s government independent of the assembly.
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Indeed, as the years went on, even raising money for the forces at Albany and elsewhere
on the frontiers became steadily more difficult. In 1693, a grateful anti-Leislerian majority were
willing to vote £6,000 and 300 men for their defense. 44 In 1694, after fresh elections, the
numbers fell to £2,660 and 170 men, and in the spring of 1695 a narrow Leislerian majority,
backed by seaboard elites tired of spending money upstate, raised nothing whatsoever for the
frontiers.45 Even the strongly anti-Leislerian assembly Fletcher convened in the summer of 1695,
after working strenuously to fix the elections, would only raise £1,700. 46 The appropriations in
Fletcher’s government would never again reach even half of those granted in 1693. Moreover,
these numbers were only nominal. Taxes were consistently in arrears by thousands of pounds, as
in Jamaica, and the full numbers of men allotted were never present. 47
Nor did the increase of New York’s garrison from two to four independent companies in
1694, at Fletcher’s request, lessen the burden to the degree the New Yorkers must have
expected.48 The soldiers were poorly disciplined, paid, and supplied, and could find much more
remunerative work as civilian laborers. 49 They consequently deserted frequently, leaving the
companies invariably well below their listed strength. Fletcher sought “to milk as much money”
out of this suboptimal situation as he could by filling up the muster rolls with his dependents. 50
However, his endeavors to press the assembly to pay recruiting bounties and supplementary pay
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for the companies were a source of continual friction. Nor, since the companies were
understrength, was the province freed from the necessity of sending detachments from the county
militias, to which the assembly consistently objected. 51 By the time the war with France ended in
1697, the Leislerian/anti-Leislerian divide had seemingly lost its power to motivate the assembly
to supply the government with funds.
Actions in London, however, would ignite the flame once more. Whig attacks on the
Tories in Parliament in the spring of 1695 had already combined with Leislerian lobbying to
produce a parliamentary act reversing the attainder of Leisler, Milbourne, and his other chief
lieutenants. At a distance of three thousand miles, Leisler was an unthreatening martyr of the
revolution the Whigs held dear, and his accusations of popery and arbitrary power were favorite
Whig stones to cast at the Tories. The new ministry then put forward Richard Coote, earl of
Bellomont, for the combined governorships of New York and Massachusetts. Bellomont had
been an early supporter of William in the Glorious Revolution, was one of the chief lobbyists for
the reversal act, and was “a friend of all the Junto lords.”52 In these changed political
circumstances, Bellomont was a perfect candidate for the governorship. Though the low priority
of colonial affairs created considerable delays, he at last received his commission to replace
Fletcher in March 1697.
At the same time, the newly constituted board of trade, dominated by Whigs, finally
reviewed the laws passed over the last six years in New York. Twenty-five had expired, nine
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were “laid by,” and twenty-two were confirmed. 53 These confirmations meant that New York
had permanent fundamental laws, which Jamaica did not. New York had thus experienced a bit
of luck. Though its elite had never been permitted to make lasting laws in an assembly util 1691,
once they did have that ability, the Glorious Revolution had already happened. The crown
would, as in the case of Jamaica, take advantage of the fruits of former policy to hold a colony’s
legal framework to ransom. However, in the new political atmosphere, the metropolitan
authorities do not seem to have contemplated recreating the Jamaican situation in New York
through their own actions. From 1697 on, the New York assembly was therefore in a stronger
position than the Jamaican assembly, because the crown did not have leverage over the
continuation of the colony’s basic laws.
One central aspect of metropolitan policy towards the colonies nevertheless remained
constant. One New York law—the 1691 declaratory act—was singled out for repeal. The board
noted that the act granted “too great and unreasonable privileges” to the assembly and to New
Yorkers at large, and “contain[ed] also several large and doubtful expressions.” 54 The declaratory
act was therefore repealed.55 Colonists, though they deemed themselves Englishmen, were not to
be allowed statutory confirmation of the rights metropolitan Englishmen had won in the Glorious
Revolution settlement. As in Jamaica, so in New York the project of colonial prerogative
government demanded that transatlantic institutional dissonance continue.

53

CSPC, XV, no. 1010. For a law to be “laid by” meant that its consideration was deferred until the effect of the law
could be more clearly understood, or until an aggrieved party launched a challenge. Colonists, unsurprisingly,
tended to resent the imperial authorities’ employment of this method, since the laws could be struck down at any
time. However, in practice, colonial laws were rarely re-considered once laid by.
54

Representation of the board of trade to the lords justices, 11 May 1697, CO 5/1115/65. They suggested a charter
along the lines of that granted to Virginia by Charles II, which would have been wholly unsatisfactory to the New
Yorkers. The lords justices duly noted this recommendation, and then all parties proceeded never to consider it
again.
55

CSPC, XV, no. 1012.

114

Leislerians versus Anti-Leislerians
Bellomont arrived in New York in spring 1698, well after the bad news of the declaratory
act’s repeal had crossed the Atlantic. Fletcher returned home in disgrace, facing an inquiry into
his support of piracy, extravagant grants of land, acceptance of bribes, and general and persistent
corruption.56 Bellomont also disapprovingly noted “the great pains Col. Fletcher took to divide
the people here, and to foment the feud between Leisler’s party and the opposite party.” 57 But
Bellomont was equally prepared to exploit the divisions in the province for his own and his
superiors’ gain—he would simply do it from the opposite side. He held political sympathies
almost diametrically opposed to that of his predecessor, believing that the Leislerians were “a
more sober and virtuous people, and better affected to his majesty’s government than the other
party.”58 Fortunately for Bellomont, there was not much more to be won from the antiLeislerians in any case, since they had already secured multiple measures punishing their
enemies, land grants to their most prominent members, and connivance at illegal trade. The
Leislerians, however, were now deeply aggrieved. Bellomont could offer them his assent to
reversals of the anti-Leislerians’ legislation, land grants of their own, and perhaps financial
recompense for damages the Leislerians had suffered, in exchange for their agreement to his
measures in the assembly.
Bellomont would need that assistance. He was relieved of the burden of financing an
imperial war, since peace with the French had been concluded in 1697. However, the enmity
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between France and England had not dissipated, and Bellomont’s instructions charged him with
fortifying the frontiers and making sure the Haudenosaunee “apply themselves to the English
trade and nation rather than to any other of Europe.”59 Moreover, Bellomont needed to make
money from his governorship. He was to be governor of Massachusetts and New York
simultaneously, a combination that conjured up the ghost of the Dominion of New England, in
order to increase the salaries he could draw to £1,600. Nevertheless, he would require more than
that yearly sum to satisfy his expectations and enlarge his wealth, having been in necessitous
circumstances for over a decade.60 Furthermore, the revenue that paid his New York salary was
only a year away from expiration.61 Bellomont would likely take any assistance the Leislerians
were willing to proffer.
Bellomont’s first assembly, however, did not have enough Leislerians to secure the
measures he wanted, and so he dissolved them in June 1698 after they had sat for less than a
month.62 In the new elections, the anti-Leislerians, led by William Nicoll, made a startling volteface. Having given strong support to Fletcher and the prerogative over the last six years, and
voted for multiple revenue extensions via duties on trade, Nicoll and his adherents now warned
the electorate “how dangerous impositions on trade are,” and argued that the revenue, “when
once in the crown for some time […] will never get out again.” 63 They hoped that the electorate
would not, by electing a Leislerian majority that would grant the revenue, prove themselves “of
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so abject a mind as willingly to quit […] liberty.” 64 The sudden anti-Leislerian adoption of this
position, when they feared the Leislerians were to be in power, indicates that the Leislerian/antiLeislerian antagonism remained more fundamental than disputes concerning the support of the
crown’s government. However, it also shows that leading New York politicians believed the
electorate was receptive to appeals against strengthening the crown’s authority, suggesting there
was a latent constituency for the sort of anti-prerogative politics that characterized Jamaica’s
struggles between crown and assembly. If New York’s partisan strife ever weakened, antiprerogative, pro-rights of Englishmen politics could come to the fore.
The anti-Leislerians’ new anti-government rhetoric, however, was no match for electionfixing backed by the power of the colonial executive. The Whig-dominated board had backed
Bellomont’s intention to excise “the corruption in the main body of the people of New York,”
and so he acted with a free hand.65 He effected considerable turnover in the offices of the
government, especially the sheriffs, who then “very fairly carried” the elections to the
Leislerians’ benefit.66 They returned sixteen Leislerians in the twenty-one member assembly,
headed by Abraham Gouverneur, Leisler’s most prominent living lieutenant. 67 The Leislerians
were aware of their leverage. They consequently passed a bill indemnifying Leislerians not
already pardoned, and repealed the previous punitive acts against Leislerians, before introducing
an extension of the revenue to 1706.68 Bellomont passed these bills, as well as another bill
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safeguarding the Leislerians from lawsuits, a bill against pirates, privateers, and those who traded
with them, and a bill “vacating the extravagant grants of land” in May before proroguing the
assembly.69
It had been a profitable exchange for both sides. The Leislerians secured their legal
protections, and some revenge on their opponents through vacating land grants to antiLeislerians and squeezing the anti-Leislerian-dominated illegal trade. Bellomont, meanwhile,
secured his salary and a gift of £1,500, larger forfeitures from pirates, privateers, and illegal
traders from his position as vice-admiral, and the ability to make new land grants in exchange for
favors or presents. Conveniently for Bellomont, securing the revenue, suppressing piracy and
illegal trade, and vacating land grants with no quit-rents also served the crown’s interests. Once
again, the Leislerian/anti-Leislerian enmity had proven fruitful for the crown and its governor.
Bellomont’s other efforts at self-enrichment, and politics in England, complicated
matters. William Kidd’s turn to piracy, after Bellomont and members of the Whig junto had
sponsored him on an anti-piratical mission to the Indian Ocean, damaged Bellomont’s credibility
and political capital along with that of his patrons.70 The Kidd affair was one of the last straws
that broke the back of the junto ministry, which William replaced with a Tory-dominated
grouping in 1700. A more Tory board then received voluminous complaints about the 1699 acts
of the New York assembly. Merchants with business in New York complained of the stifling of
legal trade, and anti-Leislerians and their Tory sympathizers complained of everything. 71 The
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board, with metropolitan political reasons not to gratify Bellomont, temporized. They sent a
request to Bellomont for more information on the extravagant grants, while withholding
determination on most of the other laws. 72 They did, however, reject the pirate law, while
confirming the revenue extension and Bellomont’s present. 73
Bellomont characterized these actions as a betrayal of his negotiations. He angrily told
the board that if he had not assented to the several acts for the Leislerians’ benefit, “the revenue
had never been obtained.”74 If the board were now to reject them, it “would be a great
mortification and discouragement to those people that gave the revenue (against the humor and
endeavors of an adverse party) to show their loyalty and affection to the king.” 75 By accepting
the revenue extension, which was unequivocally favorable to the crown’s interests, but passing
nothing useful to the assembly, the metropolitan authorities had planted the seeds of resentment
and distrust among the Leislerian majority in the assembly. Whitehall had ensured that any
governor’s subsequent negotiations with the assembly would be more difficult and painful.
Those negotiations were already necessary. Some of the Leislerian leadership might have
been Dutch, but they were all happy to embrace the idea of the rights of Englishmen, and they
had every reason to pursue the power of the purse. Despite Bellomont’s assent to their measures,
therefore, the Leislerians had proved no more willing than the anti-Leislerians to make an
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addition to the inadequate revenue or pay off the colony’s debts. This “conjunction of affairs”
had forced Bellomont to agree to a bill for building fortifications on the frontiers that appointed
“commissioners to direct in the matter” in the autumn of 1700. 76 Though he knew this was
“derogatory to the king’s prerogative,” he had no other choice if he wanted the fort built. 77 The
assembly had wrung this concession out of Bellomont only on the basis of the comparatively
light demands of peacetime. By 1701, however, war with France loomed once more, and New
York’s governor would have to negotiate for new supplies with an assembly that had already
voted some £27,000 in extraordinary taxes to finance the last war, and now had damaged trust in
the colonial and metropolitan executive.78
The Fundamental Struggle Revealed
That task would not fall to Bellomont, for he died on 5 March 1701. His successor was
Edward Hyde, viscount Cornbury, a prominent Tory. Cornbury was also the cousin to the heir to
the throne, Princess Anne, and was therefore the most august person yet to hold the governorship
of New York. Like all the royal governors of New York before him, he also had served in the
army. With the certainty of war with France on the horizon as Cornbury departed for New York
in the winter of 1702, the metropolitan authorities must have imagined that experience would
stand him in good stead.
Cornbury’s greater challenge, however, would be the internal politics of his new
governorship. Upon Bellomont’s death, lieutenant governor John Nanfan had been absent in
Barbados. The resulting controversy between the Leislerians and anti-Leislerians in the council
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as to who held governing authority had rebounded across the Atlantic to trouble the board and
the privy council. Prompted by this most recent instance of a decade of partisan strife, the
metropolitan authorities armed Cornbury with a new instruction. The board noted that “the
inhabitants of his majesty’s said province have of late years been unhappily divided,” and
concluded that “by their enmity to each other, his majesty’s service and their own general
welfare have been very much obstructed.” Cornbury was therefore to “avoid the engaging
yourself in the parties which have been formed amongst them,” and instead “to use such
impartiality and moderation to all as may best conduce to his majesty’s service and the good of
the colony.”79
The board’s analysis, on the face of it, was faulty. The divisions among Leislerians and
anti-Leislerians had allowed the last three governors to play the two sides off against each other
to secure revenue grants and funding for the crown’s wars. If anything, “his majesty’s service”
had benefited from “their enmity to each other”—though the same could not be said for “their
own general welfare.” However, the board’s prescription makes more sense in light of
contemporary thinking about parties. “The rage of party” in late Stuart England/Britain was so
intense precisely because contemporaries did not imagine that such political opposition was
legitimate. As Patricia Bonomi notes in her excellent study of Cornbury, “the other side could
not be seen as equals in a legitimate contest of party politics; it was a disloyal presence that
threatened the very existence of the nation.”80 The instruction “to use […] impartiality and
moderation” was not an instruction to accommodate those who were necessarily enemies of the
general welfare.
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Instead, with the Tories holding the ascendancy in England by 1702, Cornbury’s
instructions can be read rather differently. In the Tory understanding, aided by anti-Leislerian
revisionism, Sloughter and Fletcher had both sided with the richer, Anglican, English faction in
the colony in the defense of royal authority against a poorer, dissenting, Dutch faction. Though
Sloughter and Fletcher had perhaps done so too aggressively, they had aimed at embodying
correct principles of order, from a Tory point of view. Then the Whig Bellomont had arrived,
and taken advantage of Leislerian animus towards the “right sort” of people to throw the
government into palpable disorder, thereby harming both crown and colony. 81 Cornbury, a solid
Tory, was to restore the rightful Tory order of things in New York, while still exercising such
moderation and reserve as to prevent civil war. The Tories wanted the sort of consensus
produced by dominating the opponents of the rightful order. 82
This is partly conjecture, of course, for no one involved would have said this explicitly.
However, it seems the more reasonable to suggest because the Leislerians sought the analogous
end with their actions. In the winter of 1702, the Leislerians had already convicted Nicholas
Bayard, “the man many New Yorkers still blamed for Leisler’s demise,” of high treason for
calling the legality of the assembly into question, along with his associate John Hutchins. 83 Like
the anti-Leislerians had done to Leisler and Milbourne, so the Leislerians “attempt[ed] judicial
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murder” of their enemies.84 With a flimsier case than Sloughter had against Leisler and
Milbourne, Nanfan had reprieved Bayard and Hutchins on 30 March 1702. But the conviction
still hung over their heads, both angering and frightening the anti-Leislerians. Then, knowing
that Cornbury was on his way, Nanfan and the Leislerian majority in the assembly hurriedly
passed several bills in the spring of 1702, including one while Cornbury’s ship sat becalmed at
the narrows a few miles south of the city. Perhaps most offensive to Tory sensibilities was an “an
act for paying the debts of this government made in the time of the late happy revolution,” which
Cornbury called a charge “to pay the rapines of a rebel.” 85 The whole program was, in his
opinion, “contrived […] for the ruin of this province,” and he therefore recommended the repeal
of the assembly’s acts.86
Cornbury did not, however, wait for imperial authorities to act on that recommendation.
Instead, he met a new assembly controlled by anti-Leislerians on 20 October 1702, and swiftly
came to an arrangement with them.87 The anti-Leislerians voted Cornbury a present of £2,000,
raised £1,800 through a property tax for the defense of the frontiers, and passed a three-year
extension of the revenue, which would now expire in 1709. Cornbury, for his part, passed a bill
repealing all the major acts of Bellomont and Nanfan’s assemblies. 88 He also corroborated the
anti-Leislerians’ accusations against the Leislerians to the metropolitan authorities, replaced
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Bellomont’s Leislerian officers of the government with anti-Leislerians, connived at imprisoning
Nanfan for debt, and lent his support to a bill to vacate Bayard and Hutchins’s convictions. 89
Cornbury also furthered the anti-Leislerians’ retelling of the history of Leisler’s
Rebellion. Unlike Fletcher, Cornbury eagerly adopted the anti-Leislerians’ retelling of the
history of Leisler’s Rebellion in his letters home. He had already written the board on 27
September that “the chiefest, honestest, and richest of the inhabitants of this province had
suffered by the wicked contrivances” of the Leislerians. 90 The Leislerians, he contended, were
“Dutchmen […] the meanest of the people, men extremely ignorant of all things,” and they “had
projected the extirpation of the English here.” 91 He would continue in this vein for the next
several years of his governorship, aiding the English anti-Leislerian cultural offensive against the
Dutch. Indeed, Cornbury repeated the characterization of the Leislerians as “the black party,”
which Joyce Goodfriend has argued was a deliberate piece of “proto-racial political terminology”
designed to denigrate the Leislerians even further in a society “already primed to think in racial
terms.”92 The anti-Leislerians could not have asked for a more enthusiastic rhetorical support of
their project.
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Cornbury’s accommodation with the anti-Leislerians had come easily to him. As a Tory,
he sympathized with the anti-Leislerians, and restoring them to political dominance in the colony
benefited him as well as them. Moreover, though Cornbury had not perhaps used the utmost
“impartiality and moderation” as he was enjoined to do, he argued he had “espoused neither
party any further than the queen’s service and justice has obliged me to do.” 93 The antiLeislerians had not charged a price too dear for the crown. None of the support Cornbury had
won for the crown’s interests and his own had come at the cost of concessions damaging either
to the prerogative or to English material interests. And simply by behaving with a modicum of
calm, Cornbury “managed to lower the temperature in politically feverish New York” from the
heights of 1701-2.94
The anti-Leislerians in the assembly were naturally pleased with Cornbury’s passage of
the repealing act and his reversal of Bellomont’s appointments, which won the anti-Leislerians a
return to the pre-Bellomont status quo. Once that was done, however, the problem of Fletcher’s
later government revealed itself once more. The anti-Leislerians required little more from the
governor to secure their position against their partisan opponents. In consequence, when the
crown’s government needed money, the governor would have to offer a different kind of
concession, or else risk getting nothing at all—an unpalatable prospect in the midst of war.
The session of late spring 1703 revealed which concession the assembly desired. After
voting Cornbury only half of the £3,000 he requested to build batteries at the narrows, the
assembly politely asked Cornbury to write home on their behalf for leave to appoint their own
treasurer to handle funds “raised for the public use, as a means to obstruct […] misapplication
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for the future.”95 The governor they accused of misapplying funds was Bellomont, but it would
be Cornbury and his administration that paid the price. 96 The New York elite’s interest in
controlling the power of the purse, heretofore obscured by the partisan legacy of the Glorious
Revolution, was beginning to reveal itself.
Cornbury unsurprisingly did not comply with the assembly’s request, contrary as it was
to his instructions and to his own interest in exercising power. In 1704, therefore, the assembly
turned truculent. The majority challenged Cornbury openly on the sufficiency of the revenue, the
disposition of the men on the frontier, and the appropriation of money. 97 Cornbury reprimanded
them for “assuming to themselves to exercise a power vested by the crown in the governor
alone.”98 In response, the assembly claimed they were only exerting “that natural and civil liberty
[…] which they conceive every free Englishman is entitled to,” and argued that they “ought not
to be divested [of their property] but by their free consents, in such manner and to such ends and
purposes as they shall think fit.”99 Two days later, when the council sought to amend their bill
for the defense of the frontiers, the assembly followed the example of their Jamaican
contemporaries in resolving “that it is inconvenient for this house to admit of any amendment
made by the council to a money bill.”100 It had taken thirteen years, but the New York elite in the
assembly had now joined the Jamaican elite in opposing their governor in search of the power of
95
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the purse, in defense of their rights as Englishmen and their material interests. They too now
sought to bring the Glorious Revolution settlement across the Atlantic.
The trend across the colonies—though he did not connect these two specifically—was
apparent to Cornbury. He wrote the board that the New York assembly was adopting “the same
methods that the assemblies of some other provinces have fallen into, who think themselves
equal to the House of Commons of England.”101 Cornbury had corrected the New York
assembly, having “told them often” that “the holding general assemblies here is purely by the
grace and favor of the crown.”102 In his hierarchical metropolitan conception of the world, that
point ought to have settled the controversy. But, he observed, “notwithstanding that they will
pass no bill for the service of the queen, nor even for their own defense, unless they can have
such clauses in as manifestly encroach upon the prerogative of the crown, or in some measure
destroy the power of the governor.” 103 Like the Jamaicans, the New Yorkers were willing to
engage in brinkmanship over their own security, wagering that the crown’s desire to see its
possessions properly defended would impel the governor to agree to otherwise objectionable
bills.
Nor was their reluctance as absurd as Cornbury made it sound. Unlike the Jamaican elite,
who had fended off a French invasion in 1694 and always faced a serious security threat from the
Africans they enslaved, the New York elite faced no grave endogenous or exogenous threats.
Neither the French nor their indigenous allies had made any serious attempt against New York
after 1690 in the Nine Years’ War, and they would launch no attacks in the entirety of the War of
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the Spanish Succession. Moreover, as a very different New York assembly would note nearly
thirty years later, the majority of the representatives came from counties distant from the
frontiers, with little incentive to fund the defense of Albany or Schenectady. 104 Meanwhile,
though there was an enslaved African population in New York, Whites outnumbered Blacks
seven-to-one, in almost an exact reversal of Jamaica’s demographics. 105 In those circumstances,
the four independent companies of royal soldiers seemed sufficient. Any further colonial
expenditures on security would require the crown to concede powers to the assembly.
Cornbury, like most of his fellow governors, had no practical solution to this problem of
the transatlantic constitution. He told the board that in New York there had been government
without assemblies before, and “her majesty may exert the same power if she pleases.” 106 He
noted hastily that “the laying aside of assemblies […] is far from my thoughts,” but believed the
board should know “what I take to be the queen’s right, especially when assemblies begin to be
refractory.”107 The board made no comment on this implicit plan to threaten the abrogation of
representative government, but proposed no solution of their own. Instead, they pronounced that
Cornbury was right and the assembly wrong on the narrow question of the commission being the
assembly’s authority for existence, and left the matter at that. 108
In 1705, Cornbury tried to hector a new assembly into compliance, and faced even more
strenuous opposition. The assembly resolved unanimously to appoint a treasurer “for the
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receiving and paying the public monies” they raised in June. 109 Neither they nor Cornbury
receded from their respective positions in two different sessions, and so Cornbury prorogued
them for a year in October without a penny raised for the frontiers or the debts of the
government.110 It also became clear that Cornbury was not, as he had thought the previous year,
frustrated by Leislerians seeking a “Dutch assembly.” 111 Instead, though he was a Tory, and
historians’ usual analysis of transatlantic politics indicates that the anti-Leislerian “English
party” ought to have sympathized with him, many of them had in fact deserted him. The now
opposition majority were led by Philip French, Thomas Codrington, and Thomas Garton, all of
whom were English and at least two of whom had involved themselves prominently in antiLeislerian politics in recent years. 112 The Leislerian/anti-Leislerian conflict was no longer, for
these men and their adherents, the most salient issue in New York politics. Control of the power
of the purse, to defend their rights as Englishmen and to advance their material interests, had
now surpassed factional hatred as the key political contest.
Cornbury seamlessly switched rhetorical tracks from inveighing against Leislerians
specifically to castigating opposition generally. He claimed the assembly had been “misled and
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abused by two or three turbulent men, who never were nor ever will be faithful to the Queen nor
true to their country.”113 Cornbury’s rhetoric mirrored Beeston’s accusations against Totterdell
and “2 or 3 more republican principled men” in the Jamaican assembly not three years before. 114
As in Jamaica, this construction served the governor’s narrow ends and resonated with his and
his superiors’ worldview, while completely hiding the depth of principle that undergirded local
resistance to the measures pressed by the colonial executive. And Cornbury’s use of this rhetoric
indicated clearly that the fundamental conflict in Jamaica between crown and assembly had
emerged in New York.
Despite Cornbury’s bluster, the board seem to have recognized the outlines of the
problem. The crown needed to hold the strategic northern frontier against the French, and in that
endeavor “New York’s cooperation was essential.”115 With the assembly no longer willing to
extend that assistance in exchange for the governor’s intervention in the colony’s internecine
strife, some other compromise would have to be found. In February 1706, the board therefore
informed Cornbury “that when the assembly raise extraordinary supplies for particular uses
(which is not part of her majesty’s standing and constant revenue), they may be permitted to
name their own treasurer.”116 Since the colonial governments were absolutely dependent on such
“extraordinary supplies,” particularly in wartime, this was a substantial concession of the power
of the purse to the assembly. The impact was perhaps lessened by the board’s knowledge that
they had tacitly permitted the same concession in several other colonies, including Jamaica, by
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this time. But making the terms of the arrangement explicit was a new and risky step, and it
illustrated the pressure imperial warfare was exerting on the project of prerogative government in
the colonies.
The board were presumably aware of some of the implications of their compromise, and
therefore took pains in their letter to quash the assembly’s other aspirations. “No assembly in the
plantations,” they told Cornbury, “ought to pretend to all the privilege of the House of Commons
in England, which will be no more allowed them” than if the colonial councils tried to imitate the
Lords.117 Parliament in England, from the executive’s point of view, was already troublesome
enough. Colonial assemblies could not be allowed to become their own little Parliaments, no
matter how much their members believed that the powers and privileges of Parliament were
necessary to the defense of their rights as Englishmen. The problem was that the colonists would
never be satisfied with the transatlantic institutional dissonance that had prevailed since the
Glorious Revolution. New Yorkers had begun pressing for a remedy to this insult to their
Englishness later than the Jamaicans, thanks to their partisan struggles. But they would no more
heed the board’s pronouncements that they had no just claim to the rights of Englishmen than
would their Caribbean contemporaries.
The treasurer concession had its desired short-term effect once Cornbury received the
board’s letter in September 1706. The assembly were willing to raise £3,000 for fortifying New
York City, and at least £1,700 more for the defense of the frontiers, naming their own treasurer
in both bills.118 However, they still balked at extending the revenue, which would remain outside
their control. Cornbury therefore adjourned them in October, and then dissolved them in spring
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1707 from New Jersey, where he was dealing with an even more recalcitrant assembly. 119 He had
no more luck with his next assembly in the autumn of 1708, which ignored his call to reestablish
the revenue that was to expire the next year.120 Instead, a party led by the prominent New York
City merchants Stephen de Lancey and Philip van Cortlandt joined Thomas Garton and the
speaker, William Nicoll, in inveighing against the fees collected by the officers of the
government. Garton composed a resolution declaring that “the imposing and levying of any
monies upon her majesty’s subjects of this colony […] without consent in general assembly, is a
grievance and a violation of the people’s property.” 121 This castigation of taxation backed only
by the prerogative was a direct reference to the English Bill of Rights of 1689. It was therefore a
clear signal that the treasurer concession had not lessened New Yorkers’ discontent with the
failure of their rights and institutions to match those that Englishmen in England enjoyed. Faced
with this principled opposition from his former allies, Cornbury could secure only two small aids
for frontier defense and the revenue before adjourning the assembly to March 1709. 122
The Revenue Expires
Cornbury had not been inclined to press this assembly, for he had already known that his
replacement was in the works. In Britain, Godolphin and Marlborough had decisively sided with
the Whig junto by 1708. Cornbury, as a well-known Tory, was a casualty of that political
realignment. He was succeeded by John, lord Lovelace, an experienced soldier who was carrying
a heavy debt burden. With the revenue due to expire in May 1709, Lovelace faced the pressing
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need to win another renewal for the crown’s sake and for his own. He made the request to the
assembly in April 1709, but died a month later without much of a chance to secure its passage. 123
Even if Lovelace had not died, however, the assembly’s initial response had not been promising.
Lovelace had presented them with an estimate of the salaries “established to be paid out of the
revenue of New York” that amounted to £3,542, as well as a further £770 required for the
support of the forces.124 In response, the assembly had resolved to raise only £2,500 for a single
year, and had taken upon itself to decide which officers should be paid, and how much, in a clear
violation of the prerogative.125
Lovelace’s successor was Richard Ingoldsby, who had first arrived in New York to
confront Leisler twenty years before, and was only able to take up executive power because the
order for the revocation of his commission as lieutenant governor had been lost in 1706. 126
Knowing well that “when another governor came over he should be removed,” and that he was
anathema to the Leislerians still in the assembly, Ingoldsby had no incentive to urge the passage
of the revenue on terms agreeable to the crown. 127 Moreover, the imperial authorities had
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directed Ingoldsby to make preparations for an invasion of Canada. That project would require
further extraordinary aids from the assembly, thereby increasing their leverage.
In exchange for acquiescing in the assembly’s appropriation of the one-year revenue
grant, and assenting to a bill regulating fees that impinged on the prerogative, Ingoldsby secured
£800 for himself and £2,500 for the government. He also secured £14,000 for the invasion of
Canada, but it was to be paid in paper money, to which the metropolitan authorities were
consistently opposed for its regulation of the Atlantic economy in favor of colonial debtors. 128
Ingoldsby protested to the board that he would have preferred not to agree to multiple
transgressions on the prerogative, but given the assembly’s leverage, he had been “forced to
accept of what the assembly would give […] rather than let all the officers starve” and the
expedition go unfunded.129 The assembly had made their leverage tell against the governor.
Despite the profound differences between the two colonies, by 1709 New York politics
had converged with Jamaica’s in important respects. In both colonies, the central political issue
was now not partisan strife between major opposing factions among the elite. Instead, the
conflict of the colonial elite’s material and ideological interests with those of the governor and
the metropolitan authorities had become fundamental in both New York and Jamaica. Jamaican
politics had arrived at that point by the middle of the 1690s. In New York, two decades of the
demands of war, while Leisler’s Rebellion receded ever further into the past, had at last brought
politics to the same end. The Jamaican assembly had made use of the leverage granted it by
imperial warfare to take a part of the power of the purse it would never relinquish. The assembly
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in New York had done the same, with the additional security of an explicit concession from
imperial authorities that future assemblies would exploit to the fullest of their ability.
Other circumstances in New York still remained importantly different than in Jamaica.
The Leislerian/anti-Leislerian factional division was weaker but still extant, and New York’s
other economic, religious, and sectional distinctions persisted. A skillful governor might be able
to exploit them to win concessions. However, the ferocious bitterness engendered by Leisler’s
Rebellion, which had won the crown funds at little cost to the prerogative, was gone for good.
Moreover, the crown did not have in New York, as it did in Jamaica, the potent leverage of
temporary confirmation of the colony’s basic laws. As a result, with the New York revenue
expired as of May 1709, imperial authorities had no easy route towards securing a new long-term
grant. The governor would have to fend off the New York elite’s push to secure the Glorious
Revolution settlement while somehow still finding means to fund the crown’s impecunious
government during wartime. Ingoldsby’s successor would face a daunting task.
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Chapter IV
A Scotsman Abroad: Robert Hunter in New York, 1710-1719
Robert Hunter, governor of New York from 1710 to 1719, enjoys a sterling reputation
among historians. Patricia Bonomi calls him “an exceptional governor [who] easily dominates a
field where mediocrity of virtue and ability was too often the norm’; Eugene Sheridan says that
“few were more able or distinguished than Robert Hunter”; and Mary Lou Lustig writes that his
“New York administration [is] perhaps the most highly regarded in American colonial history.” 1
This high esteem derives from three sources. First, Hunter’s personal qualities were remarkable;
he was “a man of integrity, wit, and tact,” “an accomplished belletrist,” and “intelligent and
dashing.”2 Second, those qualities endowed Hunter with “an extraordinary political skill,” which
he used to bring “peace to New York after decades of vicious factionalism,” and thereby
“transformed an archaic, even anarchic, colony into a stable Augustan province.” 3 Third, and
most importantly, Hunter settled the colony’s accumulated debts of the last two decades and
established a revenue after its expiration in 1709. For Stephen Saunders Webb, this achievement
amounts to the imposition of “a politically stable, whig, Hanoverian military-fiscal state on the
province of New York.”4 Other historians do not go so far, but there is a consensus view that
Hunter “was leaving behind a more stable and prosperous colony than he had found” thanks in
large part to his own actions.5
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However, scholars have generally taken care to qualify these assertions. Despite her
praise of Hunter’s virtue, Lustig is also very well aware that Hunter aggressively exploited his
“executive authorities” to enrich himself and to silence his opponents. 6 Bonomi mentions in A
Factious People that while Hunter minimized factional strife during his tenure, he did preside
over and “sometimes nurtured the emergence of a new political alignment” of merchants versus
landowners.7 In The Lord Cornbury Scandal, she raises the most critical caveat of all. Hunter’s
three major compromises with the assembly, Bonomi argues, “opened the way for a decisive
shift of fiscal control—the famous power of the purse—from England to the province.” 8 Other
historians, from Jack Greene to Ian Steele, have agreed. 9 Hunter’s successes were won by
“compromising to placate competing interests,” and the prerogative in the colonies thereby
suffered in the all-important fiscal point.10 With one of its most competent servants at the helm,
was this really the best the crown could do?
The answer, I argue, is yes. The same structural constraints that had denied the crown a
favorable resolution of the Poynings’ Law crisis, had prevented the establishment of a permanent
revenue in Jamaica a generation later, and had brought about the expiration of the New York
revenue in 1709 were still in operation. The governor and the crown still had divergent interests;
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the metropolitan authorities still almost always had more important concerns than colonial
affairs; and the crown still remained unwilling to finance an administrative state in the colonies.
And neither the means nor the will for coercion were available to imperial authorities. The only
available method of governance was cooperation with local elites. Moreover, those elites wanted
to exercise their rights as Englishmen, to advance their material interests, and to lay a strong
foundation for both by securing ever more of the power of the purse. All those desires were in
various degrees of conflict with the crown’s prerogative and the material interests of
metropolitan Britons. As ever, if the crown or its governor wanted funded and functional colonial
government, they would have to make concessions.
Lustig has argued that “concessions to provincial oligarchs [were] not the principal
reason Hunter enjoyed successful administrations in New York and New Jersey,” claiming
instead that his ability “to utilize effectively the extensive powers” of his commission made him
a success.11 I contend, rather, that Hunter’s personal qualities allowed him to identify suitable
concessions, and then to defend them successfully and cogently to the metropolitan authorities,
in a way that few governors did. The effects of a governor’s exceptionalism, however, stop there.
Even a talent such as Hunter could neither reshape the fundamental contours of the transatlantic
empire nor escape the strictures of English political culture. The choice for every governor, then,
was simple (though difficult). Should functional colonial government be secured at the price of
the crown’s other interests? Or should the governor defend the prerogative to the fullest, trusting
that duty and obedience would produce a colonial support of government? Hunter’s compatriot,
Hamilton, opted for the latter as governor of Jamaica. Hunter, “a realist who had a chameleon
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quality,” chose the former.12 He did indeed secure stable and funded government for a time in
New York, after the colony had hit its fiscal low point. But he did so at the price of giving up,
forever, the crown’s undisputed control of the regular revenue in the colony. Even Britain’s best
colonial governor could do no better than this.
Hunter Before New York
Robert Hunter landed on 14 June 1710 as the new governor of New York and New
Jersey, at the age of forty-four.13 Like most first-time colonial governors, Hunter was no
administrator. Instead, he was a veteran army officer. He had fought in the Nine Years’ War and
the War of the Spanish Succession, rising to the rank of colonel. As an aide to the duke of
Marlborough, the captain-general of the crown’s armies in Europe and the most important
political figure in Britain, Hunter had fought in the great victories at Blenheim and Ramillies.
However, he fell out with Marlborough not long after, when he accepted the surrender of
Antwerp rather than leaving it for Cadogan, Marlborough’s favorite. 14 With the doors of military
advancement barred to him after the loss of his most influential patron, Hunter sought other
opportunities of advancement, and found them in the colonies.
Though without experience of civil administration, Hunter did have an extensive network
of friends and patrons beyond Marlborough upon whom he might call. A scion of impoverished
Scottish gentry, he had diligently nurtured his relationships with leading lights of the Scottish
nobility, including the earls of Stair and Orkney and the duke of Argyll. 15 A Whig by upbringing,
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he had also developed ties with the Whig junto, especially the earl of Sunderland and lord
Somers.16 And through his amateur literary and scientific efforts, he had enjoyed the society of
Jonathan Swift, Joseph Addison, Richard Steele, and John Arbuthnot, and was probably a
member of the Kit-Cat Club.17 Finally, Hunter had a burgeoning friendship with one of the most
essential cogs in the machinery of the governance of empire: William Popple junior, secretary of
the board of trade.18 These connections would all stand Hunter in good stead when lobbying the
metropolitan authorities for support.
Hunter possessed one more signal advantage for a colonial governor—significant income
unburdened by debt. In 1707, he married Elizabeth Orby, the widow of one of his former
military colleagues, and sole heiress to her father’s and her uncle’s estates. Her dowry lands
alone, which Hunter controlled jure uxoris, were worth £3,000 a year.19 Hunter therefore had the
income of an aristocrat, without the social pressure or inherited expectations of lavish spending
that came with an actual title. His financially independent status meant he did not come to the
colonies desperately seeking to retrieve a depleted fortune, as so many governors did. However,
Hunter certainly wanted to become wealthier, and the income a canny governor could draw
more-or-less legitimately from the pay and subsistence of the four independent companies in
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New York amounted to thousands of pounds. 20 Hunter therefore went to the colonies determined
“to make money” as well as to provide effective imperial government. 21
Hunter’s Colonial Education, 1710-1713
It would take every bit of Hunter’s skill to accomplish both of those ends, for the
metropolitan authorities had put him on a collision course with the assembly. He was to regulate
the fees taken by lawyers and officers of the state by ordinance in council, since the crown had
rejected the assembly’s attempt to do so by legislation. 22 He was to secure even more funds for
the defense and fortification of the colony than the assembly had already raised. 23 And most
importantly, he was to renew the revenue in the province, which had expired in 1709, without
giving into the assembly’s infringement on the prerogative. 24 The board imagined he would
somehow do all this while “avoid[ing] the engaging […] in any parties,” and “reconciling all
differences amongst them,” though the past two decades of New York history indicated the
opposite.25
Before confronting the assembly with this ambitious agenda, however, Hunter had
another major duty to discharge. He had come over with 3,000 “Palatine” refugees, who had fled
the devastation of war in the Rhineland.26 Hunter had embraced and promoted a project of
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putting them to work making naval stores in New York, which was intended to lessen Britain’s
dependence on Scandinavia and Russia for those supplies. 27 Hunter spent two months settling the
Palatines and directing their preparations, while securing an alliance with Robert Livingston by
contracting with him to supply the Palatines.28 He accumulated a considerable debt in this
project, but did so with little fear, since the treasury had promised to honor his bills for prompt
repayment. Then, on 1 September 1710, he met his first New York assembly.
The election results were not promising for Hunter, with only five changes in the twentytwo-member assembly that had refused to renew the revenue in 1708 under Cornbury. The group
that had spearheaded the opposition remained strong, with van Cortlandt, de Lancey, Nicoll, and
Garton all retaining their seats, and the Ulster county landowner Henry Beeckman lending them
his support.29 This party demonstrated they had the majority by electing Nicoll as speaker once
more. There were only two bright spots for Hunter in the elections—Livingston took an Albany
seat, while the New Jersey councilor and considerable landowner Lewis Morris made his first
foray into New York politics by winning the seat for the borough of Westchester.
Faithful to his instructions, Hunter opened the assembly by telling them it was “only your
duty, your interest, and common justice […] to provide a suitable support for her majesty’s
government.”30 The majority in the assembly preferred to start upon business closer to their
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hearts, bringing in a new bill of fees as well as a bill for settling land titles. 31 Not until 25
October did they resolve to pay Hunter 2,500 ounces of plate for his salary, which would be
raised by a hearth tax paid to and distributed by their own treasurer. 32 Besides this infringement
on the prerogative, Hunter also understood the sum to be “little more than half the salary
appointed by her majesty.”33 It was, however, just about the old figure that governors had been
paid before the crown had eliminated gifts in 1703 and doubled the governor’s salary in 1708,
thereby reducing the scope for mutually beneficial exchanges between assembly and governor. It
was little surprise, therefore, that the majority had decided on a confrontation to reduce their own
expenses and the governor’s fiscal independence.
With their resolution on Hunter’s salary, the assembly paired “an act for the more ease of
her majesty’s subjects.”34 Hunter and the council had refused to consider the assembly’s earlier
bill of fees, and instead had composed an ordinance settling the fees. 35 The assembly’s new act
therefore declared “that no sum or sums of money be, shall, or ought to be imposed, levied, or
exacted from any person or persons in this colony […] unless by consent of the people convened
in general assembly.”36 This startling assertion of their power over the purse verged on violating
the acts of navigation. But the deliberate evocation of the 1689 Bill of Rights demonstrated that
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the assembly were determined to defend their rights as Englishmen from arbitrary assessment of
fees. They were, of course, also motivated to keep as much of their property as they could, and to
deny the crown’s officers fiscal independence from the assembly. Together with the resolutions
on his salary, the assembly had served notice to Hunter that if he wanted any money from the
assembly for the support of government, he would have to cede primary control over the colony’
revenue to them.37
Less than half a year into his government, Hunter was not yet prepared to contravene his
instructions, nor was he sufficiently experienced to appreciate the practical limitations on his
sovereign’s rights. Instead, like Cornbury before him he scolded the assembly, who “lay under so
great obligations” to the queen, for “question[ing] her power of appointing such salaries for her
governors as she should think fit, out of the subsidies granted her for the support of her
government.”38 This haughty assertion of the prerogative backfired. The assembly further
reduced their support of government, expelled Hunter’s ally Morris on 9 November for
criticizing their refusal to comply with the queen’s instructions, and consistently refused to
“admit of any amendments made by [the council] to a money bill.” 39 Nor was the council
unanimous in support of Hunter. Abraham de Peyster, the assembly’s nominated treasurer, voted
against every resolution condemning the assembly’s behavior, and “appeared […] as an advocate
for the unaccountable proceedings of the assembly,” while Adolph Philipse also vigorously
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opposed the revenue bill.40 Frustrated and undermined, Hunter prorogued the assembly on 25
November until the following March, having achieved nothing for the support of the
government.
The realignment of New York’s political factions had clearly progressed further in this
combative and unproductive session of assembly. One can, without too much squinting, perceive
the outlines of an anti-Leislerian opposition to Hunter, given the presence of such antiLeislerians as Nicoll, Garton, and de Lancey in the majority’s leadership. However, Hunter’s
most prominent supporters, Morris and Livingston, were certainly not Leislerians, and few of the
rest had outstanding Leislerian credentials. Moreover, if the Whig Hunter had been frustrated by
the anti-Leislerian opposition, so too had the Tory Cornbury. The pattern of 1691-1703 no longer
held. Instead, merchants from Albany, New York City, and Long Island were joined in
opposition to renewing the old revenue based on import duties, while landholders from the
Hudson River valley supported it. The New York elite’s many identities precluded the division
from being quite that simple, with smaller merchants in New York City supporting the revenue,
landowners from Ulster county opposing it, and the elite in Queens and Kings counties breaking
in both directions on ethnic and religious grounds. 41 But the principal internal conflict was no
longer motivated by the bitter aftermath of Leisler’s Rebellion; instead, there was now an
economic contest with a distinct geographical flavor. It remained to be seen whether Hunter
could turn this new factional division to the crown’s advantage as his predecessors had done with
the old.
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This political conflict emphatically did not fit Webb’s model of a “tory party” against a
would-be “whig oligarchy.”42 It is certainly true that metropolitan Tories and the anti-Leislerians
had generally banded together, as had the Leislerians with metropolitan Whigs. And it is also
clear that some of the opposition to Hunter drew strength from Anglicanism and anti-Scottish
feeling, as did the Tories in Britain, while he received support from dissenters as did the Whigs
in Britain.43 Moreover, given the transatlantic community of English political culture, “some of
the more cosmopolitan colonial oligarchs were Whigs or Tories.” 44 But New York’s central
political issues were not the same as those of the metropole. There was no easy equivalent in
Britain of New York’s particular “pluralistic matrix of politics,” which included sectional
divisions over the burden of defense, English/Dutch/French ethnic tensions, and a near-equipoise
of merchant and landowner power. 45
The most crucial difference, however, was the balance of power between executive and
legislature, as Jack Greene and Bernard Bailyn pointed out half a century ago. 46 Parliament had
begun the contest of elected versus prerogative government in earnest in England in 1641, and
the Glorious Revolution settlement had ensured Parliament’s primacy in both formal and
informal fashion. That settlement of powers had not made its way to New York, however, where
the assembly was still fighting governor and crown both for the powers Parliament had already
won. “Whig” and “Tory,” as they applied to contemporary Britain, will not do. “Court” and
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“country” comes closer, as Lustig suggests.47 But the closest political parallel to the opposition to
Hunter comes from other English colonial assemblies, such as that of Jamaica, battling for the
rights that Englishmen enjoyed “at home.” There was no analogy for this in Britain, and
therefore metropolitan political parties could not coherently transfer across the Atlantic.
Hunter did not, of course, convey such an appraisal of the political situation in New York
to the board. But he did write them on 14 November to “tell you the pretended [reasons], and
then, as far as I am able to guess, the real ones” for the assembly’s refusal to renew the old
revenue.48 The “pretended” reasons were that the expedition to Canada and “the misapplication
of former revenues” had drained the colony’s resources. 49 Hunter dismissed the first argument
with some inexpert economic analysis, noting that the money for the 1709 expedition was a land
tax, while the revenue normally “arose by an impost of goods imported and exported, and by an
excise.”50 Only a land tax, according to his landowner ally Morris, would be “esteemed a
burthen”; duties on trade, contrary to the arguments of the merchants, had passed “without being
felt by the country.”51 Hunter had more sympathy with the second argument, despite terming it
“pretended,” since he could pin the colony’s indebtedness on Cornbury. 52 But the only solution
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he offered to the assembly was that the receiver general would provide more transparency in his
accounting, and never pay out more than he collected. Since this compromise did not
meaningfully advance the assembly’s control over the power of the purse, they disregarded it. 53
The “real reasons” were also twofold, which Hunter had learned “from private discourse
with the most considerable amongst them.”54 The first was the longtime complaint that the
neighboring colonies were not paying their share, which was borne out by the failure of
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Connecticut to provide even half of their quotas
for the 1709 expedition.55 Hunter’s predecessors had backed this argument to the board for their
own reasons. Unlike them, however, Hunter needed a revenue, and could not afford to suggest
that New York’s burden ought to be lightened. Therefore, he avoided confronting the assembly’s
arguments, instead suggesting that the colony had been a gainer by the supposed £20,000 per
annum the crown spent on its defense. 56
The second was that contrary to British practice, the assemblymen received six shillings
per session day from their counties. As a result, Hunter claimed that the assembly was overrun
with impecunious members desperate for reelection, who employed “the popular arguments of
having saved the country’s money” and would therefore always be “refractory in what relates to
the expenses of government.”57 Hunter therefore asked for the crown’s repeal of the 1701 act that
established the salaries, so that he could have “men of substance, sense, and moderation for
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representatives, who come with true intent to serve their country, not themselves.” 58 This was the
classist English argument for aristocratic amateur government at its finest, calculated for
maximum appeal to the metropolitan authorities’ prejudices. However, it was also, like Hunter’s
other arguments, a stark misrepresentation of the facts. In reality, most of the assemblymen were
among New York’s richest men, to whom six shillings per day made little difference. Their
“refractoriness” was not forced upon them, but a choice freely made.
Hunter suggested one last reason that he did not categorize as “real” or “pretended,” but
from his tone fits with the latter. He noted that the belief “that her majesty hath no power to
appoint salaries” had gained currency, with “this weighty argument to back it, that by the same
rule that [the queen] appoints 1200, she may appoint 12,000.” 59 This point did not deserve so
brief a dismissal, because it was absolutely correct. Reason, prudence, and justice might all
dissuade the crown from unilaterally raising the expenses New Yorkers were expected to bear to
whatever heights were desired. Then again, however, they might not. And New Yorkers in 1710
were wary of counting too heavily on the crown’s good sense or virtue, having had the rug pulled
out from under them in the matter of the 1709 expedition. Moreover, while the crown was
determined not to allow them Parliament’s limited right to decide the aggregate size of the civil
list, the assembly were equally determined not to permit the colonial executive to become
fiscally independent.
Hunter’s analysis did himself, the board, and reality itself a tremendous disservice. His
“real reasons” were real reasons, but so too were his “pretended ones.” Most glaringly, like
Carlisle in Jamaica, he had given the metropolitan authorities no account of the battle of rights.
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The assembly certainly did have their own material interests at heart in refusing to vote for any
revenue they did not control. However, the assembly also had genuine ideological interests at
stake. The power of the purse would enable them to defend Englishmen’s rights to property
against corruption, and to incentivize the governor against other exercises of arbitrary power by
controlling his salary. Any assertion of the crown’s rights in this regard would correspondingly
deny those of the assembly and their constituents. Hunter had omitted this argument entirely
from his letter to the board of trade, possibly because he knew the board would not welcome
hearing it, but probably also because he was simply unable to credit it. English governors or
colonial administrators, when colonists inconveniently demanded the self-governing rights of
Englishmen, had little difficulty in regarding those they governed as not properly English.
Hunter, though a Scot, was just as capable of doing the same. 60
Hunter suggested, for a remedy, that the metropolitan authorities wield the blunt
instrument of Parliament to smash apart the obstacle. He proposed parliamentary legislation for
duties on all imports and exports, as well as an excise on retailed liquors in all colonies north of
Maryland.61 Within a year of his arrival Hunter seems to have understood, and implicitly
acknowledged, the structural inability of colonial governors to compel obedience from a resolute
legislature. He could not defend the prerogative while securing a revenue to support the
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government. Nor, however, was he willing to make concessions of the prerogative in exchange
for money. And with an anti-revenue party in the majority in the assembly, he could not play one
party off against another to get his funds, as Fletcher and Bellomont had done. The only way to
solve the problem in favor of the crown, in Hunter’s mind, was to preview the crisis of the 1760s
and 1770s by replacing the undesirable outcomes of local self-government with direct and
theoretically unchallengeable imperial action.
Hunter’s letter arrived in London on 2 January 1711, to a vastly changed political scene.
The queen had dismissed Godolphin on 7 August 1710, with Hunter’s Whig junto patrons
following shortly thereafter, and Harley now headed a Tory ministry. However, the board of
trade remained largely unchanged. They responded rapidly, repeating Hunter’s flawed and
incomplete conclusions to the queen and the privy council in a representation of mid-February. 62
The board advised that the assembly be scolded for actions “justly displeasing to your majesty,”
and that Hunter press them again on renewing the revenue. 63 Should the assembly persist in their
recalcitrance, Hunter was to tell the assembly that “their refusal or neglect will give a just
occasion to the passing an act by the parliament of Great Britain for granting to your majesty the
[…] revenue” customary since 1692. 64 The privy council accepted these recommendations, and
the draft of such an act was ready to be laid before Parliament by 15 March. 65
Surprisingly, the Tory administration had agreed with Hunter. They probably preferred to
threaten parliamentary legislation without carrying through, which was why they had enjoined
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Hunter to warn the assembly of the plans afoot in London first. However, after previously
ignoring requests from governors for parliamentary legislation to solve their difficulties with the
New York assembly, the metropolitan authorities had now directed a bill to be introduced in
Parliament. While previous attempts had centered on peripheral matters, Hunter sought to defend
the crown’s right to collect and dispose of its revenue to support its government, which was the
heart of the prerogative in the colonies.66 Parliamentary legislation to resolve a colonial issue
would, of course, legitimize and strengthen its authority in colonial affairs, weakening the power
of prerogative government for the future. In so crucial a point, however, the benefit might
outweigh the cost.
However, the prerogative and prestige of the crown had come under even more dire
threat during the Poynings’ Law crisis in Jamaica. Yet there was no hint of parliamentary
legislation then to enforce the crown’s measures. The challenging situation Charles II and his
ministers faced with parliamentary opposition in the form of the Exclusion Crisis provides a
partial explanation. Legislation on Jamaica would have been more likely to oppose the crown
than support it. Moreover, since the Poynings’ Law crisis in Jamaica, the Glorious Revolution
and twenty years of war had made the crown less independent of Parliament both practically and
ideologically, and commensurately weakened the prerogative. Parliament’s intervention in
colonial affairs was thus both more necessary and more palatable. 67 The proposed New York act
would nevertheless still be a new step, both in its specificity to a single colony and in its subject
matter, and if passed it might well portend a seismic shift in colonial governance.
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One thing had not changed. Colonial governors who needed their salaries and expenses
could not afford to wait for letters to cross the Atlantic and resolutions to be taken in London.
Hunter’s independent means would normally have relieved him of this necessity, but the new
commission of the treasury had yet to honor the bills he had drawn on them for the Palatine
project, involving Hunter in a debt of over £10,000. 68 However, the old assembly refused to act,
holding that, as in Cornbury’s time, Hunter had dissolved them by illegally proroguing them
from New Jersey.69 New elections did Hunter no favors, returning all of his former opponents. 70
That assembly’s first priority, however, was to raise men and over £10,000 for a new
expedition to Canada, which they did while once again complaining of the unequal burden. The
expedition then met disaster on 18-19 August, when several ships ran aground in the fog in the
St. Lawrence and some nine hundred aboard died. With the abandonment of the expedition
shortly thereafter, the New York assembly had financed two invasions of Canada in three years
to no purpose. They were consequently in no mood to empower Hunter. Their bill for the support
of government raised £3,874 for the next year only, directed that sum into the hands of their
treasurer, and was accompanied by a bill of fees and another stripping Hunter of the power to
appoint sheriffs.71 The council sought to strip the objectionable provisions from the support bill,
and once again the assembly denied the council’s right to amend money bills.
This time, the council escalated the conflict. They claimed that they had as much right in
the legislature as the assembly did, since both bodies were constituted “by the mere grace of the
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crown, signified in the governor’s commission.”72 The assembly’s response was immediate and
explosive. On 17 November, they declared that “the inherent right the assembly have to dispose
of the money of the freemen of this colony does not proceed […] from the crown, but from the
free choice and election of the people, who ought not to be divested of their property (nor justly
can) without their consent.”73 Rather than quietly accept the council’s historically accurate point
on the origin of the assembly, the assembly trumpeted their perceived moral truth. In language
deliberately reminiscent of their understanding of Magna Carta, the assembly asserted that their
power of the purse derived solely from the people. The rights of Englishmen demanded that it be
so.
The assembly probably did not intend to take an unequivocal constitutional position with
regards to the extent of the prerogative. However, it was clear that a majority in the assembly
meant to wield the entire power of the purse in New York, and would attack any element of the
prerogative that stood in the way. Since the prerogative in the colonies fundamentally depended
on control of a steady revenue, the assembly’s assertion could therefore be viewed as a broad
assault on the crown’s authority.
The assembly only strengthened this perception with resolutions, like those in Cornbury’s
time, that Hunter and the council’s establishment of fees and a chancery court were “contrary to
law […] and of dangerous consequence to the liberty and property of the subjects.” 74 Hunter
prorogued the assembly immediately afterwards, and wrote the board that “her majesty’s letters
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patents and the power granted by them [are] set at nought.” 75 He feared that the assembly
intended to force the crown, through lack of revenue, “to a concession that they may new garble
their government after the Connecticut model,” in which the assembly held all the reins of
power.76This sincere assertion also served a performative purpose. By “appear[ing] to the tory
ministry to be starving himself, in support of the crown, in a contest with an aggressive, even
independence-minded, assembly,” Webb argues, Hunter insured himself against recall. He
showed the crown he was doing his duty in fighting for the prerogative, and made New York
seem “an unattractive post,” despite the income from the four independent companies. 77 All
parties in New York now waited to see who had persuaded Whitehall best.
The board had repeatedly pressed for the introduction of the New York revenue bill into
Parliament in 1711 and 1712, warning that inaction would provide a “very ill example to her
majesty’s other governments in America, who are already but too much inclined to assume
pretended rights tending to an independency on the crown.” 78 But Tory retribution against the
Whigs, the ministry’s own internal dissension, and struggles over the treaty to end Britain’s
involvement in the war with France consumed all of Parliament’s attention. As in 1680, the
tertiary priority of colonial concerns precluded metropolitan intervention.
All the board could offer Hunter in return for his assiduous correspondence and lobbying
was epistolary support. They wrote him on 13 November 1711 to reject the assembly’s position
on money bills, independently pointing out that “by virtue of [the queen’s] commission they only
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sit as an assembly.”79 On 12 June 1712, after the ministry once more ignored their
recommendations, the board took a risky step further. Agreeing with Hunter that the assembly
had violated the constitution of New York and the prerogative in “assuming a right no ways
inherent in them,” they authorized him to make a threat. 80 If no revenue were settled in New
York, he could tell the assembly that “such measures will be taken here as may be effectual to
assert her majesty’s undoubted prerogative in that province, and to provide for the necessary
support of that government.”81 Of course, the measures the board had suggested had not even
glimpsed the inside of Parliament, making this threat even weaker than that the board had backed
in Jamaica a decade before. If the New York assembly called the board’s bluff, the imperial
authorities would have no means of compulsion to hand, and the prerogative, so dependent on
the appearance of strength, would have its weakness revealed.
Long before the board’s 12 June letter could arrive in New York, however, Hunter had
met the assembly once more. He had waited several months for news or instructions from
Britain, but had received nothing more than the board’s discouraging 13 November 1711 letter.
Hunter had received no salary for nearly two years, and the debt for the Palatines’ subsistence
had ballooned to £20,000.82 With no prospect of aid from Britain, Hunter’s financial situation
drove him back to the assembly in the spring of 1712.
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This time, however, he had some reward for his labor, when the assembly passed a bill to
pay him 8,025 ounces of plate for “barely the salary due” to Hunter for the past two years. 83
Some assemblymen might have been intimidated by the board’s 13 November 1711 letter; some
might have been persuaded by the arguments of Hunter and his allies; and some might have felt
that now was the moment to get the governor in their debt. Certainly their largesse did not extend
to respect for the prerogative. The act made no mention of the receiver general, instead directing
the treasurer to pay Hunter “out of any public money now in his hands or that shall be by him
received.”84 Hunter could construe this in conformity with his instructions since the money was
technically an extraordinary supply, and not a revenue. He was worried enough about the
technicality, however, to plead to the board that he “was under a necessity to accept the act,”
given his financial straits.85
Hunter expanded on this point to the board after the 26 June 1712 close of the session. If
he “could be prevailed on to put my private interest in competition with her majesty’s,” he wrote,
“I should have but little difficulty in getting my own salary, the assembly […] professing the
greatest willingness to make me easy.” 86 This neatly encapsulated one of the most intractable
problems in colonial governance. The governor’s interests were not identical with those of the
crown, particularly if his income sank below the level of his expectations. In those
circumstances, an ideological commitment to defend the prerogative waned in the face of
pecuniary losses. Hunter had already given way to a slight encroachment on the prerogative for
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the sake of his own interest. In mentioning the assembly’s “willingness to make him easy” in
conjunction with his approval of the act paying him 8,025 ounces of plate, Hunter signaled to the
board that he could and might do it again unless the metropolitan authorities took action. He also
took pains to indicate the size of the concession he would have to make: “unless I would give up
her majesty’s prerogative of appointing her own officers, and rewarding their services, divert the
channel through which the receipt of her money has ever run, and […] reserve nothing but the
name of government, it is in vain to expect from these men any manner of support.” 87 By
couching the issue in these terms, however, Hunter preserved a useful ambiguity. His letter could
be read either as warning of the damage that would be done to the crown if his circumstances
forced him to agree to bills impinging on the prerogative, or as trumpeting his virtue in standing
firm against such blandishments if he could avoid doing so. He thereby managed forcefully to
indicate that the metropolitan authorities had to solve the problem of his interests diverging from
those of the crown without clearly admitting that such a divergence existed.
Hunter could make no further progress with the revenue until the board’s 12 June letter
arrived, with its threat of a parliamentary settlement of the New York revenue, on 22 October. 88
For the next nine days debate raged in the assembly on its contents. 89 Hunter remarked that “the
indecent heats and undutiful expressions in their house upon the reading your lordships’ letter are
not fit to be repeated.”90 Of course, the board had threatened the assembly with an abrogation of
the most critical part of their authority—the power of the purse—just as the assembly were
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striving to secure that power tightly to themselves. Moreover, the board had haughtily denied the
assembly’s claims made in defense of the rights of Englishmen. An intense and angry debate
ought to have been expected.
In the end, the assembly did resolve to pay Hunter, the chief justice, and several other
officers certain sums of money. However, Hunter was deeply suspicious. He wrote Popple junior
that the assembly had done so only “to put off or defeat the intention of their lordships” while not
retreating from their core position on the power of the purse. 91 Instead, Hunter claimed they had
slashed all salaries, did not intend to fund their resolution, and were “bantering” the government
with bills inimical to the prerogative.92
Small wonder, therefore, that the assembly approved an address to the queen on 4
November 1712 in which they complained of “being prejudiced by misrepresentation.” 93 They
remonstrated as usual about the unequal burden of imperial defense, but added a new point to
justify their giving money to the treasurer. They claimed they had “borne misapplication of the
public monies, and the enormities of those clothed with a delegated power, as they have the
inclemency of the air, and other inevitable accidents and afflictions.” 94 New York assemblies had
of course done nothing of the sort, having doggedly resisted and vociferously complained of
their governors for years. However, in asserting that corruption in the crown’s officers was as
certain as bad weather, the majority in these assembly employed metropolitan-style “country”
rhetoric in legitimizing their proceedings on money bills. They argued that any colonial crown
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official unaccountable to the people whose money he collected would invariably indulge in
fraud. Only the people’s treasurer, chosen and supervised by the people’s assembly, could
“prevent such misapplications […] necessarily attending.” 95 Lastly, in order to make sure their
point of view predominated in London, the assembly requested royal instructions to Hunter to
pass a bill empowering the assembly to appoint its own agent in England. 96
Not long after, Hunter dissolved the assembly and called for fresh elections. He had little
hope of change, but told the board it was his duty to dissolve an assembly that had “fixed the
name of slavery upon the supporting the government in the manner her majesty has been pleased
to direct, and that of liberty on their own rash resolutions and practices.” 97 Perhaps most
unforgivably, the assembly had “taught the thoughtless people to speak after them.” 98 Like any
good English politician, Hunter would happily have “taught the thoughtless people to speak
after” him, although he would have instead referred to the good sense of the “generality of the
people.”99 Hunter’s problem was that the prerogative paled in popularity next to local control of
the power of the purse. He had to settle, therefore, for second best— accusing his opposition of
consorting with the demon popularity, knowing such imprecations would at least find a ready ear
in London.
Hunter could expect no substantive aid from that city, however. The board had once
again sought to get the New York revenue bill introduced into Parliament. Thanks to the good
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offices of the earl of Dartmouth, the former head of the board and now secretary of state for the
south, the bill got as far as a privy council recommendation before it stopped. The settlement of
the peace of Utrecht and Tory political intrigue once again crowded out anything else.
Hunter therefore redoubled his efforts for the 1713 election. In an unsigned election
pamphlet, he compared the assembly’s appointment of a treasurer to the Long Parliament’s
attack “on all laws human and divine, the constitution, and at last the precious life of their
sovereign of ever-blessed memory.”100 The scurrility of the comparison must have inflamed the
electorate. But it did inadvertently illustrate the nature of the conflict. Though Parliament’s
power of the purse had become an integral component of the rights of Englishmen at home,
Englishmen abroad were still bitterly contending with the crown over control of the revenue. The
calendar read 1713, but in constitutional time it was still 1641 in the colonies.
More substantively, Hunter also issued a writ for previously unrepresented Dutchess
County to return an assemblyman. The monarch was endowed with the right to add more
members to the assembly by a 1692 act, and Hunter took advantage of his position as the queen’s
commissioned governor to exercise that right in her name. His action, in the service of his own
and the crown’s interests, was technically legal but had the whiff of arbitrary power, and it was a
pattern to which Hunter would hew for the rest of his governorship. Less skillful or wary
governors, such as Hamilton in Jamaica, either failed to perceive or chose to disregard the
distinction, and they paid for it in the bitterness and success of the opposition to them and their
measures. Hunter, by contrast, would achieve moderate success of his own through the dubiously
legal exercise of executive power.
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In 1713, however, that success was still years in the future. Hunter complained to Popple
junior after the elections that “all the avowed opposers of her majesty’s interest [were] chosen
again, and avowedly for that end.”101 In his frustration, he warned Popple junior that he was
likely to dissolve the assembly soon after they met to deprive them of the pay they expected. 102
After that, he would make “a general alteration in the commissioners of peace and militia, that ill
men may no longer use her majesty’s authority against her,” and likely also to fix the new
elections as Albemarle had done in Jamaica in 1688. 103 Hunter was only slightly more
conciliatory to the assembly. If they did not act “to avert the consequences which threaten you,”
he told them, then like Pontius Pilate he would “wash my hands of them, and leave them at the
door of those who with both their hands have drawn them down.” 104
These threats had some effect, as the assembly passed a bill allocating £2,800 to support
the government for the ensuing year. The bill was hardly satisfactory. It was seven hundred
pounds short of the regular salaries of the government’s officers, made no allowance for
maintaining the garrisons, and directed the bulk of the funds to the treasurer. There was no
reasonable way to term this bill an extraordinary supply, and thus justify the treasurer’s
inclusion. However, the need for funds forced Hunter and the council to compromise the
prerogative for the sake of functional government. They passed the bill on 1 July 1713. 105
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Hunter drew the line, however, at passing the assembly’s other major legislation of the
session. After working their way through a twenty-year backlog of claims, the assembly’s debts
commissioners had made their report in June 1713. 106 The assembly had thereupon passed an act
“appropriating the excise to the payment of the public debts for twenty years,” but without
enumerating the debts or specifying the manner of payment. 107 Hunter feared, if he passed the
twenty-year excise, that the assembly would outflank him, and he would have passed “an act for
lodging considerable sums in the hands of a country treasurer for purposes which I am a stranger
to, and which may be applied to worse uses than anybody dreams of at present.” 108 Hunter also
knew, however, that debts owed to him might well be included. He therefore delayed the formal
consideration of an act potentially so harmful to the prerogative, rather than refusing his assent
point-blank.
Hunter the Pragmatist, 1713-1716
Before meeting the assembly again, Hunter received the entirely expected news of the
board’s failure to get the revenue bill into Parliament. His attentive correspondence with the
board and their secretary had been rewarded with lobbying on his behalf. But the board could not
prevail against its structural disadvantages in formulating policy, and Hunter’s friends were out
of power. He was very much alone, tasked with defending the crown’s interests while receiving
no aid from home. He had tried to persuade or frighten the assembly into voting a revenue that
respected the prerogative. That had failed. He had sought to secure parliamentary legislation to
enforce a revenue on New York. That too had failed. Coercion, with his four underpaid,
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underfed, and understrength independent companies, was not a possibility, and was therefore not
even considered.109 After three years of frustration, Hunter seems to have decided that effective
government for New York demanded compromise.
In that vein, Hunter evidently decided to support the assembly’s projected settlement of
the public debts. He informed the assembly in October 1713 that he had passed the excise bill, it
now “being perfected” by the council. 110 However, the only changes the council could have
made without the assembly’s agreement were grammatical, so this seems to have been a fig leaf
to cover Hunter’s concession of a point he had only three months before regarded as inimical to
the prerogative. Hunter then urged the assembly to pass a public debts bill financed by the excise
bill in October 1713 and then again in March 1714.111 As with the support bill passed in 1712,
Hunter could justify these proceedings by regarding the excise bill as an “extraordinary supply”
to pay the public debts, and not a revenue. However, levying and appropriating the excise for
twenty years would stretch that definition to its limit. In addition, the public debts bill would
provide for the salaries the revenue ought to have covered in the previous years of Hunter’s
government, thus suggesting its interpretation as a retrospective revenue bill. Moreover, the sums
were all to be directed into the hands of the receiver general. Hunter had warned the board in
1712 that, without support from home, he would be forced to “divert the channel through which
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the receipt of [the crown’s] money has ever run” to fund the government and his own interests. 112
Now his warning had become reality.
The settlement of the debts was extremely contentious in the assembly. From 31 March
to 25 May 1714, the assembly conducted hardly any other business, resolving into a committee
of the whole house on the debts day after day. 113 The debate was so contentious that an order was
made on 6 April to ensure that “while any member of the committee is speaking to any article of
the accounts or warrants under consideration of the committee, that said member be not
interrupted.”114 The journals, sadly, are laconic, and supply little further insight into what was the
subject of debate. Historians have tended to identify economic divisions on the bill. As Bonomi
remarks, “the main resistance […] came from the Assembly’s commerce-oriented members,”
because, Lustig argues, they objected to their “goods being taxed to pay off the debts of their
political and economic enemies.”115 There was also a division between those members rich
enough to be the government’s creditors, and those who were not, which did not align neatly
with the merchant-landowner divide.116 One remarkable speech, however, illustrates the
marriage of ideological and material interests in opposition to the bill.
Samuel Mulford, the longtime Suffolk member, had vigorously opposed the settlement of
the revenue under both Cornbury and Hunter. He was also Hunter’s foe in the courts, locked in a
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dispute with the governor since 1711 over whaling rights. 117 It was therefore no surprise that he
began his speech on 2 April 1714 by complaining of “the ill measures that have been taken […]
which may bring the subjects within [New York] to be tenants at will.” 118 The first of these “ill
measures” was the equation of a revenue with duties on trade, since New York’s revenue had
been raised by such duties since 1692. Mulford, a merchant, rejected the landowners’ assertion
that duties on trade would “insensibly produce” a revenue. 119 Instead, he believed that the
country was only now rebounding from being “twice so much damnified” by duties on trade, and
that reviving the old revenue would only lead to ruin. 120
The second “ill measure” was the former embezzlement of the revenue. Mulford alleged
that that the government’s debts, though caused by the crown’s officers’ embezzlement, were
“now endeavored to be turned upon the country as if they were their debts.” 121 Mulford
contended that New York could not be liable for those debts, since from the point it had granted
“sufficient […] into their majesties’ officers’ hands for the support of government,” the revenue
became the responsibility of the crown’s government and not the colony. 122 If the assembly
accepted the colony’s liability in the debts bill, however, Mulford warned that then the governor
would have the fiscal independence the assembly had never yet allowed him. The governor could
happily enrich himself and his cronies through ill-gotten gains, knowing that the debts could
117
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retrospectively be wiped out by a complaisant assembly willing to vote future taxes. Mulford
melodramatically asserted that New Yorkers would then become dependent on “the governor’s
good nature to let them have such part of their estates to live on as he pleaseth,” with the
assembly unable and unwilling to defend their rights. 123
Mulford therefore argued that the queen’s instructions to Hunter did not allow the
governor “to make as many debts […] as he pleaseth, and to have the whole disposing of all the
public monies, with the advice and consent of the council.” 124 Mulford was largely wrong.
Though Hunter did not have explicit permission to contract whatever debts he wanted, he
certainly was supposed to keep the government running even if the assembly would not vote a
revenue. Moreover, all governors’ instructions were intended to keep “the whole disposing of the
public monies” in the hands of the colonial executive, in order to safeguard the prerogative. That
was the crux of the controversy over the assembly’s treasurer in New York, as Mulford would
have known well.
Mulford consequently found himself, like the Jamaicans in the 1670s, needing to oppose
the prerogative while not openly flouting it. He did so neatly, declaring that he would “not
believe that her majesty ever intended those words should be construed to alter English
government, nor to deprive the subject of property and liberty.” 125 Instead, he cited as his
authority the 1706 instruction to Cornbury, which he believed to be “the most just way […] and
nothing against the intent of her majesty’s instructions, as is pretended.” 126 The short-term
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necessity of a concession to secure war supplies was returning to plague the prerogative in the
long-term, as Mulford used it to support his contention that the assembly’s control of the power
of the purse was part of the rights of Englishmen
Mulford closed by exhorting the assembly to stand firm. He implored them not to heed
the threats of legislation in Parliament, “which drew several to consent to what they did not well
understand” in the passage of the last year’s support of government. 127 Instead, he said that “if
we must be enslaved, it were better to have it forced upon us than for us to bring it upon
ourselves.”128 The Jamaicans had resisted Poynings’ Law in almost the same terms.
However, the threat to the New York assembly’s power from debt and revenue bills did
not measure up to that leveled by Poynings’ Law against the whole of Jamaica’s legislature, and
could not excite the same unanimity. Nor did Jamaica in the 1670s have the socioeconomic
divisions that hampered New York in the 1710s. Resistance in New York was naturally therefore
rather differently composed. Instead of a united council and assembly, as in Jamaica, it was a
majority in the assembly and de Peyster in the council. Nor was the resistance as inflexible, as
the 1713 support of government bill indicated. However, the weaker resistance in New York in
the 1710s than in Jamaica in the 1670s should obscure neither the former’s resilience nor its
power. The assembly had denied Hunter a revenue for multiple years, had directed what support
it did give into the hands of the treasurer, and had done the same with the twenty-year excise. A
bare majority in the assembly, if it could be preserved, was enough to resist the crown’s
measures.
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Unfortunately for Mulford, that bare majority did not exist, because the “government
creditor” constituency cut across all of New York’s other elite divisions. Morris was well aware
of this, and had utilized his role as chair of the committee of the whole house on the debts to
ensure that the prizes were distributed widely. Upstate men, like Livingston and Schuyler, were
paid, as were downstate men like Caleb Heathcote and Thomas Willet. Anti-Leislerians, like
William Nicoll, collected large sums, but so too did prominent Leislerians, such as Jacob Leisler
junior himself, who received over £2,000. Merchants like Philip van Cortlandt, Stephen de
Lancey, and Samuel Bayard collected their due, but so too did landowners like William Smith,
Henry Beeckman, and Henry Swift. And as these names indicate, Dutchmen, Englishmen, and
even Frenchmen across the colony shared in the bounty. Against this tremendous gratification of
material interests, there was little Mulford and his adherents could do but delay. The assembly
passed the debts bill on 21 July 1714.129 The final amount to be repaid was set at £26,950, with
Hunter, the largest single beneficiary, set to receive some £4,297. 130 The colony would repay
these debts in bills of credit, or paper money, which were intended to be “sunk” over the long
twenty-year term of the excise. The council momentarily jeopardized the bill’s progress to
completion by offering several amendments. However, none fundamentally altered the bill’s
structure. The assembly were therefore happy to admit the amendments through the artifice of
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voting that their money bill was not, in fact, a money bill. That hurdle cleared, Hunter at last
gave his assent on 4 September. 131
Notwithstanding the council’s minor assertion of their own power, the assembly had won
a major victory in their quest for the power of the purse. All the funds in the excise bill and the
debts bill would be handled by the assembly’s appointed treasurer. The queen’s commissioned
officer for such purposes, the receiver general, would never see a penny coming or going.
Neither Hunter nor the council had dared to challenge the bill in that respect, because their own
material interests and desire for funded government outweighed their attachment to the crown’s
rights. The crown’s trust in officials whose interests necessarily diverged from its own, and the
frequent incompatibility of its rights with its interest in functional colonial government, had once
again resulted in a diminution of the prerogative in the most critical point. Moreover, the
assembly’s issuance of paper money interfered with the metropolitan authorities’ regulation of
the Atlantic economy for the benefit of metropolitan interests. All this might, perhaps, have been
avoided if Hunter had been effectively backed from London. But the structures of Britain’s
transatlantic empire had precluded it.
Hunter regarded the passage of the debts bill as a victory, and therefore rewarded Morris
with the position of chief justice.132 However, Hunter knew he would have to defend the debt and
excise bills to London if he and his allies were to be paid. He therefore preemptively protested to
the board that “had I known, or could I have apprehended, that there was anything in that act
either contrary to my instructions or her majesty’s interests, though I am reduced to very great
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necessities, I had not passed it.”133 He argued that the appropriation of the excise was
“reasonable, seeing her majesty has not thought fit to apply that fund by act of Parliament to any
other use,” and that putting it in the hands of the treasurer was “no new thing,” since it was done
in other colonies.134 He contended, furthermore, that the bill was fundamentally a retrospective
support of government, which could be won no other way. 135 And he reminded the board that “if
these bills miscarry I shall be in a more deplorable condition than the worst of my enemies could
wish me,” since the colony owed him, by his estimation, £5,000, while he still labored under the
£20,000 Palatine debt.136
None of these arguments convincingly answered the potential charge of infringement
upon the prerogative. Instead, Hunter had essentially argued that the infringement was justified.
He had implied that he could expect no substantial support from home, and so had done the best
he could do on his own. He had asserted that he had won the crown’s main object—the support
of government—without dwelling on the question of whether that victory would be selfdefeating for the prerogative. Instead of lobbying the board of trade against the assembly for his
and the crown’s interests, he was lobbying the board of trade for himself and the assembly
against at least some part of the crown’s interests.
Fortunately for Hunter, the metropolitan authorities had historically been more receptive
to compromising the prerogative than the rigidity of official communications suggested. Though
they naturally preferred to defend every particular of the crown’s rights, they had sometimes
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prioritized functional colonial government over the preservation of the prerogative—as in the
1706 instruction to Cornbury. Of course, this prioritization could never become explicit, since
the prerogative depended on the appearance, rather than the reality, of strength. Hunter had to
hope the board would comprehend and sympathize with what he could only imply. If they did
not, he could expect repeal, censure, and possibly recall, which was Bevil Granville’s fate after
passing a paper money bill in Barbados in 1706.137 If the board did approve, like Handasyd after
passing the 1704 tack to the Jamaican revenue, Hunter would probably receive a reluctant
approbation of the act along with a written slap on the wrist. 138 Even if the compromise were
made, appearances would still have to be maintained.
Events in Britain intervened once again, this time to delay consideration of the debts bill.
Anne had died on 1 August 1714, and with the succession of her second cousin George, a Whig
ministry would take power. When Hunter learned of this in October, his relief was palpable. In
reference to the incoming ministry, he wrote Popple junior that since “no man has been better
acquainted with my sufferings than you, so nobody can better judge of my present joy.” 139 He
imagined, as he wrote Stair, that finally “justice runs in its right channel,” and that his “most
worthy patrons, my lords Somers and Sunderland” would see him reimbursed for the Palatine
debt.140 In that Hunter would be disappointed, for he would die without ever receiving a penny
from the treasury in recompense. Instead, fortune worked in his favor through a different
mechanism.
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The new ministry dismissed all the previous members of the board of trade. The entirety
of their new Whig board therefore lacked familiarity with the usual approach to colonial
governance, and needed swiftly to become acquainted with a massive volume of business. They
would have to rely heavily on their secretary, William Popple junior, to whom Hunter had begun
to sign his letters “your most affectionate friend.”141 Though the internal deliberations of the
board are not preserved, it seems likely that Popple junior would have used his suddenly
increased sway to present his friend’s measures in the best possible light. 142
The complaints of Cornbury (now earl of Clarendon) against the 1714 debts bill probably
aided Popple junior in presenting the case for approval. Clarendon accused Hunter and the
majority of the assembly of corrupt self-dealing in the bill, and of deliberately excluding his just
claims from the bill. Popple junior would have informed the board of the many allegations of
Clarendon’s corruption, while the board themselves knew that Hunter was a Whig and Clarendon
a Tory.143 They dismissed Clarendon’s complaints after only pro forma consideration. Then, on 6
May 1715, the board represented briefly to the king that the excise bill and the debts bill ought to
be approved, without noting a single objection to their contents. 144 The royal confirmation
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followed the next month.145 Hunter and the assembly had won their compromise, unexpectedly
escaping censure entirely, as the metropolitan authorities acquiesced in their inroads on the
prerogative and British material interests.
Bonomi has identified, in The Lord Cornbury Scandal, an even more profound
ideological reason for this permissiveness. Earlier ministries would have opposed this “decisive
shift of fiscal control […] from England to the province,” but now “the impulse to reform
colonial administration […] was spent.” 146 She contends that “the transition to the age of
Walpole and ‘salutary neglect’ was under way,” and therefore “the opportunity to set the empire
on a solid constitutional foundation […] was lost.” 147 It is probably true that the 1714 debts bill
would have met with stiffer opposition under a different ministry. However, it is also the case
that the first “shift of fiscal control” had occurred in 1706 with the instruction to Cornbury on
extraordinary supplies, which had been issued by a distinctly imperially-minded GodolphinMarlborough ministry.
More broadly, it is unclear what realistic reforms could have preserved metropolitan
fiscal control while providing a “solid constitutional foundation” for the empire. Funding the
colonial governments from Britain was too expensive and too difficult, particularly since
colonial affairs were never a priority for all but a few British political elites, and would also
require parliamentary interference in the project of prerogative government in the colonies.
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Taxing the colonies internally through parliamentary legislation also depended on that
interference, and would raise the practical and ideological challenge of forcing colonial
compliance with measures sure to meet bitter resistance, to say nothing of “garrison
government.” There was no acceptable alternative to securing the cooperation of colonial elites,
particularly after twenty years of war had made it clear that the metropolitan government needed
their votes of funds to sustain Britain’s imperial competition with France. Without the leverage it
enjoyed in Jamaica, in New York as elsewhere, the crown had to trade the power of the purse for
functional colonial government. The “opportunity” Bonomi mentions had never materialized,
and indeed could not exist without a more fundamental shift in the structures of the transatlantic
empire than anything her “old imperialists” had envisioned. 148
Meanwhile, Hunter’s work was only half done. He had received money for the past, but
he needed money for the future. To that end, Hunter asked a new assembly in spring 1715 for a
fresh revenue, but beyond expelling Mulford for printing his speech of the previous year without
leave, they did nothing to gratify the governor’s request. 149 Then Hunter discovered that “the
naturalization bill was the block laid in the way of the revenue.” 150 Given the confusing tangle of
proclamations, treaties, and legislation surrounding New York’s passage first from the Dutch to
the English, and then from proprietary to royal colony status, many of those who lived in New
York could not be certain that they held all the rights of natural-born subjects of the crown. 151
Most crucially, the navigation acts prevented foreigners from acting legitimately as traders
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within the British Empire—enforcement of those provisions could be enormously damaging to
the many Dutch merchants in the colony.152 Three times previously in Hunter’s government, the
assembly had brought in such bills.153 Every time, they had failed to pass, either from lack of
time or because Hunter and the council deemed the provisions of the bills too broad.
Hunter recognized that he had leverage. However, he still could not compel the assembly
to reduce their sweeping naturalization of all foreign Protestants, or, failing that, to pass the bill
with a suspending clause.154 In consequence, he “at last asked them what they would do for the
government if I should pass it in their way, since they did not like mine.” 155 In response to this
explicit invitation to negotiation, the assembly resolved to “raise an ample support for the
government of this province, and continue it for five years,” by means of various import
duties.156 Morris was once again the chief architect of the bill’s passage, so it was no surprise that
it settled a pro-landholder revenue.157
Even to win that much, however, Hunter had needed to make three further concessions.
The first was relatively minor. The assembly enumerated the salaries in their journal by
resolution on 21 June 1715, and did likewise in the bill they passed, thereby violating the
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crown’s prerogative right to set the salaries of its servants. 158 However, the amounts they
enumerated were exactly equal to those the crown had assigned, thus making the resolution more
a technical reservation of right than an actual infringement. Still, a precedent had been set, and
later governors would rue it.159 The second concession was rather more significant but also
expected—the treasurer was to receive and disburse the money. 160 And the third was once again
to allow the issue of paper money, rather than immediate payment in cash. Once Hunter had
consented to these stipulations, both the five-year revenue bill and the naturalization bill
proceeded nicely, and Hunter “assented to both at the same time” on 5 July 1715. 161
Hunter could perhaps have waited for the board of trade to weigh in. On 22 June 1715,
the day after the assembly had passed their bills, the board had written inquiring whether the
assembly were likely to “settle an established revenue for the support of government.” 162 If they
were not, the board indicated that they were ready to support “the settling of such a revenue by
act of Parliament here.”163 Hunter of course did not know about the board of trade’s letter when
he passed the bill. Even if he had, he might not have waited. Although he had renewed his
request for a parliamentary act in March, he knew not to expect anything from that quarter. 164 He
had written to Popple junior on 8 November 1714 that “you know well that the revenue bill was
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never intended to be passed, though prepared by the lords.” 165 Though the ministry were now
Whigs, the structural constraints of the transatlantic empire prevailed regardless of party. Even if
Hunter would not have used the word “structural,” he was certainly aware of the metropolitan
authorities’ consistent unwillingness and inability to defend the prerogative against the
assembly’s incursions.166 He had therefore chosen not to wait, but instead taken what he could
get.
And what he could get was reasonably beneficial to the crown, under the circumstances.
There had never been a chance of securing a revenue that would pass through the receiver
general’s hands. Without the leverage of law expiration that Jamaican governors enjoyed, Hunter
had defied recalcitrant assemblies, built alliances, and massaged elections until his allies held a
slim majority in the assembly. Hunter’s allies had then delivered a revenue bill that did indeed
infringe on the prerogative, but would also pay Hunter’s salary and fund the government for the
next five years. Functional government, at the price of the crown’s rights, had been secured for
the second time in as many years. And as Lustig notes, “it is doubtful […] whether any lesser
trade would have worked.”167
Hunter well knew the bill might be regarded poorly, despite his “good connections to the
centers of power in London,” and he hastened to excuse himself to the board. 168 He made no
mention of the assembly’s enumeration of the salaries in their journals, nor of the issue of paper
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money, but did directly address the fact “that the money is lodged in the treasurer’s hands.” 169 As
in 1714, he had no exculpatory response, for he had been unable to defend the crown’s rights in
any meaningful way. The best he could offer was the simple fact that “no art could lodge [the
money] otherwise.”170 The leverage of the naturalization bill had opened the door for the revenue
bill, and party competition had produced a revenue more favorable to Hunter’s allies than the
main group of his opponents. But that was as far as political maneuvering went. No opening had
offered for Hunter to play one faction against the other to secure the crown’s rights and interests,
in contrast to the experience of governors before him. Whatever else their differences, all parties
agreed that the assembly, not the crown, ought to exercise the power of the purse. Against that
united front no governor could hope to prevail. Hunter’s plaintive statement to the board that “if
I have done amiss I am sorry for’t, but what was there left for me to do?” was a perfect
summation.171
However, the board objected to the 1715 revenue bill not because it infringed on the
prerogative, but because it violated metropolitan regulation of the Atlantic economy. The 1715
revenue bill set the value of an ounce of plate at eight shillings, which contradicted the act of
Parliament that limited an ounce of plate in the colonies to no more than six shillings tenpence.
The board warned Hunter in September 1715 “that if the New York act be approved of here, the
proprieties and all other governments will immediately do the same thing, and the intent of the
act of Parliament be thereby wholly evaded. ”172 The board refused to lay the act before the king
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until Hunter could make some explanation, rather than set a precedent for every colony to
interfere in the regulation of the Atlantic economy. 173
Hunter noted in response in April 1716 that the board had already approved such a
valuation of plate in the 1714 debts bill, that New York’s neighbors did not observe the coinage
act in any case, and that repeal would bring […] certain ruin to the trade as well as to the
possessors of such bills” of credit as had already been issued. 174 He also again pleaded the
impossibility of settling things otherwise, saying “tis not in the power of men or angels to beat
the people of this continent out of a silly notion of their being gainers by the augmentation of the
value of plate.”175 Despite the board’s letter and his swift riposte, however, Hunter was probably
little worried. There was almost no precedent for the repeal of revenue acts passed in the
colonies. Moreover, Hunter had once again escaped castigation for violating the prerogative.
Instead, the board tacitly accepted political reality, while still refusing openly to recognize it.
Hunter and the King’s Party, 1716-1719
Two months later, Hunter met the assembly he had sought for his entire gubernatorial
tenure. His opponents lost in New York City, Queens, and Kings, and two new members joined
thanks to more executive action, giving his allies a substantial majority. 176 In a sign of the new
spirit of cooperation, for the first time the assembly resolved to thank Hunter for his speech
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opening the assembly.177 Then Hunter’s wife Elizabeth died on 9 August, and Hunter himself fell
ill shortly thereafter. With five young children, his wife’s estate, and the Palatine debt all to
consider, Hunter wrote home asking for leave to return to Britain. 178 He was determined,
however, to settle his own and the government’s affairs in New York before leaving.
The opportunity finally came in the fall session of 1717. Hunter had proposed a new
debts bill to the assembly in 1716, to satisfy any claimants who had been frustrated by
“omission, neglect, or otherwise.”179 The assembly had charged the New York City members
David Provoost and Jacobus Kipp, two of Hunter’s allies, with considering those claims. 180 By
the autumn of 1717, the assembly had completed the full evaluation, and passed a new debts bill
on 27 November. The bill would pay 37,600 ounces of plate in debts through bills of credit, to be
sunk by a five-year extension of the excise and an increase in rum and wine import duties. 181 In a
sign of new amity, the governor, council, and assembly had cordially agreed to pay fully onethird of the sums in the act to themselves.182 And, to ensure that London would present no
obstacles, the bill had no suspending clause, unlike its predecessor of 1714. Once Hunter passed
the bill, de Peyster could immediately begin to issue the bills of credit.
The 1717 debts bill was thus the most extensive trespass on the crown’s interests that
Hunter had yet sanctioned, worsened by the fact that he had actively connived at it. He had
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presented the board with a fait accompli that could be undone neither quickly nor easily. In so
doing, he had defied his explicit instructions, and worked to harm the British mercantile interest
with the further issue of paper money. Since the colony’s last debt settlement was only three
years old, he had also exposed his allies and himself to charges of corruption. Hunter would need
to find excellent arguments to justify his conduct.
To “convince their lordships of the reasonableness and justice” of the bill, he reiterated
points made in 1714 about the necessity of honoring the government’s debts to preserve its credit
for the future, which certainly would have resonated with imperial authorities. 183 He also
contended, dangerously, that the increase of paper money had resulted in a corresponding boost
to trade, since it “enable[d] the many to trade to some small loss to the few who had
monopolized.”184 But his trump card was the identity of the creditors paid in the new bill. Many
of them, he wrote, were “those (or their heirs) who took up arms in favor of the happy
revolution, and continued […] a considerable time at their own cost.” 185 Unable to secure the
Leislerian veterans’ payment in a more delicately balanced 1714 assembly, when the number of
the old anti-Leislerians had been greater, he had finally managed to compass it in 1717. The
Whig ministry had defeated rebellious Jacobites only two years before. The temptation to
identify the reimbursed Leislerians as defenders of the Glorious Revolution, and thereby equate
them to the Whigs of the present day—or at least to view them as sympathetic allies—must have
been strong. As a Whig himself, Hunter might well have been moved by the same analogy, and
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he certainly knew its rhetorical power. He would have to hope it was enough to excuse his, and
the assembly’s, transgressions.
Even before the bill had passed, Hunter and the assembly had run into trouble in London.
Mulford had arrived there to press his grievances against Hunter in 1716, but the board had
stonewalled him. In frustration, early the next year Mulford distributed papers before the doors
of the House of Commons charging that Hunter’s additions to the assembly were illegal, and had
made “the minor part of the people in the government […] the major part of the assembly.” 186
Mulford therefore concluded that Hunter and his party “deprived [New Yorkers] of the privileges
of Englishmen,” and were “arbitrary, illegal, grievous, oppressive, unjust, and destructive.” 187
Though the assembly voted the paper “false, malicious, and scandalous” as soon as they heard of
it, and composed an address denying its contents, it was not enough to silence Mulford’s
complaints.188 After delaying as long as they could, the board saw Mulford’s case against Hunter
pass out of their hands and to the lords of the committee for hearing appeals from the plantations,
with whom Hunter had no existing rapport. 189
More worryingly for Hunter, the board also wrote him on 25 February 1718 instructing
him to get a new revenue bill passed that did not affect “the shipping and navigation of this
kingdom” by laying tonnage duties on British ships and import duties on their cargo. Otherwise,
they warned, they would have to take the drastic step of recommending the rejection of the 1715
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revenue bill.190 Then, upon receiving Hunter’s 20 January 1718 letter, they replied to tell him
that “some merchants here, and others residing at New York” had written to them against
confirming the 1717 debts bill, which the board had not yet even received. 191
Hunter and his party in New York thus had a mountain to climb to sustain their
legislative agenda. They did, however, enjoy two signal advantages. The first was that Mulford’s
complaints, lurid though they were, were unlikely to produce substantial results. The
metropolitan authorities generally forgave gubernatorial excesses in the exercise of executive
power, especially when it could plausibly be argued they had furthered some portion of the
crown’s interests. Moreover, the board had forwarded a mass of favorable supporting documents
to the lords of the committee that showed clearly, they thought, “what opinion the inhabitants of
that province have of Brigadier Hunter’s conduct in his government.” 192 Though the inquiry
dominated Hunter’s letters for the rest of his government, that reflected the anxiety and
helplessness of being three thousand miles distant from the business rather than the likelihood of
an adverse result.
The second, and greater, advantage was that majorities in both houses of the colonial
legislature were united with the executive in their aims. Hunter and the New York legislature
could therefore present that political unanimity so prized by British elites of the time. They could
deploy it to make effective rhetorical resistance to the demands of the metropolitan authorities.
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And they could also use it to justify any actions they took that encroached upon the prerogative,
by arguing that there was no constituency that would support any alternative. That this situation
pertained a scant five years after Hunter’s standoff with the assembly demonstrated his political
skill; it also betokened his willingness to compromise on the prerogative for more pragmatic
ends. He was effectively now siding with the New York assembly against the crown.
Indeed, in order to preserve that appearance of unanimity in a divided province and
support their legislative agenda, Hunter and his allies in the assembly had already employed
“arbitrary methods.”193 Hunter had suppressed an address from Suffolk county in support of
Mulford and against his measures in November 1717, later forcing nineteen signatories to
“unfeignedly acknowledge our error in so doing.” 194 That same month, the leaders of the
merchant party in New York City had made an address from the grand jury on behalf “of all his
majesty’s trading subjects of this city” against the debts bill.195 This time, the assembly
summoned the signatories, forced a partial apology from them on the threat of languishing in
custody, and then made a counter-representation to Hunter. 196 One of Hunter’s opponents
complained that this pattern of intimidation held true across the colony, and “deter[red] any
inhabitant of New York from appearing in any public address against the proceedings of the
government.”197 He was probably right. Hunter and his party held majorities in both houses of
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the legislature, and Hunter had used his powers as governor to replace unfriendly judges and
justices of the peace while cowing the rest. His opponents in New York therefore could not
produce the sworn depositions and signed addresses that the metropolitan authorities would
require for proof of the malfeasance of a governor who shared their political affiliations. There
was no way for them to contest Hunter’s assertion that the complaints were just “the clamors of a
few self-interested men,” opposed by “the joint opinion of his majesty’s council here, the
representatives of the people, and the whole body of such as are known to be well-affected to his
person and government.”198
The assembly were also ready to use more orthodox legislative means on their, and
Hunter’s, behalf. When they heard of the board’s objections to the 1715 revenue bill, they
directed Morris, Hunter’s staunchest ally, to draft explanatory legislation in answer. 199 The bill
he drafted removed the tonnage duty that had been laid on British ships docking in New York,
eliminated the duty that had been laid on slaves imported directly from Africa in those ships, and
equalized the duty on wine imported from Britain with wine imported “from the place of its
growth.”200 The assembly paired this act with a representation in justification of the assembly’s
bills, which Morris also composed.
The crux of Morris’s argument, unsurprisingly, was that duties on trade were “the only
way” a revenue could be raised “to any tolerable effect.” 201 At the beginning of Hunter’s
government, land taxes “for two fruitless (if not whimsical) expeditions to Canada,” debts caused
198
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by former governors’ corruption, and mercantile self-interest had left the colony poor and the
government without a revenue. 202 Only Hunter’s “prudence and justice,” Morris contended, had
made New Yorkers willing to essay a new revenue through a tax on trade, though he said nothing
of the less savory methods the governor had employed. 203 As a result, the government had once
again been well-funded. Moreover, the relief from land taxes and the credit provided by the 1714
debts bill and the 1715 revenue bill both had resulted in a “great increase of the trade and
opulency of this province.”204
Were the 1715 revenue bill now to be repealed, two dire consequences would ensue.
First, it would be impossible to raise a sufficient support for the crown’s government. The
revenue would already be deficient thanks to the explanatory act’s repeal of some of its
constituent duties, but a full repeal would throw the colony on the necessity of raising funds via
an insufficient and damaging land tax.205 Second, thanks to the recall of the bills of credit, New
York’s trade and credit would collapse, which would “prove of much more dangerous
consequence to the trade and interest of Britain than a trivial and inconsiderable duty of
tonnage.”206 Morris therefore pleaded with the board to allow the assembly to continue raising
money as it previously had done, because it simply could not support government “without an
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impost on the importations or exportations of this province.” 207 Hunter happily cosigned the
representation to Popple junior, writing that “I shall add nothing (neither is much needful).” 208
Left unsaid in the entire representation was that it was profoundly in the material interest
of Morris and the landowner party he led in the assembly to levy a tax on trade, rather than on
land. As they understood it, the merchants would bear the principal burden of a tax on trade,
while the landowners would conversely bear the principal burden of a tax on land, and the
landowners naturally would prefer to shift the burden. 209 The difficulty was that from imperial
authorities’ point of view, land taxes in the colonies were greatly preferable to taxes on trade.
The former involved the material and ideological interests of Britain not at all, while the latter
imposed extra costs on British trade and interfered with the crown’s and Parliament’s rights to
regulate the Atlantic economy. Morris, aware of the conflict, had emphasized the support of
colonial government, colonial trade, and New York’s past readiness to fund the crown’s
American military expeditions in the address. All three themselves served material and
ideological interests of Britain as well, and by explicitly or implicitly suggesting repeal of the
assembly’s bills would threaten them, Morris could create a plausible case for the board to
refrain from repeal.
The final obstacle to Hunter and his allies’ legislative agenda was the merchants’
objections to the 1717 debts bill, which had unfolded along predictable lines. The merchants
contended that “paper money prevents the currency of silver and gold,” which disabled
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merchants from remitting those much-desired metals to Britain, and that if the taxes on trade on
which the bill relied were allowed to persist, commerce would crumple. 210 The merchants also
complained of illicit self-dealing in the payments to governor, council, and assembly. In
language reminiscent of Mulford’s speech, they warned that the act would “give a handle ever
after for designing men to introduce presents to themselves, and under a color of paying such
imaginary debts, real ones will be created.” 211 Together, the merchants argued, Hunter and the
assembly’s measures ran counter to the material interests of British merchants and imperial
economic policy, and secured not New York’s welfare, but its elite’s enrichment.
Before these objections even reached New York in October 1718, however, Hunter’s
years of cultivating the board had borne fruit once more. At the board’s request, the crown had
appointed Richard West as a separate counsel for the board to refer colonial legal matters not of
“great importance” in April 1718.212 The precedents the 1717 debts bill might set were of
obvious significance, so a referral to the law officers might have been expected. However,
Popple junior wrote a letter referring the 1717 debts bill to this friendly lawyer, rather than the
attorney or solicitor general, on 26 June 1718. 213
West duly reported in favor of the New York legislature on 20 August 1718. He pointed
out that the merchants had no grounds to complain of which or how many debts were allowed,
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but examined their allegations anyway, and found that “the ends for which the said money was
given, were perfectly just and honorable.” 214 The only complaint he had was the lack of a
suspending clause. Nevertheless, in a victory for the assembly’s fait accompli strategy, he noted
that “since the bills of credit are actually out and made current in all payments, they cannot now
be called in again without […] the utmost confusion.” 215 The merchants could expect to make
little headway against such an unfavorable report.
Though he and the council together produced a representation against the merchants’
accusations, Hunter remained determined to return to Britain. He met the assembly again in the
spring of 1719, hoping to secure a new five-year revenue. But that went beyond what even his
allies in the assembly were willing to do for him. Knowing Hunter was soon to leave, they had
no desire to surrender their leverage over his successor. They renewed the revenue for only a
single year—paid to the treasurer, of course—and rejected Hunter’s suggestion that the treasury
had run into debt over the previous year. 216 Hunter accepted the limits of the possible, passing
the extension on 24 June 1719, and then made his final speech to the assembly of New York.
Still concerned as ever to perform unanimity, Hunter congratulated himself and the assembly
for tamping down disputes and factionalism. The departing governor also promised that “whilst I
live, I shall be watchful and industrious to promote the interest and welfare of this country, of
which I think I am under the strongest obligations for the future to account myself a
countryman.”217 The assembly gratefully accepted Hunter’s sentiments in an address the next
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day, urging him to “make haste to return” if he could. 218 If he could not, however, they asked
him to “permit us to address you as our friend,” and to “give us your assistance when we are
oppressed with an administration the reverse of yours.” 219 In 1710, this amity would have
seemed ludicrous. But nine years later, Robert Hunter left New York ostensibly the most wellliked governor of any in these pages.
Hunter’s reputation with his friends and allies in New York would only have climbed
higher after news of the board of trade’s representation on the 1717 debts bill reached them. On 4
June 1719, the board had delivered a report to the privy council that completely vindicated
Hunter and the legislature of New York. The board asserted that “the legislature have acted both
justly and prudently in endeavoring to extricate the province out of the difficulties their public
debts had involved them in,” and had chosen the best available method for so doing. 220 Marking
a certain victory for the fait accompli strategy, the board noted that disallowing the bill now
would cause havoc.221 They therefore gave their opinion that “if his majesty should be graciously
pleased to confirm this act, it would tend to the great advantage and benefit of his majesty’s said
colony.”222 However, they attached a caveat. Explicit instructions were to be given not to pass
any similar bills for the future, “in order to prevent the further increase of paper credit, and the
anticipation of any fund upon which money may be raised to supply the emergencies of the
government.”223 The lords justices finally approved the 1717 debts bill on 19 May 1720, while
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the 1715 revenue bill faded from the consideration of the metropolitan authorities once it neared
expiration.224 With the success of the one, and the non-failure of the other, New York’s
legislature had secured a remarkable concession. The metropolitan authorities had permitted
them to flout the spirit, if not the letter, of the governor’s instructions, in order to regulate the
Atlantic economy with primary attention paid to the benefit of their colony, not that of Britain.
Hunter’s Legacy
Indeed, Hunter’s nine years in New York show what a competent governor could
accomplish for the crown’s interests. Against bitter and determined opposition, he had managed
to secure a revenue where before there was none. He had ensured the repayment of anything that
could be considered a debt of the colony, thereby strengthening its credit for the future. He had
eliminated open factional discord in New York’s legislature. And he had managed to do it all
while neither going bankrupt nor becoming a byword for corruption, perhaps his most
remarkable achievement in an era of amateur and venal government. Luck played its part, with
the change in the ministry, but much of the credit can go to Hunter himself. He was patient,
ruthless without crossing the line into outright illegality, assiduous in cultivating useful friends
and allies, and eloquent in his many letters. Few colonial governors were his equal in any of
these traits, let alone in all.
Nevertheless, Hunter’s accomplishments also laid bare the structural limitations on
successful colonial government. Hunter arrived in 1710 determined to observe his instructions
and provide for successful government in New York. After three years of largely fruitless
endeavors, he seems to have realized that he could do one or the other, but not both. Like the
Jamaican planters a generation before, New Yorkers were united in their determination that the
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crown’s government would never be fiscally independent. Hunter’s skillful maneuvering to
secure a sympathetic majority in the assembly consequently did not mean that he could impose
the metropolitan authorities’ preferred measures, let alone “the fiscal-military state in New
York.”225 It meant only that he had the power to make a deal.
And deal he did. From 1714 onwards, Hunter repeatedly traded the crown’s claim to
control colonial revenue, and the metropolitan authorities’ right to regulate the Atlantic
economy, for the minimum revenue the government needed to function. In so doing, he exposed
the central contradiction at the heart of colonial government. Nothing valuable could be won for
the crown’s interests, which a governor was supposed to defend in totality, without sacrificing
some part of those interests. If Hunter had successfully “bought the legislature,” as Webb
contends, it was equally true that they had bought him.226
This difficulty persisted because there was no alternative to governing by and through
colonial elites. The royal bureaucracy in the colonies was so small as to be almost invisible.
During Hunter’s governorship, all the royal civil officials in New York could be counted on two
hands.227 They could not by themselves administer a colony of tens of thousands of people. Nor
could the four poorly paid and worse fed companies of royal troops in the colony enforce their
decrees if there were any resistance. Scaling up the administrative state in the colonies to the size
of the task would present an expense the metropolitan authorities would refuse to pay from the
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central treasury. They were not, after all, even willing to ensure Hunter’s financial independence
from the assembly by paying his £1,200 salary from London. Co-opting colonial elites for the
administrative and financial burden was the only other choice.
But the choice was also dictated at a level below these conscious concerns. Amateur
government by local elites was a bedrock assumption of early eighteenth century English
political culture, on both sides of the Atlantic. Even Parliament was essentially a tool to
streamline the process of securing the cooperation of England’s local elites in national
government. Any other system would be unsustainably contrary to centuries of English history,
as both the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution showed in their own ways. Imperial
authorities might bemoan the recalcitrance of the New York assembly, and scold them for their
undutifulness, but they could not conceive of doing without them.
Cooperation, then, it was perforce to be. The metropolitan authorities tacitly
acknowledged as much by approving each of Hunter’s major compromises, a success rate no
other governor could match. The result was, during the second half of Hunter’s government, the
sort of accommodation that maximized the success of British imperial government in this period.
Neither the assembly nor the crown had all they wanted, but the government was funded while
the colonial elite controlled the revenue. Neither side had escalated the conflict to the heights of
the Poynings’ Law crisis, so neither side had embarrassingly to admit its inability to impose its
will on the other. The central conflict of interests simmered on unresolved, but a low heat might
be bearable for a time. And though Hunter had not eliminated factions, he had at least left his
successor with a friendly majority in the assembly, which offered his successor the opportunity
to continue the tenuous peace. Hunter had not executed his instructions to the fullest, but no
governor could have. Given his constraints, it is hard to imagine how he could have done better.
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Chapter V
Another Scotsman Abroad: Archibald Hamilton in Jamaica, 1711-1716
One year after Robert Hunter landed in New York, Jamaica received its own Scotsman,
lord Archibald Hamilton, as governor. Hamilton, however, does not enjoy a reputation like that
of Hunter, for he receives little treatment in the historiography. In part this is Hamilton’s bad
fortune, for the colony he governed has received less historiographical attention than those on the
North American mainland. He also arrived in Jamaica in the least studied period of that colony’s
first one hundred and fifty years, between the elimination of the buccaneers as a political force in
the 1690s and the Maroon wars of the 1730s. Hamilton has also been minimized because, as
Agnes Whitson notes, the central constitutional question of the permanent revenue was not at
issue during his government.1 Lastly, Hamilton does not seem to have been an effective governor
like Hunter. The principal legacies of his government, for historians, are his “violent disputes
with the Assembly” and his removal after being accused of supporting piracy. 2
However, Hamilton was governor of Jamaica during a crucial period. His governorship
saw the end of two decades of war between the Atlantic empires, and the beginnings of the Whig
ascendancy in Britain. In Jamaica particularly, the first twenty years of the eighteenth century
were transformative, as Trevor Burnard argues. They saw the establishment of the dominance of
the planter elite, “richer and more powerful than any other” in Britain’s Atlantic colonies. 3 Lee
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B. Wilson contends, therefore, that this period did in fact see “constitutional conflict.” 4 She
claims that the “coalescing large planter class” first contested gubernatorial control over escheat,
and then a number of other executive powers in a familiar escalating fashion, in order to
“facilitate large plantation formation.”5 Though the conflict “culminated in particularly
rancorous relations” between governor and assembly that were unmatched between 1677 and
1730 in Jamaica, Wilson argues that the metropolitan authorities ultimately defeated this
particular “attempt to reposition [the assembly] within an imperial institutional hierarchy.” 6
I agree wholeheartedly with Wilson that constitutional questions were at stake in
Hamilton’s government. I disagree, however, with the distinction she makes between “abstract
notions of justice or liberty [and] practical and tangible concerns about property.” 7 The Jamaican
elite had mutually reinforcing, intrinsically intertwined rights and interests. Separating property
rights themselves from the English constitution that was largely constructed in defense of those
rights would have been nonsensical to them. Their “rights talk” certainly was “deployed
strategically […] to accomplish their economic objectives.” 8 But even though the constitutional
issues of Hamilton’s government did not rise to the level of those in the Poynings’ Law crisis, or
in the renewal of the twenty-one-year revenue, the Jamaican elite still genuinely felt their rights
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were under threat during his administration, and defended them sincerely. Moreover, far from
going down to constitutional defeat during Hamilton’s government, the Jamaican elite actually
secured some concessions of the prerogative from London.
Indeed, Hamilton faced a conundrum in Jamaica remarkably similar to that his
countryman Hunter faced in New York. The structural constraints of Britain’s transatlantic
empire compelled him to seek the cooperation of the Jamaican elite if he wanted to realize the
crown’s interest in funded and functional government. The price of that elite’s cooperation was
high. Most of them wanted the assembly, not the colonial executive, to exercise the power of the
purse, believing that the best way to secure their rights as Englishmen and advance their material
interests. Assembly control of the power of the purse, however, weakened prerogative
government, while gratifying the Jamaican elite’s material interests often meant sacrificing the
prerogative or material interests in the metropole. Further complicating the task of the royal
governor in Jamaica was the greater unity of the Jamaican elite compared to that of New York.
While economic, geographic, religious, and ethnic concerns had divided New York’s elite, only
the first of these had ever been a major differentiating factor among Jamaica’s elite. And with the
rise of the “large integrated plantation” and its commensurate planter elite described by Trevor
Burnard, even the fissure between large and small planters was losing relevance. 9 Hamilton thus
faced an even greater structural challenge than did Hunter.
But while Hunter chose compromise for the sake of functional government, Hamilton
declined to do so. Instead, he sought persistently to comply not only with the letter but also the
spirit of his instructions, aggressively and vigorously defending the prerogative against all
colonial intrusions. The Jamaican assembly was therefore unable to expand its control of the
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purse under Hamilton as the New York assembly had under Hunter, which was a victory for the
prerogative. It came at the cost, however, of functional government for the colony. The Jamaican
treasury careened ever deeper into debt in the latter half of Hamilton’s government, while the
garrison companies on the island received only sporadic subsistence money until Hamilton took
the responsibility upon himself. Meanwhile, the aftermath of the conflict between Hamilton and
the assembly poisoned the atmosphere in Jamaica for the next fifteen years, hobbling future
governors’ attempts to pass the crown’s desired measures. Hamilton’s government thereby
sharply illustrates the fundamental problem of colonial government in this period. The crown
wanted governors to defend the prerogative and to fund their colonial treasuries, but need for
local elite cooperation made the two choices mutually exclusive. And if a governor made the
former choice, he might well imperil that cooperation for his successors.
Hamilton Before Jamaica
Like Hunter, lord Archibald Hamilton was a Whig, appointed as one of the last colonial
acts of the Godolphin-Marlborough ministry in July 1710. Hamilton too had turned to colonial
administration after seeing his prospects of advancement in uniformed service dissipate. He had
joined the navy in 1687, at the tender age of fourteen. Unusually for a future colonial governor,
Hamilton had been to the other side of the Atlantic, serving with distinction in the expedition to
Guadeloupe in 1690-1. Although he was commanding ships of the line by 1704, in 1708, a junior
captain and protégé of the junto was promoted to rear admiral over his head. 10 Hamilton
complained bitterly, and consequently found himself without another command, though he did
assist his brother, the earl of Orkney, in command of the British infantry at Malplaquet. 11 He
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spent two years in Parliament, reingratiating himself with the Whig leadership and doggedly
searching for some remunerative office. He was eventually rewarded with the Jamaica post,
regarded as “the best the queen has, excepting that of Ireland,” since it was worth £2,500 in
salary alone.12
Like Hunter, Hamilton was a novice in civil administration,. Unlike Hunter, however, he
was a scion of the highest ranks of the Scottish nobility. He was the seventh and youngest child
of the duke and duchess of Hamilton, the premier peers of Scotland. By the time he sailed for
Jamaica in 1711, his eldest brother was duke of Hamilton, and his three other brothers were
earls. One of them, Orkney, was close with Marlborough, and it was through him that Hamilton
won his post.13 Hamilton therefore did not, like Hunter, have the need to cultivate other patrons
diligently, and does not seem to have had the scientific or literary interests to forge other friendly
connections.14
Despite his social status, Hamilton did not have the significant independent income that
Hunter enjoyed. He relied on his captain’s half-pay, a pension of £300 a year granted by William
in 1699 that was continually in arrears, and the smatterings of property and allowances that could
be spared a youngest son. For Hunter, the governorship of New York was beyond anything he
could have anticipated as an impoverished young man, and served to confirm his socioeconomic
rise. For Hamilton, however, the governorship of Jamaica was critical to avoid sinking below the
level of his, and his society’s, expectations. And even though its salary was twice that of the New
York governorship, Hamilton would not enjoy nearly as large an income from the troops
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stationed in Jamaica as Hunter did in New York. For unlike Hunter, Hamilton was not the
colonel of the regiment in Jamaica—that remained to Handasyd and then his son—and so he
would not draw the considerable perquisites and allowances that pertained to the office. 15
Therefore, patience of the kind Hunter had shown in New York was not a luxury Hamilton could
afford, should the need arise.
Jamaica Before Hamilton
That might have been a severe handicap for Hamilton, if the recent history of Jamaican
assemblies was any guide. Though Handasyd had secured a new twenty-one-year revenue in
1704 in exchange for the confirmation of Jamaica’s laws for the same period, the conflict
between crown and assembly had hardly slackened. The government’s expenditure consistently
outran the revenue, particularly given the demands of war. Moreover, the regiment garrisoned on
the island required an additional subsistence beyond what the crown paid, since Jamaica’s cost of
living was extraordinarily high thanks to its near-total dependence on food imports. The
assembly had too keen a sense of their leverage to make any long-term provision for either the
revenue or the additional subsistence, and Handasyd therefore had to ask them for new funds
every year.
The assembly extracted regular concessions for their authorization of funds. The annual
taxes they raised were paid to commissioners of their choosing, like New York’s “extraordinary
supplies” after 1706. Though in Jamaica the governor did not have formal authority to make this
concession, Handasyd always passed the bills. Twice he also found himself compelled to agree
to clauses tacked to the additional subsistence barring “all foreigners [from] serving either in
civil employments or in the militia” in perpetuity, which he told the board in 1705 he would
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“never have complied [with] did not the life of my regiment depend on it.” 16 In 1708, when the
assembly were concerned that Handasyd had used his “power in administrating […] property
law” to enrich his favorites, they extracted one more set of concessions. 17 Handasyd reluctantly
assented to a quieting possessions bill that gave blanket confirmation to the many dubious or illrecorded land grants on which the Jamaican elite relied for their land tenure, and also minimized
the quit-rent payments due to the crown. The next year, he also agreed to a bill that sharply
restrained the fees the officers of the government could charge for their services, which was
aimed at his particular favorite Richard Rigby, the island’s provost marshal and deputy
secretary.18
Though the metropolitan authorities seem to have tacitly accepted the appointment of
commissioners, they balked at Handasyd’s other concessions of the crown’s prerogative in the
colonies. Three times, therefore, the privy council deliberately waited until the annual tax bills
neared expiration before rejecting them. 19 They thereby preserved the taxes voted for the island’s
treasury while negating the long-term concessions Handasyd had made to secure those funds.
Though this was an effective use of the crown’s formal power, the repeated cancellation of the
deals struck between governor and assembly further eroded the trust already much damaged by
the long drama of the 1688 revenue bill. It was thus little surprise that Handasyd’s 1710 and
1711 assemblies were even more contentious than their predecessors. Though Handasyd was
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able to resist a new quieting possessions bill, he did pass a new bill of fees and a bill aimed at
Rigby that prevented multiple office-holding. 20
Handasyd believed he had been opposed, throughout his government, by a permanently
intransigent party of opposition. He was frustrated, he wrote, by a “Venetian faction [that] cannot
endure kingly government.”21 Their efforts had risen to a height in the 1711 assembly, Handasyd
thought, in which “all these disputes and misunderstandings [were] owing to Mr. Totterdell, who
has been the same disturber in Sir William Beeston’s time, and seems resolved still to continue
on in his wickedness.”22 Totterdell was joined in leadership by the brothers Peter Beckford junior
and Thomas Beckford, who had followed their now-deceased father in the ways of opposition—
and had both separately been acquitted of murder. 23 They made a formidable trio. Totterdell was
a skillful lawyer well versed in the precedents of the House of Commons, and had become a
wealthy planter holding over a hundred slaves. 24 The Beckfords, especially Peter, were so
enormously wealthy and influential that they could personally sway elections in a quarter of
Jamaica’s parishes. Peter Beckford junior had also previously secured a post as comptroller from
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the commissioners of the customs in London, and as Nicholas Lawes would later write, “though
that post be of no great profit, yet it serves him […] as a cloak to do mischief.” 25 These
opposition leaders were almost certainly not anti-monarchists, nor did they aim at independence
from Britain. However, Beckford junior quite rightly serves as the model for Trevor Burnard’s
“ambitious, assertive, and aggressive” elite planter, “who gave no quarter to political opponents,”
and both his brother and Totterdell were formed in the same mold. 26 None of the three had
shown an inclination to conciliate or be conciliated by the governor in their pursuit of the
interests or defense of the rights of the Jamaican elite.
Handasyd and his allies in the council resolved that they had to overwhelm this
opposition party for the new assembly in 1711. Handasyd’s loyal councilors, led by Rigby, John
Stewart, and William Broderick, promised “to use their best endeavors that such persons should
be chosen […] as should show their duty and loyalty to her Majesty.” 27 In other words, they
would press their thumbs on the electoral scales as heavily as they could. 28 Their efforts were
successful. Handasyd wrote the board that the elections had produced the “least inclined to
faction of any assembly that has been hitherto since my being here.” 29 Then, on 16 July 1711, the
day Handasyd wrote that letter, Hamilton arrived to take up the government.
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Underneath the tumult of political conflict, Jamaica was experiencing socioeconomic
transformation. Trevor Burnard has convincingly argued that the imperial wars of 1689-1713,
and the intensification of the Atlantic slave trade during that same period, generated a “pool of
landless men with few alternatives outside plantation employment” who were also “hardened to
the rigors of plantation life.”30 As a result, by around 1700 there were enough White men
available to enforce the vicious discipline of the plantation gang system on enslaved Africans.
This availability of overseer labor mitigated the risk of insurrection caused by concentrating the
enslaved population, and thus enabled “the transition to the large integrated plantation”
throughout the island in the next two decades. 31
The rise of the large integrated plantation did nothing to halt Jamaica’s ongoing
demographic catastrophe, as the White population remained static at around 7,000 despite a
continual influx of immigrants.32 Nor did it immediately increase the prosperity of the island in
aggregate, for Jamaica’s sugar output was roughly the same in 1713 as it had been in 1685, in
part due to the dislocation caused by two transatlantic wars. 33 But by Hamilton’s arrival in 1711,
those with the luck and skill to build up and own large integrated plantations had begun to
separate themselves from the rest. Already in 1708, as Burnard has pointed out, the assemblymen
and councilors were two to three times richer “than men in the previous generation,” and with
every passing year Jamaica’s wealthy grew wealthier.34 The small planters did not disappear in
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the 1700s and the 1710s like the buccaneers had in the 1690s, and indeed remained the majority
of slaveholders.35 Nor did they lose all political power, for most of them still held the franchise
and could participate in elections. But by Hamilton’s time, the small planters were no longer part
of Jamaica’s elite. Unlike in New York, or in previous decades in Jamaica itself, there was now
no structural division among the propertied classes that a governor could exploit for political
gain.36 Jamaica’s elite class was the large planters, leavened only somewhat by “large merchants
and government placemen.”37 If they acted in concert, a governor had little choice but to bow to
their demands if he wanted functional government.
The large planters’ new ability successfully to brutalize larger concentrations of enslaved
Africans heightened their demand for that enslaved labor. The enslaved population was no more
self-sustaining than the free population, but an accelerating rate of importation of enslaved
Africans caused a massive growth in that population. By 1713, though the White population had
shrunk by some three thousand since 1689, the enslaved population had grown by some twentyfive thousand, to a total of fifty-five thousand. Jamaica therefore had by far the highest ratio of
enslaved Africans to Whites anywhere in the British empire, at about eight to one, and the
imbalance was only growing.38 In consequence, though the new availability of White overseers
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had solved the problem of security from enslaved Africans at the level of the individual
plantation, planter greed had worsened the menace an insurrection of enslaved Africans posed to
the colony more generally. Moreover, the larger size of the enslaved population, the physical
expansion of Jamaican plantations, and the even greater violence with which enslaved Africans
were treated, continued to increase the numbers of fugitive Africans. In the first decade of the
eighteenth century, the old Maroon communities in the interior began to accept these fugitives,
increasing their strength and their ability to threaten the White Jamaican population. 39 Though
Handasyd and the assembly had combined several times to send out militia parties against the
Maroons, as ever they met with no permanent success. 40
Despite their wealth and their self-assurance, therefore, the Jamaican elite lived in a
perpetual state of fear. They were unable to defeat the hostile Black population that lived outside
their authority in the mountainous interior, and were unsure whether they could suppress an
insurrection of the enslaved Black population. It was this fear that motivated them to give extra
funds (however reluctantly) to the garrison of royal troops, to seek further White immigration,
and to heighten the brutality with which they treated the men and women they held in bondage.
However, as Hamilton would find, the Jamaican elite’s fear of the island’s Black population did
not prevent them from engaging in brinkmanship over funding their own defense, in order to
safeguard their rights and advance their interests.
A Friendly Assembly, 1711-1712
Bequeathed a friendly assembly by Handaysd, Hamilton did not immediately have to
confront Jamaican intransigence. The new governor, for his part, had also made some effort to
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ensure a favorable reception, lobbying in Britain against the double duties charged on the
profitable Caribbean trade in prize goods and for extra sloops for the island’s defense. 41 He made
sure to note both points in his speech opening the assembly, in return “expect[ing] never to hear
of any attempt against the prerogative.”42 Instead, Hamilton wanted them to demonstrate “a due
deference to that authority” he held from the queen by passing new additional subsistence and
duty bills.43 This haughty approach did him no present harm. Though the opposition must have
been enraged by the election of 1711, which they ultimately came to believe was as illegitimate
as that of 1688, they were powerless to forge their anger into policy. 44 The crown’s party, led by
William Broderick as speaker and attorney general, held a commanding majority in the
assembly. Over two sessions, they passed one-year continuations of the additional subsistence
and duty bills, and also reimbursed the treasury £5,000 for its present debts and the next year’s
anticipated shortfall.45 This last was particularly important to the relatively impecunious
Hamilton, who had told the board in August that unless the assembly directed more money to the
treasury, there would not be “any money to pay me.” 46
Hamilton paid no unusual price for these bills. The crown’s party shared the opposition’s
central concern with retaining the power of the purse, and so appropriated the funds and named
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their own commissioners for the additional duty and subsistence. However, this had been typical
for twenty years, and Hamilton saw no need at this time to resist this customary infringement on
the prerogative.47 Hamilton also passed a new quieting possessions bill, which the assembly had
framed with the intent of removing the more offensive infringements the last had made on the
prerogative. He was careful to remind the assembly, however, that his passage of “a law which
this island has so long had at heart […] must make the deepest impression on your minds of her
majesty’s goodness.”48 Many Jamaicans, remembering past rejections of laws, must have
tempered their optimism. However, the metropolitan authorities had already gratified Jamaican
lobbying in one instance, with Parliament’s passage of a new act on American trade that
removed the double duties on prize goods. 49 Trust might have begun to bloom once more.
Indeed, this was the high-water mark of Hamilton’s administration, and perhaps of
Jamaican imperial government for fifteen years in either direction. Relations between the
governor and the assembly were cordial and productive, the soldiers and the revenue were well
supplied for another year, and imperial authorities were responding to Jamaican concerns.
Notably, however, the principal challenge of Jamaican government for the past three decades
remained as insurmountable as ever. The chronic disproportion of income to expenditure placed
Hamilton “under a necessity of expecting continual assistances from the assembly.” 50 Even this
assembly, one of the friendliest to the crown that met in Jamaica between 1677 and 1730, would
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give Hamilton no more than annual bills for the subsistence and the revenue, routed through
commissioners of their own choosing. Fiscal independence for royal government in the colony,
no matter how strongly the metropolitan authorities desired it, was off the table. Even the
crown’s party evidently felt that their material and ideological interest in exercising the power of
the purse outweighed their “duty.” Meanwhile, for the royal government, some small sacrifice of
the prerogative to ensure its soldiers and officers did not “starve” was a worthwhile trade.
Consequently, the Jamaican elite continued to hold the upper hand in the battle of constitutional
attrition.
Moreover, this temporary amity was not stable. Though the assembly had demanded
little of Hamilton in exchange for their support, the winds could shift swiftly, particularly if the
confirmations he had encouraged them to expect were not forthcoming. Nor had Hamilton shown
Hunter’s assiduity in promoting a friendly assembly’s measures to the board. He had written of
the quieting possessions bill but once, telling the board on 29 August 1711 that it had passed
“exactly agreeable to her Majesty’s pleasure signified to [Handasyd],” and had not said a word of
the bills of fees that were still depending.51 If the metropolitan authorities did not approve the
quieting possessions bill, some in the crown’s party would certainly have second thoughts about
whether it was worthwhile to trust the governor. Moreover, Hamilton was not exploiting a
structural divide in Jamaica’s elite, as Hunter had in New York. Instead, he had sided with one
faction in an internecine struggle for political power and preferment. That ground was not steady,
and it was made more treacherous still by the exclusion of the Beckfords, Jamaica’s wealthiest
and most powerful family.
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Though the crown’s party still held its majority when the assembly reconvened in
October 1712, the opposition showed signs of renewed life. Hamilton and his partisans were able
to fend off most of their attacks, expelling Totterdell in the process, and then secured the renewal
of the additional duty and subsistence. One concern, however, animated elites in both parties.
Beckford junior and the councilor John Blair had received letters from the opposition reliable
Whitgift Aylmer, now in London, suggesting that the quieting possessions, fees, and multiple
offices bills were not approved or even considered in that city, and that the progress of the bills
had been deliberately sabotaged. 52 The assembly as a whole inquired of Hamilton what had
happened to the bills. Hamilton could offer only the assurance of a November 1711 letter from
the board that the bills were under consideration, and pled “the great affair of peace [that] may in
some measure retard all others” as an excuse for the board’s delay since then.” 53 He carefully
neglected to mention, however, that he had lobbied against the multiple offices bill to the board,
characterizing it both as “an encroachment on the prerogative” and an affront to his ally Rigby. 54
Then, having secured what he needed from the “loyal and dutiful subjects” of his party, and
foreseeing only trouble if the session continued, Hamilton prorogued the assembly until the next
year.55
The governor knew he needed something more concrete than the board’s year-old
promise to mollify the assembly. However, Hamilton evidently did not believe that a majority of
the Jamaican elite hoped for the passage of bills that secured their rights and interests while
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infringing upon the prerogative. Instead, like Handasyd before him, he blamed the dissension on
a few “incendiaries” determined “to disturb the quiet” of the colony. 56 He therefore asked the
board to hasten their consideration of the “bill of fees, and quieting possessions, which are
always made use of for a handle to raise discontent.”57 Hamilton does not seem to have cared
whether the bills passed. He simply wanted the metropolitan authorities to finalize their
response, which he believed would remove the irritant.
Hamilton thereby threw one of the structural problems in Atlantic imperial government
into sharp relief. As Patricia Bonomi has noted, there was “as yet no accepted vocabulary with
which to explain or justify” the party competition for political power that had emerged in
England by the 1690s.58 There was no concept of a “loyal opposition”—both Whigs and Tories
tended to view each other as fundamental threats to the state, the church, and the people. In the
colonies, where assemblies were struggling with the colonial executive for powers Parliament
already possessed, parties often challenged the governor and the prerogative directly. This
apparent defiance of the crown itself made governors even more likely than metropolitan
politicians to denigrate and misunderstand their opponents in the legislature. Moreover, no
governor wanted to concede he could not control his colony, which a truer description of organic
resistance to the crown’s measures would certainly imply. Even the most circumspect governors
resorted to explanations that cast their colonial antagonists as “conspiratorial and sinister in
intent,” and Hamilton was hardly judicious. 59 Like most of his gubernatorial fellows, Hamilton
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had given the board of trade, which depended first and foremost on his information, a
fundamentally inaccurate account of opposition to imperial government. Settlements of conflicts
between colony and metropole could not be built on such faulty foundations.
Nor had Hamilton’s earnest lobbying the previous month contributed to easing tensions
in Jamaica. In perfect agreement with the Jamaican elite, he warned the board that Jamaica had
too few White men to defend itself either against a future invasion or against “the insolence of
the negroes,” which he alleged had risen to the level of killing overseers in broad daylight. 60
Until Jamaica had enough White men settled to form a reasonable militia, Hamilton
recommended “the necessity of continuing some regular forces here.” 61 There he parted ways
with a majority of the Jamaican elite. They would probably have preferred that the regiment be
disbanded in the island, as in 1698, which would strengthen the militia, increase the overseer
labor pool, and remove the burden of quartering. But Hamilton was prepared to diverge even
further from that consensus. He counseled the board that even if enough White men arrived to
strengthen the militia, some soldiers ought to remain, for “so many inconveniencies are apt to
arise from the heat of the climate that we were not fit to be trusted altogether with ourselves.” 62
Indeed, without three independent companies, he implied, civil strife might well disrupt “the
quiet this island has hitherto enjoyed.” 63 Whether Hamilton believed this force had merely
restrained White Jamaicans from coming to blows with one another, or prevented them from
rising against the governor, was unclear. But he certainly meant to convey that the threat of
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coercion was necessary to govern White Jamaicans, thereby risking the ire of the Jamaican elite
if they ever learned he had suggested something so antithetical to their belief in their rights as
Englishmen.
Hamilton had not taken this chance solely out of a statesmanlike concern for order in his
colony. He drew little income from the soldiers while they remained regimented and under
another officer’s command, and would draw none at all from them if they left. But if independent
companies remained on the island, then Hamilton would be their commander, entitled to draw
the same sort of income for them as Hunter did for the independent companies in New York.
Hamilton would therefore, if the metropolitan authorities heeded his lobbying, have a major
stream of income that would persist irrespective of the assembly’s votes or the Jamaican
treasury’s indebtedness. He would also receive his funds from the imperial treasury, which ran
counter to the metropolitan authorities’ desire to minimize metropolitan expenditure in the
colonies. Therefore, he wanted to show that Jamaica faced multiple threats in peacetime against
which only regular soldiers could provide security, which led him to argue that the planters could
not be trusted. Given the crown’s commitment to the defense of its colonies and subjects, and
Jamaica’s economic value to the empire, Hamilton’s concern about slave insurrection likely
would have been sufficient to motivate the retention of a garrison in Jamaica. Hamilton,
however, had fallen prey to the vice of suggesting further reasons when his first would do, and
he would eventually pay the price.
After Hamilton’s agent in Britain, John Thurston, pressed the board on Hamilton’s behalf
in spring 1713, they at last bestirred themselves to consider the last two years’ worth of Jamaican
business. The board first received the scathing report of Edward Northey, the attorney general,
on the 1711 quieting possessions bill. Northey objected to the bill’s poor drafting, lack of respect
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for settled property law, and its “put[ting] the queen and her subjects on a level as to the […]
claiming their rights” by giving all parties whatsoever seven years to make their claims. 64 After
collecting other resolutions on Jamaican matters, the board wrote Hamilton on 20 July 1713,
offering as an excuse for their extended silence only “the long sitting of Parliament.” 65 Hamilton
now had his concrete response, and it was largely favorable. The board informed Hamilton that
the quieting possessions bill would be repealed unless the assembly passed a new one amenable
to the prerogative. The multiple offices bill, against which Hamilton had lobbied, would soon be
rejected. And, as Hamilton had requested, the regiment in Jamaica was to be continued for at
least another six months despite the peace, with three independent companies likely to be
continued indefinitely thereafter.66
There was likely to be outrage in Jamaica when the metropolitan authorities’ policies
were made known. As many in the assembly saw it, their 1708 quieting possessions bill had been
rejected for infringing on the prerogative, and so they had followed the directions from London
in 1711 in drafting a new and acceptable bill. Now, under a new ministry, the goalposts had
moved, and the 1711 bill was also adjudged unworthy of confirmation. Moreover, the Jamaican
elite would not capture the benefits of the end of the last war, when the disbandment of the
regiment in the island relieved them of paying the additional subsistence and simultaneously
increased both militia numbers and overseer availability. Instead, the soldiers would be staying
on as soldiers in peacetime, not only out of London’s desire to secure the island against the threat
of the Maroons and enslaved Africans, but also out of Hamilton’s personal interest and his
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expressed conviction that governing Jamaica required the threat of coercion. Hamilton and the
metropolitan authorities had combined to lay a solid foundation for increasingly unified
Jamaican opposition to imperial government.
The Opposition Gains Strength, 1713-1714
Unsurprisingly, Hamilton waited until 1 October 1713 to call the assembly together,
when the additional subsistence and duty had a month left to run. Even after this delay, he had
not yet received the board’s letter, but he had learned that the regiment was to be reduced to
three hundred men. Hamilton therefore only made the usual requests for the additional duty and
subsistence, and for a supply for the indebted treasury.67 Yet Hamilton’s friendly majority had
now evaporated without an election. 68 Instead, Peter Beckford junior led the defeat of an
attempted extension of the additional subsistence, then walked out with his party to leave the
crown’s party short of a quorum.69 Hamilton now had no money for the soldiers, but his partisans
had no way to pass a bill in this assembly either. Hamilton decided to dissolve the assembly and
hold new elections quickly. The additional subsistence would run out in the meantime, but if the
crown’s party returned in the majority, Hamilton could expect them to cover the arrears.
Hamilton believed that “popular arguments and clamor […] made against a standing
army in time of peace,” like those of the late 1690s in England, had sunk the subsistence. 70 He
loftily informed the board that these were but “unreasonable pretenses,” and that “in truth the
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real ground of difference was personal piques and animosities.” 71 There can be no doubt that
personal strife contributed, especially given resentments over the 1711 election. But it seems
more likely that the Jamaican elite’s disappointed material interests in disbandment of the
regiment played the starring role, and these were hardly “unreasonable pretenses.” In addition,
though the opposition did not know the contents of Hamilton’s letter to the board, by now they
knew their governor’s haughty temperament. They might primarily have been employing
“popular arguments” as a justification for sustaining their material interests, but they also might
have suspected that he would not be averse to using military force to coerce White Jamaicans.
Hamilton had employed a dichotomy of principle and selfishness in Jamaica in 1713
similar to Hunter’s “real” and “pretended” reasons for opposition in New York in 1711. Though
there was perhaps less principle in operation in Hamilton’s conflict than in Hunter’s, Hamilton’s
distortion put the prospects for his government in a worse position. Hunter had at least
understood that New York’s past expenditure for the wars was part of the background to
resistance in the first part of his governorship. Hamilton, by contrast, said nothing of Jamaica’s
wartime expenses, even though there was a record of regular complaints against the additional
subsistence since 1701. Moreover, Hunter had found a grievance—past corruption—with which
he could sympathize, and on which he could perhaps construct a compromise. Hamilton instead
found himself in a position where sympathy was nigh impossible. Jamaican grievances about
multiple officeholding, invasion of property rights, and high fees were directed, in large part,
toward the men who had won Hamilton his compliant majority in his first assembly, and on
whom he would depend in future elections. He could not afford to turn on them.
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In addition, Hamilton knew how reasonable the assembly’s “unreasonable pretenses”
really were. He had asked for the soldiers to stay in order to empower potential coercion of the
Jamaican elite and to line his own pockets, which were exactly the complaints made in
Parliament against the standing army fifteen years before. He had also tried to deceive the
assembly, holding out hope to them that the soldiers might be disbanded by saying that “her
majesty’s pleasure [was] daily expected” on the soldiers. 72 But he of course had lobbied against
that policy, and could be fairly confident that a garrison would remain on the island. Hunter,
whatever else he had done, had never given the New York assembly such cause for suspicion,
being generally forthright in the terms of his antagonism with the opposition. He had therefore
preserved credibility to make a compromise in a tightly balanced assembly in 1714. Hamilton,
however, had chosen duplicity, in a colony that had already experienced too many bad-faith
negotiations with the crown and its governor, and on one of the most explosive issues in
transatlantic political culture. Discovery of his deceit might prove crippling.
The new assembly that met on 26 November 1713 belied Hamilton’s assertion that there
was “no reason to believe [the opposition’s] violent proceedings are agreeable to the general
sense of the country.”73 Instead, the opposition demonstrated they were in the majority by
choosing Beckford junior for speaker. Hamilton would now, for the first time in his two and a
half years as governor, face an assembly decidedly unfriendly to him.
He did not change his approach. First, he doubled down on his earlier dishonesty. Even
though he had already received the board’s letter telling him that three independent companies
were likely to be continued in the island, he assured the assembly that a recall of the regiment, “I
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have good grounds to believe, will be soon.” 74 Then he called for the assembly to “make returns
of duty, gratitude, and loyalty” to the crown by passing the usual bills. 75 The opposition, who
now had the power to pass bills for their rights and interests, were determined on a rather
different course of action. They slashed the funds in a six-month additional subsistence bill, and
passed new multiple offices, quieting possessions, and agency bills. 76 They also spent many days
prosecuting Broderick and his allies for distributing false minutes of the last assembly, to the
point that Broderick resigned his offices and fled the island. 77 Principle, interest, and “personal
piques and animosities” were all on clear display.
Hamilton, irritated by the assembly’s “undutiful” behavior, then contrived to score a
needless political own goal.78 He refused to join in an address against a monopoly on the slave
trade, which the assembly feared was to be reestablished with the grant of the asiento to the
South Sea Company. Handasyd had cheerfully joined the assembly and council in such an
address just before Hamilton had arrived. 79 With that in mind, Hamilton told the assembly “the
said address would be fruitless […] having been already represented fully.” 80 A more plausible
reason later offered for his refusal was that “as the Lord Oxford was for an exclusive trade to
Africa, it would not be prudent in the governor to oppose it.” 81 Totterdell was delighted to seize
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upon Hamilton’s preference of metropolitan to colonial interests, suggesting that Hamilton had
thereby broken his promise to promote “to the utmost […] the interest and prosperity of this
island.”82 Totterdell thereby signaled to the electorate that only the opposition could be trusted to
safeguard Jamaica’s material interests against an uncaring and unfeeling governor. Hamilton, for
his part, had stumbled from an easy means of building up credit with the assembly into a
gratuitous confrontation.
The rest of the session passed in the same bitter mode, with conflict escalating until 20
February 1714, when the assembly addressed Hamilton for an adjournment, Hamilton refused it,
and the assembly then adjourned themselves. 83 Hamilton, enraged at this defiance of his
authority and the prerogative, thereupon promptly dissolved them. 84 Once again the governor
blamed this “scene of folly and weakness” on “two or three factious and unquiet spirits [who]
mislead the rest.”85 He also informed the board that he had refused his assent to replacements for
the quieting possessions bill that were reasonable in themselves. Hamilton “thought they very
little deserved such acts of her majesty’s favor and grace when they at the same time would do
nothing for the support of the government here, their own quiet and safety.” 86 He therefore
advised the disallowance of the 1711 quieting possessions bill, and said the replacements,
“whenever another assembly comes to a true sense of their duty, may be passed here.” 87
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Both sides held leverage over the other. The Jamaican elite had tried repeatedly to secure
their land tenures and minimize their quit-rents with quieting possessions bills for the last six
years, and could not make such a bill law without both the governor’s assent and lobbying
support in London. The government in Jamaica, meanwhile, had for decades depended on the
assembly’s yearly assistance to an insufficient revenue to discharge its debts and pay the
governor’s salary, whether the crown’s party controlled the assembly or not. Since neither side
held both the power of the purse and full legislative authority, there could be no settlement
without compromise.
In 1714 in Jamaica, however, the prospects for compromise were dim. The opposition
majority in the assembly were angry with the governor and his partisans, and suspected both
their rights and interests were under threat from that quarter. They had insisted on maximizing
the governor’s fiscal dependence on the assembly to defend those rights and interests in the
1713-4 session, and would do so again if they won in the next election. The passage of the
quieting possessions bill, though it would be welcome, would likely not be a sufficient
concession to move the assembly to fund the government to the degree Hamilton wanted. In
addition, the crown’s non-performance of past bargains would have made the opposition
extremely wary of offering anything before confirmation of their desired bills in London.
Hamilton, for his part, did not seem to be thinking in terms of compromise. Perhaps measuring
from the benchmark of the complaisant first session of his first assembly, which had only
enforced the traditional commissioner concession, Hamilton was instead envisioning
condescension from the crown that might be forthcoming once the assembly did their “duty.” In
these circumstances, either one side would have to cave in, or London would have to intervene to
alter the situation. But with the opposition and Hamilton already entrenched in their bitterness
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towards one another, and the metropolitan authorities as ever immersed in domestic and
European affairs, neither seemed likely.
Hamilton decided to wait before calling a new assembly, “being persuaded that a little
time will open the eyes of the deluded.”88 Then he made the gap between himself and the
opposition an unbridgeable chasm. He told the board on 5 May that he and the council had been
forced to pay the subsistence for the soldiers out of their own pockets after the expiration of the
six-month additional subsistence. He intended to call a new assembly soon, and to ask them to
reimburse the council and himself for their expenditure.89
There are two possible explanations for Hamilton’s apparent confidence in this expedient.
The first was that he genuinely believed his own misrepresentations. If the strength of the
opposition really was grounded on sham “popular arguments” used by “two or three factious
spirits” to deceive the electorate, then their support might disappear at the polls once rational
counterarguments were deployed. The second possibility was that Hamilton believed his allies
would fix another assembly for him, as they had done in 1711 just prior to his arrival. Politicians
in the British Atlantic generally believed elections turned on (legally dubious) influence and
sincere persuasion together, and Hamilton likely joined them in hoping for both factors to be at
work. Whatever the precise combination, the practical result would be the same. A well-disposed
majority like that of 1711 would be returned, and they would happily reimburse Hamilton and
the council for their debts.
The chance of success was low, however, and the risks high. Hamilton was wrong if he
believed the opposition to him turned on Totterdell and the Beckfords tricking the electorate.
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Most of the electorate had real interests in the disbandment of the soldiers in the island and the
approval of the quieting possessions bill, in both of which Hamilton had contrived personally to
disappoint them. Nor would opposition leaders be taken unawares again, as they seemingly had
been three years previously. Instead, they would themselves use all the legal, semi-legal, and
downright illegal tricks of English electioneering to ensure that they won the majority. Hamilton
should have known this well, for the opposition and the crown’s party had already had such a
contest of election fixing in November 1713, in which Broderick especially had put forth his best
efforts to little avail.90 If the crown’s party tried to fix another election as they had in 1711, and
lost, then Hamilton would merely have given his opponents yet another “handle to raise
discontent.” Moreover, the events of 1711-12 should have reminded him that even a “friendly”
assembly would likely do no more than pass short-term bills for the subsistence and the revenue.
Even the crown’s party would never give the colonial executive fiscal independence. This
imbalance between the risks he was assuming and the benefits that would accrue to success does
not appear to have influenced Hamilton’s thinking. Instead, as prospect theory in behavioral
economics would suggest, he had become risk-seeking when faced with an outcome below the
expectation level set by the friendly 1711 assembly.91
Hamilton had chosen quite a different path from that trodden by his fellow Scot. Hunter,
without any revenue when he arrived, had sought some accommodation with the New York
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assembly while carefully expanding the crown’s party. In fact, four months after Hamilton
turned his back on compromise in Jamaica by deciding to subsist the soldiers first and force
through reimbursement later, Hunter assented to the 1714 debts bill in New York. The disparity
in their actions can partly be ascribed to the different conditions they faced. There was no grand
debt bargain available in Jamaica as there was in New York, nor did the Jamaican elite have the
New York elite’s relatively undamaged trust in the crown. Both governors faced opposition, but
Hamilton’s opposition was wealthier and more unyielding. Hunter could play upon the structural
divisions between New York elites, while Hamilton faced an elite of large planters whose
divisions, while sometimes bitter, were neither so permanent nor so easily exploited. And while
four years of unfriendly assemblies had forced Hunter to educate himself in the politics of
patience, Hamilton had walked into an assembly as welcoming as any a Jamaican governor had
enjoyed in twenty-five years.
Once the Jamaican opposition gained the upper hand in 1713, however, it became clear
that character and intellect also played a role in distinguishing the two Scots from one another.
Hamilton’s pride seems neither to have allowed him to ignore oblique criticism, nor to
comprehend that compromise with possibly “undutiful” persons was necessary to elicit funds for
the support of government. Hunter, by contrast, could let indirect insults lie until the time was
right, and was genuinely willing to negotiate with the assembly from the start. Hamilton had
worked harder to defend the prerogative, but as Hunter had found, compromising on the
prerogative was the surest path to functional government. Hunter’s pragmatism, perhaps partly
learned as a man of middling social status, had enabled him to secure payment of most of the
government’s debts, and his own salary, from an evenly divided assembly. Meanwhile, the
inflexible, disdainful, and narrow-minded lord Archibald Hamilton found his government’s debts
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still burgeoning despite the kindly disposition of the 1711-1713 assembly. While Hunter
constructed a tenuous framework for functioning government in New York, Hamilton was busy
crippling the prospects for the same in Jamaica.
Hamilton finally called another assembly for November 1714. He had perhaps been
waiting for support from London, but received little. The board did empower Hamilton to tell the
assembly that if they continued in their obstinacy, “measures will be taken here […] to assert her
majesty’s undoubted prerogative in that island.” 92 However, New York’s experience under
Hunter could vouch for the hollowness of that threat. Nor had the delay enabled Hamilton’s
partisans to persuade the electorate. As Hamilton wrote his brother Orkney on 15 November, his
opponents had a small majority.93 They had also increased the rhetorical stakes by consciously
adopting the labels of British opposition. Hamilton scornfully noted that his antagonists “call[ed]
themselves the country party,” which signaled a principled opposition to power sustained by
corruption, and thereby implicitly accused Hamilton of corrupt behavior. 94 Indeed, all that the
governor’s delays had accomplished was to sink him and the council deeper into debt for the
soldiers’ additional subsistence.
The assembly met on 1 December 1714, and elected Totterdell for their speaker. As the
choice most obnoxious to a royal governor, and the most logical for a majority concerned to
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defend their rights, his election signaled the opposition’s readiness to fight. Hamilton gave them
even more motivation with his speech opening the assembly. He made his anticipated demand
for reimbursement of the subsistence debt, which he declared he and the council had undertaken
“with no other view than the public service.” 95 And he condescendingly proclaimed his
readiness to ignore the assembly’s demands for concessions, remarking that “if passion,
prejudice, or private views should create imaginary [grievances], they are to be unregarded.” 96
His short speech had realized the oppositions’ fears for their rights and interests, and justified
their hostility.
However, Hamilton never gave the opposition a chance to turn their hostility into action,
proroguing the assembly only three days after calling them together. The assembly’s preference
for their own address to the new king George I, which against tradition conspicuously made no
praise of Hamilton, made it clear to the governor that the assembly intended to push for his
recall.97 Hamilton was also concerned to deny the assembly the ability to coordinate in support of
a rumored petition home against him, which he believed would not only call for his and the
soldiers’ recall, but also request “that assemblies here may have the same privileges and powers
as the Parliament of Great Britain.”98 He told Orkney that there was already a voluntary
subscription circulating in its support, and that the subject matter and the method both “exceeded
all former precedents.”99
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Hamilton consequently complained to the board of “the difficulties I labor under in
asserting and maintaining the just prerogative of the crown, and supporting of government.” 100
Those difficulties now weighed even more heavily upon him, for the council had given up
subsisting the soldiers in November, leaving Hamilton alone to pay the necessary sums. 101
Hamilton told the board that continuing to maintain the prerogative and the government against
the assembly’s demands for rights and powers was an “impossibility […] without such further
support as his Majesty, upon the representation of the whole, shall please to direct.” 102 This was
doubly true because the automatic six-month extension of his commission upon George’s
succession was soon to expire, leaving him with no legal authority to convene an assembly. If his
new commission were not already en route, he had until 1 February 1715 to secure relief from
the assembly. Otherwise, he would continue accumulating debt for the subsistence until his
commission arrived.
Hamilton had backed himself against this deadline through his own actions, repeatedly
declining to convene assemblies in a timely manner. Instead, he preferred to call sessions at the
last minute before funds for the government expired, likely hoping that the pressure of time
would crowd out complaints. Both English monarchs and colonial governors had employed this
method, but most of them had at least bowed to the legislature in considering their grievances
now and again. Hamilton had shown neither real nor pretended interest in doing so. He thereby
violated the fundamental and ancient bargain of Parliaments: supply for redress of grievances.
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By so doing, he was also abrogating the rights of Englishmen to which the Jamaicans believed
themselves entitled by birth.
Hamilton instead hoped for royal commands that would compel the assembly to do what
he wanted. This had failed in Jamaica before, and was not likely to work this time. Indeed,
Hamilton should have known from his own experience as an MP that peremptory deployment of
royal prestige was not a winning maneuver with representative assemblies in the English
tradition. However, Hamilton shared the tendency of nearly all colonial administrators to dismiss
colonists’ Englishness when it became inconvenient. He likely was incapable of imagining that
mere provincials would resist a royal decree. And unlike Hunter, who explored the possibility of
compromise while enduring the board’s 1713-1715 silence, Hamilton had no fallback option. He
let the assembly be dissolved by the lapse of his extended commission in February, and left the
next move in Jamaica up to the metropolitan authorities.
Breakdown, 1715-1716
Though Hamilton’s continuation as governor was confirmed on 14 December 1714, it
took until the spring of 1715 for the wheels of colonial policymaking to turn once more in
London.103 The new Whig board, after reading Hamilton’s letters and consulting with eighteen
persons “concerned in Jamaica,” determined that “the better settlement and strengthening of that
island” with White people ought to be the aim of their policy, with which the Jamaican elite
heartily agreed.104 To encourage the assembly to fund this project, the board believed it
“absolutely necessary that some favors be granted from the crown for quieting the minds” of
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Jamaicans.105 In a show of the unity of Jamaican interests, even Hamilton’s erstwhile ally
Richard Rigby had advised the board that the approval of the 1711 quieting possessions and fees
bills would be well-received in Jamaica. 106 The board therefore requested that Northey
reconsider his unfavorable 1713 report on the quieting possessions bill. They told him that “the
not approving of that Act, and thereby keeping the inhabitants’ titles to their lands precarious,
has been one of the occasions of the difficulties the government has met with there.” 107 The
board had begun to construct their own compromise.
Northey refused to oblige the board, instead warning them on 20 April 1715 against
setting a “precedent to do unreasonable things for the satisfaction of persons who, contrary to
their duty […] would endeavor to put difficulties upon the government if their unreasonable
demands be not met.”108 However, this board clearly found the necessity of functional
government in Jamaica more compelling than a strict defense of the prerogative. The board
therefore disregarded Northey, and on April 29 recommended the royal assent to both the fees
and quieting possessions bills.109 The king and privy council accepted their recommendation,
approving the two bills the very next day. 110
The king in council also approved a royal letter to Hamilton, which set out the parameters
of the deal. “By giving our royal approbation to such good laws as may make them happy,” the
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letter read, “in return […] we cannot but expect from [Jamaica] a ready and cheerful compliance
in making an honorable provision for our revenue, in discharging all public debts and giving a
necessary subsistence to the two independent companies there in our pay.” 111 The letter also
informed the Jamaicans that the crown had no “intention to burthen our people with
extraordinary charges any longer than is consistent with their own safety,” and undertook to
withdraw the now two companies once Jamaica had sufficient White men for its militia. 112 This
was an unusually explicit quid pro quo from the metropolitan authorities. However, that
directness, though it came near to putting the crown on a level with its subjects, might well have
been a virtue. The crown’s duplicity in negotiation over the past decades had severely damaged
the Jamaicans’ trust. Now, at last, the metropolitan authorities were dealing plainly.
Wilson has interpreted this passage of imperial affairs as no real concession from the
crown. By the time of its passage in 1715, she argues that the quieting possessions bill had been
“reworked several times at the Board’s direction” into an acceptable form. 113 The board, she
contends, also turned back legal appeals from Jamaica on the escheat question and expanded
Hamilton’s authority in that regard in his new instructions. 114 More broadly, she asserts that the
board had “decidedly disagreed with the Assembly’s view of its constitutional role.” 115 Instead,
the board had acted to restrain the assembly’s disruption of a hierarchical “chain of decisionmaking institutions […] accountable to the crown,” in which the assembly sat at the bottom. 116
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Though Wilson makes some factual errors in this argument—the quieting possessions bill was
reworked only once, in 1711, and retained elements objectionable to the prerogative when it was
passed—she is certainly correct to argue that the board did not view the quieting possessions act
as a major concession. However, giving it the royal assent was still a tangible move towards
compromise. The bill would limit the crown’s independent quit-rent income in the island, and
give royal confirmation to some grants the crown and its governor had likely never made, while
the partner bill of fees would limit the income of the crown’s patent officers in the island.
Moreover, Wilson’s analysis takes only the board’s harsher words as the sole measure of
their actions. However, while the metropolitan authorities denied the assembly’s powers in one
breath, in the next they tacitly recognized the reality of the situation by offering the Jamaican
assembly approval of constitutionally questionable acts in exchange for supply. 117 It is this
seeming contradiction that produced the inherent instability of transatlantic imperial government.
This Whig board, like other colonial policymakers before them, evidently understood that
achieving the practical objectives of imperial government in the colonies required periodic
concessions to local elites. They had accepted New York’s 1714 debts bill, and now proffered a
compromise to Jamaica. However, the persistence of prerogative government depended on never
explicitly acknowledging the permission of infringements—which was why imperial authorities
had taken such care to frame the compromise as an act of royal grace. Therefore, while much of
the reality of power rested with the colonial assemblies, the formality of it still rested with the
crown, to a far greater degree than in the metropole, where the Glorious Revolution settlement
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had set formal as well as informal limits on the crown. 118 In a political culture deeply concerned
with legal and constitutional forms, the tension produced by this transatlantic institutional
dissonance constantly threatened to escalate into open constitutional conflict.
By late August, Hamilton had received all the communications from London required for
him to meet a new assembly.119 His commission and instructions had arrived, as had the king’s
letter with its attendant compromise. The councilors Charles Chaplin and John Blair, whom
Hamilton believed had worked against him in the previous election, were removed from their
posts as per his request, while Broderick was back as attorney general. 120 In the interim,
Hamilton had subsisted the soldiers on his own credit for a further nine months since the abortive
December 1714 session, making it ten months on his own, and fifteen since the expiration of the
additional subsistence in May 1714. He desperately needed a friendly assembly.
The assembly that began sitting on 31 October 1715 was decidedly the opposite.
Totterdell had died in the interim between assemblies, but the Beckfords still led a majority.
They were joined by Chaplin and Blair, both extremely wealthy men who now had personal
grievances against Hamilton in addition to whatever had motivated their previous opposition. 121
Ominously, the assembly’s first act was to elect Blair for their speaker. 122 Hamilton pressed on
nonetheless. He communicated the king’s letter to the assembly, and urged them “to lay hold of
118
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this opportunity […] by making the most dutiful returns we are capable of” in supplying the
government and reimbursing him for the subsistence debt. 123
The assembly refused to do this, instead pointedly undertaking to supply the revenue “to
discharge all its just debts” while excluding the subsistence debt. 124 Hamilton in his turn blamed
“former assemblies” for failing to provide for the soldiers, and noted that since he could neither
disband the soldiers nor allow them to starve, “the method fallen upon was the most
unexceptionable.”125 The assembly rejected these assertions in resolutions written by Chaplin on
9 November. The resolutions also castigated Hamilton for “employing his interest at home” to
keep the two companies in being, which Chaplin contended was “only advantageous to particular
persons,” instead of supporting the better and more economical expedient of disbanding the
soldiers in the island.126 The assembly therefore resolved that the £2,706 debt Hamilton and the
council had contracted was no “public debt within the construction of his majesty’s letter,” since
it was “money disbursed without a law, or the public faith given for the reimbursing the
same.”127 Paying the debt would mean “highly infringing upon the liberties of the subjects of this
island, and betraying the trust reposed in them.” 128
Hamilton now reaped what he had sown. His deliberate delay of assemblies, and his
insistence on the public repaying his freely incurred debts, were together a legitimate threat to
the rights of Englishmen. The assembly were determined to fight him explicitly on that ground.

123

Hamilton’s speech to the assembly of Jamaica, 31 October 1715, CO 137/11/61-2.

124

JAJ, II, 144.

125

Ibid.

126

Ibid., 146.

127

Ibid.

128

Ibid., 146-7.

232

They also had some inkling of Hamilton’s deceptive lobbying about the soldiers, which showed
that Hamilton could not be trusted, and probably also served to reinforce suspicions that he was
inclined to infringe upon their rights. Moreover, the assembly had a distinct material interest in
avoiding raising taxes on themselves to pay for the soldiers’ subsistence, in increasing the
overseer labor pool, and in pushing as much of the burden of imperial defense onto the crown
and the colonial executive as possible. As ever, the coincidence of their material and ideological
interests gave them strength.
It was not only Hamilton who would pay the price for his incompetence. The
metropolitan authorities’ proffered compromise was likely dead in the water. To be fair, the
opposition majority might well have viewed the metropolitan authorities’ concessions of the fees
and quieting possessions bill as an insufficient exchange for the sums Whitehall expected. It is
also clear that the metropolitan authorities included Hamilton’s subsistence debt as one of the
“public debts,” so the compromise might have foundered upon that rock in any case. 129 However,
the assembly’s complete and justified lack of trust in Hamilton definitively closed the door on
any mutually palatable exchange of supply for redress of grievances. The opposition were
extremely unlikely to raise any funds for the colonial government without excluding Hamilton
and his loyal council from any control of them whatsoever, which would be an infringement on
the prerogative that imperial authorities would never accept. There was no available compromise
while Hamilton and his allies remained in power.
Hamilton was out of options. He could not compel the assembly to vote as he wanted. He
would not compromise, nor would the assembly have trusted any compromise he proposed. He
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could not call a new assembly without running himself deeper into debt, and could not expect
any different outcome from new elections in any case. The only thing left to do was to give in to
inertia and let the assembly run. He would at least win some credit with the metropolitan
authorities for trying to get their measures passed, and defending the prerogative at every turn, as
Hunter had done in the first few years of his government in New York. This Hamilton
determined to do, writing to the board that he was “resolved not to be drove into any
unreasonable concessions from the necessity of affairs” since it was his “indispensable duty to
show the most strict adherence to our constitution.”130 Functional government in the colony,
however, was now beyond his grasp.
The assembly made this clear to the metropolitan authorities in their resolutions of 15
December, once again penned by Chaplin. They claimed that the councilors Rigby, Broderick,
and John Stewart had entered into a corrupt bargain with Hamilton upon his arrival. 131 While the
councilors engaged in election-fixing and other nefarious practices, Hamilton had supported
himself by “prostituting of his majesty’s commissions to gain votes, and turning out of men of
the best estates to make room for ordinary and illiterate persons.” 132 Hamilton had also, the
opposition alleged, deliberately misrepresented the state of Jamaica in his letters home to give
his corrupt crew cover. For evidence of this latter perfidy, the assembly angrily quoted
Hamilton’s assertion that “we were not fit to be left by ourselves” that had buttressed his appeal
for the retention of a garrison.133 In the same vein, they contended that Hamilton’s “new and
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illegal method” for subsisting the soldiers would “be of fatal consequence to the liberties of the
people.” 134 On the whole, the assembly found, while they would like to “establish that good
agreement” recommended by the king, they did not “see any likelihood of effecting it whilst his
excellency continues in his government” and Rigby, Stewart, and Broderick remained in the
council.135 Seeking to demonstrate their united front against Hamilton, the assembly recorded
that the resolutions passed with twenty-three ayes, and only three nays. 136
Since Hamilton could not possibly remedy the grievances in these resolutions, the
confrontation between governor and assembly was now almost entirely played for the benefit of
the London audience. The assembly were negotiating directly with the metropolitan authorities,
demanding Hamilton’s recall and the replacement of Rigby, Stewart, and Broderick in exchange
for functional government in the colony. They had given no assistance to the chronically
indebted revenue since November 1713, nor had they subsisted the soldiers since May 1714.
Their fiscal leverage was therefore as high as it had ever been. Moreover, the assembly did not
need to trade it for the passage of bills they wanted, because the fees and quieting possessions
bills had already been approved in London. It was the perfect moment for the opposition both to
crush their political enemies in Jamaica, and to ensure the rights of Englishmen would no longer
be threatened by a haughty and inflexible administration. Having seen the crown deal with them
in bad faith so many times, the Jamaican opposition now took advantage of asynchronous
Atlantic politics to turn the tables. The metropolitan authorities had a choice: Hamilton in the
government, or money for the government.
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Nothing else happened in Jamaica to alter this situation before the end of Hamilton’s
government. In this December session and another that Hamilton called in financial desperation
in January and February 1716, the two sides repeatedly insulted and affronted one another.
However, they passed no legislation, as the assembly repeatedly insisted on excluding Hamilton
and the council from all their money bills, and refused to accept any amendments from the
council, as they had done a decade before. Hamilton finally dissolved the assembly on 11
February 1716, after they accused him of Jacobite sympathies in “a scandalous libel,” flinging
the assembly’s address back in the messengers’ faces as Inchiquin had done twenty-five years
before.137 As the assembly’s resolutions had made clear, the issue would be settled in Britain, not
Jamaica.
The board became aware of the new heights of the controversy in February, when
Hamilton’s letter of 28 November 1715 arrived. In that letter, Hamilton accused the opposition
of hostility to the established constitution, and claiming that there was “no grievance or
uneasiness in the country but what is occasioned from our unhappy assemblies.” 138 The weight
of paper from the opposition and their partisans in London, however, belied his bold assertion.
Memorials accused Hamilton of favoring “gentlemen of no estates” over “the estated men,” of
embezzling public money in the assembly’s commissioner’s hands, and threatening councilors
with suspensions to secure their votes. 139 One particularly pungent memorial compared
Hamilton’s government to Albemarle’s, the demand for repayment of the subsistence debt to
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Charles I’s imposition of ship money, and said the assembly, like Parliament in that time, “after
hasty dissolutions, refused […] to pay money imposed without their consent.” 140 Gilbert
Heathcote capped it all off by presenting the assembly’s own representation to the king, with an
exhaustive list of grievances and accusations, in April. 141
These appeals, however, were primarily directed to James Stanhope, secretary of state for
the south and one of the most prominent figures in government, and not to the board. The
Jamaican elite and their allies on both sides of the Atlantic recognized the board’s “growing
ineffectiveness” in formulating policy, particularly after the changes in its makeup at George I’s
succession, and instead sought to bypass it.142 It is thus hardly surprising that the board still
inclined to Hamilton’s view of the assembly’s actions. After receiving Hamilton’s 28 November
1715 letter, they wrote to Stanhope expressing their fear that the Jamaican assembly’s
proceedings represented a broader trend, because “several other colonies in America […] have of
late pretended to assume new privileges and powers.” 143 Were this not forestalled, the board
warned, it might “tend to the weakening of his Majesty’s prerogative in those parts.” 144 The
board had envisioned a small exchange of the prerogative for the additional subsistence in the
compromise they had offered in 1715, which would preserve the illusion of strength by
presenting the concession as a gracious condescension. But the assembly’s defiance of Hamilton
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and of royal instructions threatened to tear aside the curtain and reveal how feeble prerogative
government was in a direct confrontation. The board knew something had to be done. However,
they had no concrete suggestions as to what.
Meanwhile, Hamilton was not entrusted with cleaning up his own mess. When an
accusation of his complicity in piracy made its way to England, the metropolitan authorities
seemed to have seized on the pretext to dismiss a governor who could accomplish nothing
whatsoever legally. Stanhope wrote to the board on 19 May 1716 informing them that
Hamilton’s commission was terminated.145 The council would also be changed, with Chaplin and
Blair restored, Thomas Beckford put in, and four of Hamilton’s loyalists ejected, including
Rigby and Stewart.146If an investigation by this new council found that Hamilton was indeed
involved in piracy, Hamilton was to “be put under arrest, and his effects seized and sent over
with him by the first ship” from Jamaica. 147 When these orders arrived in Jamaica on 25 July
1716, the opposition had won a political victory. Broderick remained as a councilor and attorney
general, but Hamilton and the rest of his reviled administration was out while opposition
partisans were in, thanks to the assembly’s successful employment of its fiscal leverage.
However, though the metropolitan authorities had cut Hamilton loose, they did not
likewise dissociate themselves from his measures. The board were particularly concerned that
the debts “contracted for their own defense […] ought to be supported by themselves,” and not
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by the crown.148 Before the piracy accusation arrived in London, Stanhope had countersigned a
royal letter on 10 April empowering Hamilton and the council to pass a warrant for their
repayment “out of the first and readiest of the revenues of that our island.” 149 Even after
Hamilton’s dismissal, the metropolitan authorities stood by this demand. They had resolved to
champion the crown’s interest in making the colonies bear the burden of imperial defense by
making an end-run around the assembly’s rights of levying and appropriating money. In so
doing, they had undermined the goodwill and trust they might have garnered by dismissing
Hamilton. They had also ensured that the conflict he had touched off between the rights of
Englishmen and the prerogative of the crown would not die down, but would instead roar into
fuller life.
Hamilton’s Legacy
Hamilton’s tenure in Jamaica was the perfect storm of bad government in the colonies.
Like all governors, he was caught in the middle of the conflict between the rights and interests of
the colonial elites on the one hand, and those of the crown and the metropole on the other. He
was at the mercy of transatlantic communications, the board of trade’s limited powers, and the
metropolitan authorities’ divided attention. Hamilton also labored under the need to secure the
cooperation and consent of a critical mass of the local elite, which in Jamaica had no structural
divisions to exploit. He also had to contend with a chronically indebted revenue, discontent at the
expense of war and quartering soldiers, and a well-led and deep-pocketed opposition. Even the
friendly 1711 assembly would only subsist the soldiers, and pay the revenue’s debts, from year
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to year. Moving the government onto firmer footing would be an onerous task, and one any
governor would be unlikely to complete.
But while his fellow Scot Hunter rose to the challenge in New York, Hamilton sank
under it in Jamaica. Enjoying an initially more favorable situation than did Hunter, Hamilton
contrived to be his own worst enemy. He escalated minor tiffs with the assembly, never
conceded an inch for the sake of compromise, and repeatedly deceived the assembly about his
lobbying. He sought to preserve a garrison in Jamaica that would serve his own interests, while
arguing for it in terms that horrified the Englishmen he governed. He turned a blind eye to the
corruption of his allies even when they could not command a majority, and very possibly
participated himself. And he incurred the subsistence debts without authorization from the
assembly, which were then, as Mulford had complained in New York, “endeavored to be turned
upon the country as if they were their debts.” 150 Few governors gave as much cause for cries of
“arbitrary power” as Hamilton did while achieving so little for the crown’s interests.
Then the metropolitan authorities stepped in to make matters worse. They had earlier
offered compromise, proffering an exchange of the fees and quieting possession bills for “an
honorable provision for [the] revenue.”151 However, when faced with the choice between
disavowing Hamilton’s arbitrary measures or supporting the material interest of the crown, they
chose the latter, ordering the repayment of the debt. Hamilton’s summer 1716 departure from
Jamaica, therefore, did not mean that the island was done with him. Though the hated governor
was gone, in Shakespeare’s phrase, the evil he did lived after him.
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Lee Wilson has identified the fundamental conflict in Hamilton’s governorship as one
over property rights and their effect on Jamaican slaveholders’ material interests. This chapter
has shown, by contrast, that the Jamaican elite feared for the broad spectrum of their rights as
Englishmen, and that their material interests were inextricably entangled with those rights. 152 The
planters believed wholeheartedly that “though we are in Jamaica, we cannot forget that we are
Englishmen,” entitled to all the rights thereof as much as they could be realized in a tropical
island five thousand miles distant.153 On the other hand, as Wilson also perceptively notes,
imperial authorities “did not accept the Assembly’s suggestion that Jamaica’s constitution was
the English constitution.”154 Neither side was prepared openly to retreat from its principles.
But the crown needed more from the Jamaican assembly than they needed from it.
Whitehall had no appetite in the post-Glorious Revolution era for direct coercion of the colonies,
no desire to sacrifice royal autonomy in colonial affairs by resorting to parliamentary legislation,
and no inclination to finance colonial government from metropolitan coffers. However,
Whitehall also needed to extend the umbrella of imperial defense to the empire’s most important
colonies, and to ensure that the colonies had functional government. The metropolitan authorities
were therefore caught in a bind. Some of their interests would have to be sacrificed for the
advancement of the rest. The Jamaican elite did not have this problem, since both their material
and ideological interests pointed towards increased autonomy within the overarching imperial
structure. Yet they labored under the disadvantage that the authority to make formal change in
the system rested with the metropole, which remained one of the assumptions of the transatlantic
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political culture. The result was a series of informal and readily disavowed compromises, which
could not remove the fundamental constitutional instability of the arrangement that had pertained
ever since the Glorious Revolution had failed to complete the crossing of the Atlantic. Governors
might ameliorate the situation, as Hunter did, or they might exacerbate it, as Hamilton did. But
both were equally incapable of remedying it.
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Chapter VI
The Final Perpetual Revenue Crisis in Jamaica, 1716-1729
In 1729, the privy council approved a bill passed by the Jamaican assembly establishing a
perpetual revenue, in exchange for perpetual confirmation of the colony’s basic laws. The
struggle had been spirited, lasting six years and encompassing three expirations of the laws and
revenue settled by the 1704 act. In the end, however, the crown had notionally realized the goal it
had sought since 1677. In what was now the empire’s richest colony, whose exports were worth
over £65,000 a year to the customs in Britain, there was now also permanent fiscal provision for
imperial government.1 But in practice, the revenue the assembly voted was inadequate even for
the regular expenses of the government, and made no provision for additional subsistence for the
garrison companies. The Jamaican elite absolutely refused to grant the colonial government the
fiscal independence the crown so badly desired, because the planters knew they had no better
safeguard for their rights, and no better promoter of their interests, than the assembly’s power of
the purse. The crown was constrained to accept this inadequate settlement, because there was no
politically viable alternative to cooperation with the local elites.
However, the Jamaican elite were also disappointed by the settlement. They would no
doubt have preferred to grant the crown less than the £8,000 per annum eventually voted. And
they also strove throughout the process to secure statutory confirmation of the rights of
Englishmen in Jamaica, but were denied at every turn. The assembly were compelled to agree to
these terms because, as Agnes Whitson has written, they were “the price which had to be paid for
the confirmation of the island’s laws.” 2 Thanks to the peculiarities of its founding and the
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crown’s attentions in the 1670s and 1680s, Jamaica’s basic laws expired when the revenue did.
Without new royal assent, even if the assembly were to reenact them, the laws would have no
legitimacy among a self-consciously English people. The Jamaican elite therefore had no choice
but to make concessions.
Historians who consider this struggle have taken a somewhat rosier view than I do here.
They have generally followed Whitson in concluding that “the Crown was the less fortunate” in
this encounter.3 Jamaica, with its laws confirmed, was now ready to “extort what it pleased from
[the governor],” in the mold described by Jack Greene for the southern royal colonies, without
having made crippling sacrifices.4 Indeed, the Jamaican elite had ostensibly secured one of their
fondest ambitions, for as Greene writes, a clause in the perpetual revenue act “formally
guaranteed by statute their rights to the protection of all English laws.” 5 This is, however, an
extremely generous interpretation of the facts, for the act did not resolve the fundamental conflict
of rights. The final perpetual revenue act did include a clause appropriating “‘all such laws, and
statutes of England as have been at any time esteemed, introduced, used, accepted, or received,
as laws of this island […] for ever.’”6 However, the clause was not a major concession, as
Greene contends. In the final bill, the assembly had been forced to retreat from their earlier
preferred appropriation of English law, which had included all statutes “concerning the life,
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liberty, and property of the subject.”7 In so doing, the Jamaican elite had failed to secure the
habeas corpus act, their most cherished aim,. 8 Indeed, when the law officers first reviewed what
would become the final clause in 1724, they were little worried, noting that the clause would
change nothing about the legal regime in Jamaica. 9 The “rights” the Jamaican elite had won in
this confrontation were without substance.
Indeed, little had changed in the struggle between the Jamaican assembly and the British
crown. The crown still wielded the prerogative to frustrate the Jamaican elite’s aspirations to
enjoy the rights and privileges of Englishmen, and could yet employ it to revise any temporary
concessions of powers to the assembly. The Jamaican assembly, for their part, still utilized the
power of the purse to thwart the crown’s ambitions for fiscal independence, and therefore
freedom of action, for royal government in the colony. Nor did either side yet possess the will or
the means to force its preferred solution on the other. 1729 therefore represented the closest
approach to a negotiated constitutional settlement between a colonial assembly and the crown,
and yet it settled nothing fundamental whatsoever. The conflict between crown and assembly,
imposed by the structures of transatlantic politics and political culture, would not, and indeed
could not, cease.
Prelude to Confrontation, 1716-1723
As they had done in the early 1690s by sending out William Beeston after Albemarle’s
conduct had poisoned Jamaican politics, the metropolitan authorities dispatched a Jamaican as
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governor to calm affairs after Hamilton’s disastrous tenure. Nicholas Lawes had lived in Jamaica
from 1663 to 1703, becoming one of the wealthiest planters in the island, before removing to
London.10 Moved by “gentlemen and merchants, our friends in England,” as he told the
assembly, “to quit the retreat I had given myself up to,” he sought and received the appointment
in 1717, though he was already sixty-five years of age. 11 Like his predecessor, Lawes arrived in
Jamaica with a demanding remit. He was principally charged with settling the revenue, making
real estate liable for payment of debts, getting the Hamilton debt repaid, and making all monies
raised payable to the receiver general, all while promoting unity and tranquility. 12
Unlike Hamilton, Lawes did not make a difficult situation worse through his own
incompetence. To be sure, he was not blameless. He insisted on a council dominated by
Hamilton’s partisans before he left for Jamaica, thereby ensuring conflict between them and an
assembly still dominated by the opposition.13 But he made few other missteps, and certainly none
that rivalled Hamilton’s. Indeed, when Lawes stepped down as governor in 1723, the assembly
had complained of him directly only once, and then on a minor matter. 14 Like Lynch and Beeston
before him, his connections to the planter elite, and knowledge of island society, had enabled
Lawes to navigate the treacherous waters of Jamaican politics more skillfully than a gardenvariety Hanoverian courtier could have done. And Lawes’s absenteeism had detached him

10

Cundall, Governors, 75.

11

Lawes’ speech to the assembly of Jamaica, 1 August 1718, JAJ, II, 256; Joseph Addison to board of trade, 21 June
1717, CO 137/12/145; Cundall, Governors, 74.
12

Instructions for Lawes, 11 October 1717, CO 138/15/353-490, esp. 414-421; Board of trade to Addison, 11 October
1717, CO 138/15/345-52; Lawes’ speech to the assembly of Jamaica, 1 August 1718, JAJ, II, 255.
13

Memorial of Lawes to board of trade, 29 August 1717, CO 137/12/342. This slightly belies the praise generally
given to Lawes for seeking “to conciliate all parties,” as Cundall puts it (Cundall, Governors, 77).
14

The incident was a complaint in the summer of 1721 about his refusal to employ his police authority to apprehend
a group of absenting members. JAJ, II, 380-3, 386-7.

246

personally from the crisis that immediately preceded his governorship, which also aided him in
reducing the island’s political temperature.
However, Lawes’s instructions ensured conflict with the Jamaican elite. Settling the
revenue and empowering the receiver general would both, in their own ways, contribute to fiscal
independence and freedom of action for the crown’s government. Meanwhile, the planters would
bitterly resist any legislation that might imperil their sugar-producing lands for the sake of debts
owed across the ocean. Moreover, multiple assemblies resolved repaying the Hamilton debt
would “tend to the entire subversion of the nature of assemblies” by making them no more than a
rubber stamp for the governor and council’s arbitrary choices on expenditures. 15 The insistence
of governor and crown on its repayment not only made clear to many of the Jamaican elite that
they were engaged in a battle for their rights as Englishmen, but also allowed the opposition to
make that argument convincingly to the electorate. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Lawes faced an
opposition majority in the assembly for almost all of his five-year tenure. And their repeated
successes in frustrating him demonstrated to the electorate that electing opposition assemblymen
could defend the Jamaicans’ rights as Englishmen.
Lawes was also hampered by two not unrelated trends in Jamaican affairs that accelerated
during his governorship. By the end of Lawes’s governorship, the process that had begun during
Beeston’s government had reached its conclusion. As Trevor Burnard argues, “[s]tarting in the
early 1720s […] the great planters of plantation America controlled society and culture.” 16 In
conjunction with the wealthy transatlantic merchants of Kingston, the Jamaican planter elite now
dominated the island. There were no structural fissures among them that a governor could
15
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profitably exploit to win even a sufficient minority’s acquiescence in the crown’s measures.
Moreover, they were “richer and more powerful than any other British American eighteenthcentury planter elite.”17 They were neither easily swayed by a governor’s honors nor intimidated
by his bluster.
The ascendancy of the planter elite, however, brought the problem of their internal
security into sharper relief. As the numbers of enslaved Africans shipped to Jamaica climbed in
the 1710s and 1720s, Edward Rugemer notes that so too did the numbers of those who escaped
to the island’s interior to join old or form new Maroon bands. Large new Maroon settlements
grew up both in the east and center of the island, and in the windward parishes particularly the
expansion of sugar plantations was met with Maroon raiding. 18 Lawes and the assembly agreed
on the necessity of sending out “parties” to attempt to suppress the Maroons. But as in all
previous instances, the parties met with no strategic success, while the governor and the
assembly repeatedly clashed over the scale and method of reimbursement. 19The Maroon threat
was enough to excite the planters to action, but insufficient to motivate unity with the colonial
executive.
Even when Lawes and his allies could put together a majority for the crown’s interests,
their triumphs were ephemeral. Though they succeeded in directing funds to the receiver general
once more, the terms of the bills made him no less responsible to the assembly than had been the
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commissioners.20 Meanwhile, three appropriations to the revenue did not stop its debts from
increasing from £5,430 in summer 1717 to £16,886 by winter 1723, when Lawes left the
government.21 Lawes himself had gone “without a shilling of the two last years’ salary” by that
point, and wrote the board that he would “have starved if I had not had a small fortune of my
own to live upon, which I have even in some measure exhausted in support of my character as
his Majesty’s governor and in doing him service.” 22
The assembly had appropriated over £20,000 in arrears on the additional duty and
deficiency tax to the revenue, theoretically sufficient to retire all the debts of the government. 23
However, collecting what the assembly had raised was beyond the capacity of the skeleton
colonial administration, which employed perhaps ten salaried officials in the whole of the island.
Instead, tax collection and the other measures of imperial government remained largely
dependent on local government institutions for their execution, and the vestry boards and justices
of the peace were evidently determined to withhold cooperation. 24 By appropriating the arrears,
however, they could cloak their defiance, and instead cast the blame on the incapacity of the
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crown’s officials.25 The colonial executive could do little to break the back of this resistance
without suing an impossibly large number of people. Even then, there would be no practical way
to enforce the decrees of the court without the cooperation of the very people being sued, short of
armed coercion.26 As ever, coercion was neither an appealing nor a practical solution, and Lawes
does not seem to have considered it.
Realizing his straits, like Hunter in New York, Lawes had written the board in autumn
1720 asking them to get a bill “into the House of Commons (though never passed) to settle a
revenue adequate to the charge of the government.”27 This, he believed, “would alarm [the
assembly], and incite them more to their duty” in aiding the revenue, and possibly paying the
Hamilton debt.28 He wrote the board at least six more times making this suggestion. As the
government grew more frustrating to Lawes, the threat element dropped away. It was replaced by
his argument that “there is no bringing these people to a sense of their duty but by settling his
Majesty’s revenue by Act of Parliament equal to the charge of the government.” 29
His reward was silence. The board wrote him only twice during his entire government,
both times before he made his plea for aid via parliamentary legislation. 30 This was partly
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because Henry Bentinck, the duke of Portland, was appointed as the new governor on 9
September 1721, not long after Lawes’s suggestion first arrived with the board. 31 The board
thereafter followed its usual practice of not bothering to write to the old governor. The lack of
communication with Lawes was also partly a result of what Steele has termed the board’s
“growing ineffectiveness” and loss of diligence in colonial correspondence after 1714. 32
Nevertheless, the board knew that Lawes’s plan would entail the expenditure of valuable
parliamentary time and political capital in order to secure a few thousand pounds a year from but
one of the crown’s colonies. This was a woeful mismatch of means to ends, without even
considering the difficulty of enforcing the law once made, or the self-defeating nature of
involving Parliament in a controversy linked to the extent of the prerogative. What limited
attention the board did have for Jamaican governance was instead given to a more realistic
solution to the problem of the expiration of the laws and revenue.
The board commenced their inquiry in 1722, only two years before the expiration. After
consulting with their lawyer West and the law officers, they recommended a reprise of the
approach taken two decades before.33 They represented to the king that “the renewal of [the
laws] is a grace which the people of Jamaica cannot reasonably expect from your Majesty
without a suitable return for the same.”34 That return, they counseled, should be “a settled
revenue equal to the present expenses of your government there,” preferably perpetually but for
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twenty-one years at least.35 Portland was authorized to make this deal by his additional
instruction of 13 April 1722.36
As in the early 1700s, the metropolitan authorities were determined to maximize the
leverage granted them by their possession of the right to review colonial laws. Jamaica was
unique among the British North American and Caribbean colonies in that a substantial body of
its foundational laws were not confirmed in perpetuity, but required periodic reconfirmation by
the crown. Not even New York, England’s other seventeenth-century Atlantic colonial conquest,
labored under that disadvantage. The crown’s negotiating position was therefore much stronger
in Jamaica than it was anywhere else, provided the time for reconfirmation of the laws was nigh.
In the early 1700s, imperial authorities had combined that leverage with the threat of confirming
the 1688 revenue bill to win a twenty-one-year grant of the revenue, by far the longest achieved
after the turn of the century throughout the colonies. Two decades later, the crown would hold
the basic legal framework of Jamaica to ransom once again, but this time without an added
threat. It remained to be seen whether the Jamaicans could be induced to pay a higher price than
in 1704.37
The structural constraints that had foiled the crown at the turn of the century, however,
had changed little. The Jamaican elite remained keenly aware that the strength to defend their
rights and advance their interests stemmed from the assembly’s power of the purse. Any grant
that gave the colonial executive fiscal independence would harm them as much as, and probably
more than, a lack of confirmed laws. The Jamaican elite also remained capable as ever of playing
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upon the distinction between the interests of the governor and those of the crown. The crown had
never even hinted at a willingness formally to concede the rights of Englishmen to White
Jamaicans in the few previous rounds of direct negotiations, and the assembly had no ready
means to persuade Whitehall. Governors, however, were much more ideologically flexible when
their salary hung in the balance, and might pass objectionable bills that the crown would then
find it hard to reject. Lastly, the metropolitan authorities remained unwilling and unable to
legislate a solution through Parliament, or to enforce anything on the colonists without the
cooperation of a critical mass of the elite. 38 There were no structural fissures among them that a
governor could profitably exploit to win even a sufficient minority’s acquiescence in the crown’s
measures.
First Attempts at Resolution, 1723-1724
Portland was not an outstanding candidate to perform the extremely difficult and delicate
task before him. His political experience certainly had not recommended him, for he had only
served four years in the Commons before ascending to the Lords upon his father’s death, and
was an equally inactive Whig in both houses. He had inherited extensive properties from his
father, Hans Willem Bentinck, the earl of Portland and William III’s favorite, and before 1720
his wealth might have rivaled even that of the Beckfords. But he had suffered massive losses in
the South Sea bubble, and so was by no means indifferent to the financial lures the assembly
could provide. Indeed, he had likely accepted the Jamaica post, the most lucrative of the colonial
governorships, to help recover his fortune. Nevertheless, he had been entrusted with the
government of Jamaica at the most critical time for the crown’s interests. 39
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Portland did, however, possess one signal advantage in dealing with a people Sarah Yeh
has argued were desperate “to convince British observers of their genteel civility.” 40 He was a
duke, the highest-ranking aristocrat to govern a colony since Albemarle some thirty-five years
before. He had a cachet that Lawes did not, and the Jamaican planters were probably eager to
socialize with such a luminary and bask in the reflected glow of his prestige. Even before
Portland’s arrival, in fact, the assembly had voted £300 worth of credit to the receiver general in
November 1722 to pay for a proper reception for Portland and his wife. The assembly had rarely
extended such a courtesy before, and never on such a scale. 41 Indeed, though Portland presided
over bitter controversies in his government, the assembly were extraordinarily careful never to
impugn him personally.42
Portland emphasized his prestige when he met the assembly for the first time in spring
1723, noting that he had made personal “application to [the king] in your behalf” concerning the
proposed exchange of the revenue for the confirmation of their laws. 43 Seeking to trade on the
Jamaican elite’s appreciation of his status, as well as the early goodwill most governors enjoyed,
he concluded that he had therefore “in a manner become guarantee” for the assembly’s passing
the bill.44 It was an argument designed to flatter the Jamaican elite with a duke’s close
involvement in their affairs, but also to warn them against disappointing him.
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The assembly, for their part, were well aware of the proposed arrangement. Led by the
Beckfords and the Irish lawyer Andrew Arcedeckne, they had twice worked on perpetual
revenue bills during Lawes’s government. 45 In both cases, however, the bill was considered in
direct response to affronts offered to their rights by officers of the government. 46 The trade they
envisioned was not merely revenue for confirmation of their laws. Instead, the majority in the
assembly wanted to confirm by law that Jamaicans held all the rights of Englishmen on which
they so vigorously insisted. The crown had rejected all their previous efforts, stretching back to
the 1680s, but the Jamaicans were not deterred. Just as imperial authorities knew that the
expiration of the laws was their best chance to win a revenue from the Jamaicans, so too the
Jamaicans knew that the expiration of the revenue was their best chance to wring concessions
from the crown, and they were prepared to deal.
Lawes had rebuffed the assembly’s efforts, believing them insincere, but Portland did not
share his predecessor’s hesitance.47 On 9 February 1723, within three weeks of calling the
assembly, Portland passed a perpetual revenue bill that also secured “all the general known laws,
statutes, customs, and usages of England concerning the life, liberty, and property of the subject”
to the Jamaicans.48 Along with it, he passed a bill for better collection of the debts due to the
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government, and a bill that doubled his already considerable £2,500 salary, both of which
certainly contributed to easing his passage of the perpetual revenue bill. 49 The Jamaican
assembly had proven willing to buy their rights, and Portland had proven equally ready to sell
them. But unfortunately for the assembly, the metropolitan authorities still had to approve the
transaction. The Jamaicans would have to hope that the crown preferred a problematic bill to no
bill at all, and that Portland would lobby effectively on the bill’s behalf.
Portland knew he had “not [..] literally conformed” to his instructions, especially in
failing to secure a clause in the perpetual revenue bill suspending its operation until the king in
council ruled on it.50 His principal argument to the board was that since the assembly were
willing to make the trade, he was unwilling to “hazard […] their continuing in the same mind, till
a draught of such revenue act could be transmitted to England,” especially since the Jamaicans
were a “people who have formerly given too many proofs of their inconstancy.” 51 He did add,
however, that there was “a full and ample provision made for the revenue,” and urged the board
not to discard such a signal gain.52
Portland’s letter and the enclosed bills did not meet with a kind reception in London after
arriving there on 1 May 1723.53 The law officers disliked the appropriation of English law in the
act, particularly noting that the institution of habeas corpus had “often been attempted in Ireland,
and the crown has, for weighty reasons, never thought fit to consent to it even in that kingdom,”
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let alone a colony five thousand miles distant. 54 The commissioners of the treasury, in a later
report, concluded that the act would provide no more than £6,000 per annum, while expenses
were roughly £8,000 per annum. Likely well aware that it would be a Herculean task to get the
assembly ever to revisit the terms of a perpetual revenue, the commissioners concluded that the
shortfall would “ruin the credit and distress the government there.” 55 And all parties agreed that
confirmation “would, in a great measure, take off the dependence of that island from the crown
of Great Britain.” 56 The metropolitan authorities therefore repealed both the perpetual revenue
bill and the bill for Portland’s salary.57 A letter nominally from the king was sent to Portland
castigating him for “hav[ing] not paid that due regard to our repeated instructions which we
might have expected.” Portland was instructed to send over a draft bill, with a full “establishment
of the whole expense […] of that our island” in time for it to be considered and settled before 1
October 1724.58
The crown had chosen a confrontational approach, and one that would be particularly
unwelcome to the Jamaicans. The insistence on the draft bill and the comparison to Ireland
would both have been unpleasantly reminiscent of the crown’s measures in the Poynings’ Law
crisis, when the crown had sought to enforce an Irish model of government on Jamaica that
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required all laws to be approved in London before they could be passed in Jamaica. As in 1678,
so in 1724 the Irish parallel would have served as proof that the metropolitan authorities
regarded White Jamaicans as constitutional inferiors. The Jamaican elite believed they were
asking only for a clear acknowledgement of rights they possessed by the incontrovertible fact of
their Englishness. But the crown had indicated to them that their rights were in fact regarded as
inconvenient at best, and dangerous to the metropole’s interests at worst.
Portland learned of some of these objections before the bills’ formal rejection, and so
changed his public tune when he met the assembly on 1 October 1723. He told them that they
had “exceeded, by your demands in that bill, what I informed you his majesty was graciously
inclined to grant, without even so much as effectually performing, on your parts, what was with
reason and equity expected from you.”59 However, the assembly absolutely refused to “reduce
the constitution here to one […] much worse than that of Ireland” by accepting Whitehall’s
revision of their bills.60 They also objected to the suggestions for a new bill the council had sent
down, which framed their rights and privileges “as an act of grace and favor” to which they had
no prior claim. Instead, as Peter Beckford junior reported from committee, “after about sixty
years’ trial […] your committee cannot conceive why such laws should not be as competent for
his majesty’s free-born subjects in Jamaica, as those in England.” 61 The assembly had
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comprehensively rejected the crown’s arguments, refusing to retreat from their defense of
Jamaicans’ rights as Englishmen, even with the expiration of their laws less than a year away.
Portland received the news of the bills’ formal rejection and the king’s letter on 12
November 1723. The king’s letter, and the report of the committee of the privy council, had
highlighted what the assembly knew but had evidently not wanted to admit. This was not, as in
the case of Poynings’ Law or the various iterations of the additional subsistence, a situation in
which the crown wanted something from the Jamaican elite much more than the Jamaican elite
wanted something from the crown. With the crown seeking a perpetual revenue, and the
Jamaican elite seeking confirmation of their fundamental laws and statutory recognition of their
rights as Englishmen, the two sides’ desires were much more equally balanced. Moreover, the
crown’s right to review colonial laws, and the Jamaican elite’s recognition of that right, meant
that the assembly had no way to secure what they wanted other than by passing a law that would
meet with both gubernatorial and royal approval. The metropolitan authorities had decided that
the assembly’s opening offer was insufficient—the colonists would have either to demand less or
to concede more, and preferably both. The assembly had little choice but to move in the crown’s
desired direction.
They did not, however, concede everything at once. They made some further provision
for the revenue, which Portland claimed would make the government “independent of the
people,” but only for £8,000 per annum, not the £10,000 that the treasury had demanded. 62 They
accepted the council’s recommendation to recede from much of the explicit appropriation of
English law on the “life, liberty, and property of the subject.” 63 Instead, the assembly included a
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deliberately vague clause making all “such laws of England as have been accepted and used in
Jamaica” permanent laws of the island.64 They also refused to send over a draft bill. In a clear
reference to the Poynings’ Law crisis, assembly leaders informed Portland “that it has been
attempted before, and that the strength of their objection, or reason, had always prevailed.” 65
Therefore, after the council and assembly passed the bill, Portland transmitted it to London
without first giving his assent, which was the closest he could come to sending a draft
beforehand.66
The board received the new perpetual revenue bill and all the relevant minutes only on 25
June 1724, with just over three months before the laws and revenue expired. 67 Neither the law
officers nor the treasury objected to the clause on the laws of England, which would remain in
every form of the bill until it was finally passed. 68 Jack Greene has argued that this was an
important concession, for “free Jamaicans had been formally guaranteed by statute their rights to
the protection of all English laws.”69
The law officers instead opined that the clause would not practically enforce any new
laws in Jamaica, and could thus be disregarded as a symbolic gesture. 70 However, the treasury
objected both to the continued insufficiency of the revenue and the assembly’s arrogation of the
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power to dispose of any surplus of the “patrimonial revenues of the crown” appropriated to the
revenue.71 The law officers’ principal concern was that if the £8,000 per annum proved
insufficient, then “the people of the island, having their laws secured to them in perpetuity, may
think themselves in a better condition to withstand even reasonable demands which may
hereafter be made by the government to supply any deficiencies on that head than they have
hitherto been whilst their laws were temporary and precarious.” 72 They knew how much leverage
the crown was giving up, and did not want it to go cheaply.
However, as in the early 1700s, the metropolitan authorities failed to understand the
perspective of the people with whom they were negotiating. The Jamaican assembly might give
the crown more revenue, but even under threat of “temporary and precarious” laws, they would
never give the crown enough. The assembly’s power to check the executive via the power of the
purse, as Parliament did in Britain, was too crucial to the defense of their rights and the
furtherance of their interests. They would never surrender it freely.
The law officers had cautiously suggested an alternative. In a representation made before
the 1724 revenue bill arrived, they had opined that it might still be theoretically possible for
Jamaica to be taxed via prerogative alone.73 However, they warned that this was only true if
Jamaica was “a conquered country,” and not “a colony of English subjects,” which they believed
was still an open question in law.74 The metropolitan authorities do not seem to have been
interested in attempting to settle the conflict in this manner. They knew that prerogative taxation,
71
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which was explicitly prohibited in the metropole by the 1689 Bill of Rights, would provoke cries
of violation of the rights of Englishmen louder than any yet heard from the colonies. Nor would
they have wished to court the controversy Jamaicans in London would certainly succeed in
rousing in Parliament. And, of course, the metropolitan authorities were British Whig politicians
who had largely come of age after the Glorious Revolution, and were committed in Britain to
“revolution principles” that sharply limited the prerogative. Prerogative taxation, even in the
colonies, was probably too redolent of the worst excesses of arbitrary power in the seventeenth
century for their own sensibilities. The board therefore never even reported this opinion to the
privy council.
Expiration, Delays, and Further Attempts, 1724-1726
Instead, with only a few months remaining before the expiration of the laws and the
revenue, the metropolitan authorities chose delay. To give themselves time to puzzle over the
right approach, the privy council ordered the board on 23 July to instruct Portland to get a oneyear continuation of the laws and the revenue passed in Jamaica. 75 But before this instruction
could arrive in Jamaica, the laws and revenue together expired on 1 October 1724. Indeed,
Portland still had not received his new instructions before urgent business forced him to
reconvene the assembly on 20 October. The deficiency and additional duty bills were about to
expire, and Portland had no desire to be forced into Hamilton’s choice of subsisting the soldiers
himself or watching them starve.76
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The assembly’s first action was to bring in a bill reviving the laws of the island for a year.
The Beckfords, Arcedeckne, and the councilor Thomas Bernard were the authors of the renewal
bill, and Portland believed they were motivated by “nothing but disorder and faction.” 77 But he
took advantage of their desire for the bill, and the Jamaican elite’s general “apprehension of the
want of their laws,” to secure a valuable concession.78 In exchange for Portland’s assent to the
reviving bill, the assembly passed an additional revenue bill, which Portland crowed was so
incautiously drafted as to be “to time indefinite,” and would stand until a new perpetual revenue
bill was passed.79 Portland passed the bills on 13 November 1724, having just received the
authorization from London to consent to the one-year renewal. 80 He secured the deficiency bill
later in the session, but the assembly refused to pass an additional duty that did not lay an extra
tax on slaves landed by the South Sea company, and so he ended the session on 27 November. 81
White Jamaicans’ desire to have their fundamental laws operable had given Portland the
leverage he needed to win a victory for the crown. He had secured an unencumbered aid to the
treasury that would last until there was a new long-term perpetual revenue bill, and in a short
January session his allies pushed through a bill to address the massive arrears of taxes. The
Jamaican government would thus be on much firmer fiscal ground, which would make Portland
“better able henceforward to engage them into a compliance with whatever instructions I may
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receive.”82 If the standoff over the laws and the revenue continued, the crown’s government in
Jamaica might now be able to outlast the assembly.
But the victory was not as unambiguous as Portland imagined. Though Portland told the
board that “I look upon [the arrears bill] to be a great step towards the support of the public
credit,” Lawes’ government had made it clear that debt collections bills were unlikely to have
much effect.83 Moreover, Portland’s choice to drive a hard bargain at this preliminary stage,
before the greater matter of the long-term revenue was settled, was a risky one. It could very well
provide the opposition with legitimate grounds to argue that the crown intended to milk the crisis
for all it was worth, at the expense of White Jamaicans’ rights and interests.
Like every governor before him in both Jamaica and New York, Portland had also
underestimated the sincerity of his opponents’ motives. Doubtlessly some wealthy Jamaican
planters wanted to reduce their tax burden, some also benefited from the inability of their
creditors to sue them in the courts while the laws were lapsed, and some saw personal political
advantage in posing as champions of the rights of Jamaicans. However, Portland’s suggestion
that they were concerned with nothing more than “disorder and faction” rings extremely hollow.
As men who sat at the pinnacle of Jamaican society, they shared their British counterparts’
preference for order and hierarchy, and their deeply ingrained commitment to government by
laws. Portland knew some of this—he had mentioned the Jamaicans’ “apprehension for their
laws” as the reason he was able to pass his additional revenue bill—but evidently not all. He
does not seem to have realized that White Jamaicans genuinely prized their rights and liberties as
Englishmen, and would never give the crown’s government in Jamaica the fiscal independence
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to threaten them. His blithe assurance to the board that the assembly would now “always be glad
to grant the old revenue, for the sake of renewing their old laws,” was dependent on this
fundamental misapprehension and underestimation.84 Portland, like governors and ministers
before him, was unwilling to recognize that the Jamaicans thought of themselves as Englishmen,
and unable to ascribe to his opponents the principled motives he claimed for himself.
Meanwhile, the board of trade had settled on an approach to securing the perpetual
revenue bill back in August 1724. They told the duke of Newcastle, secretary of state for the
south, that “this may be the best opportunity his Majesty will have to engage the people of
Jamaica to make such a firm and lasting provision as may be sufficient for his Majesty’s service,
and for their own security.”85 They therefore recommended that the “attorney and solicitor
general […] form the draft of a bill for this purpose as near the plan of that sent from Jamaica as
may be, free from the several objections” already made. 86 It would be transmitted to Portland,
“with orders to recommend the same to the council and assembly of Jamaica, as the terms upon
which his Majesty will be graciously pleased to renew their laws.” 87 The last draft bill
transmission from London had ended in the conspicuous failure of the Poynings’ Law crisis, and
the Jamaicans now had decades of tradition with which to resist such a maneuver. However, the
board’s disinclination to regard Jamaicans as true Englishmen, and their sense that the crown
was poised at a position of maximum leverage in this peacetime confrontation, together seem to
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have convinced them that they could not let slip this opportunity to perfect the revenue situation
in Jamaica.
But there the matter rested in the metropole for nearly seven months, as Jamaican affairs
retreated to the low priority they normally enjoyed. Not until 3 March 1725 did the king in
council order the law officers to prepare a draft as per the board’s representation. 88 Nor did the
law officers act speedily. As Portland would later tell the Jamaican assembly, in words Hunter
would have found very familiar, “the business of parliament has prevented those to whom it was
recommended to give it that dispatch we all hoped for.” 89 The king’s desire to depart for
Hanover once the session was finished left the privy council only with enough time to authorize
Portland to pass another one-year continuance of the laws and revenue. 90 The board wrote
Portland on 30 June 1725 to inform him of the same, ensuring that there would be hardly any
time in Jamaica to get a continuance passed before the new 1 October 1725 deadline.
Portland did not receive the board’s letter until early September, and thereupon promptly
called the assembly together. The revenue was not in as happy a situation as he might have
hoped. Predictably, the arrears bill had achieved little, with the arrears of taxes now swollen to
over £25,000.91 Portland asked the assembly for a new bill, “since it would be to no purpose to
make laws, and then to have them laid by like waste paper.” 92 But as in Lawes’s government,
making toothless debt collection bills was exactly what served the interests of the Jamaican elite
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best. They appeared as though they were complying with the governor’s demands, while
highlighting the necessity of their genuine cooperation by reserving it. All the crown’s
alternatives to securing that cooperation were either fiscally or ideologically unpalatable.
The opposition majority in the assembly seemed resolved to put Portland’s mettle to the
test in a confrontation. They moved slowly on the continuing bill, not sending it up to Portland
and the council until the night of 1 October, the deadline day. Without enough time for formal
review and assent, the bill was invalidated, and Jamaica’s laws expired for the second time in as
many years. Portland claimed that the opposition leaders had done this deliberately, since the
opposition believed “that they had better be without laws than to have them renewed yearly,
which (as they pretended to perceive) was the intention of the ministry at home.” 93 He was
probably right. After all, the assembly had seen the price of such renewals just the previous year,
when Portland had strong-armed them into granting the additional revenue. Extracting short-term
concessions was their game, and they were determined not to be beaten at it again.
The additional revenue was the opposition’s next target. They sought to tack a repeal to
the deficiency bill, and expelled Portland’s “friends who opposed this tack.” 94 Portland resisted
this bitterly, complaining to the assembly that they had “put him under the difficulty of
disagreeing to a bill in other respects so useful to the public, or to assent to it in manifest
contradiction to his majesty’s positive directions.” 95 That was, of course, exactly the point.
Whichever decision Portland made, the opposition would win some kind of victory. He could
reject the deficiency bill, but then the soldiers would have no funds for their additional
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subsistence, while the Jamaicans would have fewer taxes due. Or he could pass the deficiency
bill, but then lose his additional revenue achievement of the previous year and the flexibility it
gave the government. On 22 November 1725, Portland chose to reject the deficiency bill and
sacrifice the soldiers’ subsistence for a few months, and then prorogued the assembly. 96
Portland protested bitterly to the board that he could have made some headway if he had
any control over patronage in the island.97 He had been inveighing against the patent officers
since his arrival, correctly noting that they “think themselves entirely independent on the
governor” since he had no influence over their appointments.98 Now, he argued to the board that
“all […] the government here has to influence is the people’s expectations of being
recommended to favors from home,” particularly for council positions. 99 But, as Bernard Bailyn
has argued, imperial authorities preferred to disburse colonial offices to serve metropolitan
political purposes.100 They had therefore relentlessly disregarded their governor’s
recommendations, and Portland had little else to offer to those who wished to side with him. He
was a British politician unable to pull the key lever of British politics.
Moreover, with all the annual aids to the revenue expired, the assembly’s leverage over
Portland had increased. They passed a new perpetual revenue bill on 18 January 1726. Then,
they tacked payment for an agent of their own in London, the repeal of the additional revenue,
and a supplemental salary for Portland to the deficiency bill.101 Portland refused to pass these
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bills, and prorogued the assembly to mid-February. Portland forcefully reminded the assembly in
the next session of “the respect or duty you owe his majesty as your sovereign,” but to little
avail.102 The assembly passed their perpetual revenue bill again on 17 February 1726, and
repeated the tack of Portland’s supplemental salary to the deficiency bill. 103 The council, as
interested as the assembly were in renewing the laws, passed the perpetual revenue bill a week
later.104 Portland withheld his assent, unwilling to contravene his instructions directly.
The assembly took the opportunity afforded by his delay to state their case clearly to the
Jamaican electorate and to Whitehall. In an address to Portland of 25 February, they again
strenuously objected to submitting to draft legislation from Britain, following their “predecessors
[who] formerly asserted their right of framing their own bills […]in a reign less favorable to the
liberties of the people than the present is.”105 From the Poynings’ Law crisis to the present day,
they contended, White Jamaicans had followed the example of “their mother country, who can
endure no laws but those of her own choosing.” 106 Though the stakes were not as high in 1726 as
they had been in 1678, the Jamaican elite remained equally determined to preserve their
inheritance of English rights and privileges, “which distinguishes his majesty’s subjects from
those of arbitrary princes, or rather differences his freemen from their slaves.” 107 In a colony that
was nine-tenths enslaved Africans, there could be no more forceful (or fanciful) declaration of
the stakes.
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When Portland delayed further, the opposition leaders determined explicitly to use his
supplemental salary as further leverage. They had already tacked his salary to the deficiency bill.
Now the assembly resolved, on 2 March 1726, “that this house will not pass any money-bill, till
they know the state of the perpetual bill now before his grace.” 108 Once again, the assembly had
laid bare the divergence between the interests of the governor and those of the crown. If Portland
wanted the soldiers’ additional subsistence, and the sweetener of his supplemental salary, he
would have to buck his instructions and pass the assembly’s perpetual revenue bill.
On 5 March, Portland passed the perpetual revenue bill. He then told the assembly that
“since he had complied with the desires of the house, he hoped they would proceed to the speedy
dispatch of the other public affairs before them.” 109 The assembly responded by immediately
passing the deficiency bill and an extension to Portland’s supplemental salary for the rest of his
government, the latter only to take effect if the perpetual revenue bill received the royal assent. 110
Portland assented to these bills, and in his speech ending the session proclaimed that “the whole
community of this island, and the interests of all traders hitherto” required the renewal of the
laws.111
The impression that Portland had traded his assent for his own material gain was and is a
hard one to shake. Portland was therefore at pains, in his 11 April letter to the board, to convince
them that his opponents were beyond persuasion. Malcontents, debtors who wished to evade the
law, and those who had “obtained a sort of tribunitial authority” through “deluding the populace
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with the specious notions of rights, liberties, and privileges” had united against him and for the
new perpetual revenue bill.112 Portland scornfully claimed that the whole grouping affected a
“character as patriots,” mimicking the opposition to the government in Britain, and like those
Patriots invariably sought to distress the public for private ends. 113 However, unlike the
government in Britain, Portland faced an opposition majority he could not persuade, undercut, or
intimidate. Therefore, Portland told the board he had no way to address the “incurable confusion
and distraction” of affairs in Jamaica but by agreeing to “what appeared to be against his
Majesty’s instructions.”114
Portland also had a real interest in seeing the perpetual revenue bill approved, as did all
governors who struck such deals with the assemblies. Were it to be rejected at home, his ability
to negotiate credibly with the Jamaicans in the future might seriously be hampered. Moreover,
his supplemental salary for the rest of his government was dependent upon its passage. Portland
therefore informed the metropolitan authorities that the bill achieved their desired ends. The
“revenue given by it,” he wrote, “is by experience found to exceed the estimate of the charges
considerably,” and the bill did not grant the Jamaicans “the least color of title to any law of
England they had not before.” 115 Portland then assured the board that there was no better
settlement available. Indeed, if the bill met “with any disapprobation at home, it will be next to
an impossibility to bring them into any other so good and unexceptionable.” 116 Portland further
warned that “the people here […] never will, unless directly compelled, give way to any bill that
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has not its first rise among themselves,” an assertion that the assembly’s 25 February address
strongly substantiated.117 Portland therefore advised that the crown leave well enough alone, so
that the peace he had won by giving his assent could continue. 118 The settlement was not ideal,
perhaps, but it was much better than the alternative of nothing.
A Draft Bill? 1726-1727
The metropolitan authorities disagreed. The law officers and the board had at last finished
a draft of a perpetual revenue bill for Jamaica on 4 May 1726. The draft insisted upon a revenue
of £10,000 per annum, which covered both the existing £8,000 figure and £2,000 per annum for
the additional subsistence. The board were particularly concerned to include the latter, since it
had been imperiled “upon disputes that have arisen between governors and the assembly,
particularly during the Lord Archibald Hamilton’s administration.” 119 Far from settling for what
they could get, the metropolitan authorities were concerned to solve all the problems of
dependence upon the assembly in one fell swoop. The draft and attendant instructions were
approved by order in council of 5 July, and dispatched to Portland soon after, “as the terms
which his majesty expects […] in return to his gracious condescension in the confirmation of
their laws, and in departing from his patrimonial revenue in that island for their welfare and
defense.”120 One month later, the privy council rejected the bills Portland had sent over, and his
arguments, as “inconsistent with your majesty’s orders and instructions.” 121
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Imperial authorities had decided against compromise, coupling a lack of concessions with
demands of a particularly provocative nature. 122 Their requirement that the Jamaicans assent to a
draft sent over from London conjured the specter of the Poynings’ Law crisis, when the crown
had sought to insist that the Jamaican assembly could do no more than vote yea or nay on laws it
dispatched across the ocean. Though the attempted imposition of Poynings’ Law was fifty years
in the past, it still lived on in Jamaican memory, and moved the assembly to fight for their rights
once more. Permanent subsistence for the soldiers, meanwhile, would strip the assembly of the
annual fiscal leverage it exerted over the government. The opposition, in control of the assembly,
had shown twice in as many years that they would let the laws expire rather than accede to terms
less harsh than these. Imagining that they would not do the same in 1726 indicated that the
metropolitan authorities did not understand the people with whom they were dealing, or perhaps
that they were dealing with them at all.
Portland died the day before the privy council approved the draft bill, and so it arrived
with the president of the council, John Ayscough, in late September or early October. 123 Like
Lawes before him, Ayscough was a wealthy Jamaican planter deeply familiar with the island,
having begun his political career in the assembly of 1702. 124 However, the island was perhaps
too familiar with him. He had never, like Lawes or Beeston, spent a long period away from
Jamaica that might have detached him somewhat from its crises. Instead, Ayscough had been one
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of Hamilton’s partisans in the council, and so the opposition leadership personally resented him.
Ayscough too remembered the controversies of Hamilton’s government, and so recognized that
the provision for the two independent companies would be viewed as “entailing upon us a
military force to perpetuity, whereas the people of England only provide for the forces there from
year to year.”125 He knew the Jamaican elite would never accept such a differentiation.
Nevertheless, he presented the bill to the assembly when they met on 18 October 1726. 126
The opposition rejected the draft out of hand, and seized on Ayscough’s inartful reference to “his
majesty’s commands” to proclaim that Ayscough sought “the introducing of arbitrary power in
this […] colony.”127 The session spiraled ever further into contentiousness, with both crown’s
party and opposition eagerly contributing their share of petty juvenility, until Ayscough at last
dissolved the assembly on 17 January 1727. 128 The laws and revenue had now been expired for
over three months, and resolution of the crisis seemed further away than ever.
Back in London, the ministry chose a familiar face for the next governor on 14 February
1727. Robert Hunter would be heading back out to the colonies, this time to Jamaica. 129 Lustig
suggests only prosaic motives for this decision on Hunter’s part, noting that Hunter was “tired of
his post” as comptroller of the customs, and might have hoped the “warm, moist climate would
be soothing for his rheumatism.” She offers only that he “used his contacts among the Whigs” as
the mechanism by which he gained the post. 130 In the Newcastle era of colonial governance and
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patronage, that might have been all it was. But if the metropolitan authorities had a mind to
retreat from their hardline stance of the previous year, Hunter was certainly experienced in the
art of the colonial compromise.
And indeed, once Ayscough’s letters describing the reaction to the draft bill in Jamaica
reached them in the spring of 1727, the metropolitan authorities altered course slightly. The privy
council disclaimed any intention to set a precedent by draft transmission. Instead, they
authorized Hunter to pass any act that was “strictly agreeable to the said draught,” since they did
“not think it material to insist upon the form of passing it as transmitted from hence.” 131 Hunter
was also authorized to reduce the provision for the two independent companies to “a term certain
of as many years as he can obtain,” a concession for which Hunter had probably lobbied the
ministry directly.132
This retreat opened some space for accommodation. Unlike in 1677-80, the ministry
probably was genuinely indifferent to whether Jamaicans agreed to a draft or passed a bill for the
same purpose. Receding from the draft demand cost the metropolitan authorities nothing, while
potentially smoothing the way to settlement. The modification of the terms of subsistence for the
soldiers gave Hunter considerable leeway in working out an acceptable settlement, and he was a
man to take every inch he was given in constructing a compromise. However, this withdrawal
still left the metropolitan authorities advanced from the position they had taken at the beginning
of the crisis in 1722. Whitehall was still holding Jamaica’s basic legal framework to ransom, in
exchange for the perpetual revenue.
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In the meantime, the struggle in Jamaica over the draft bill sent over in 1726 intensified.
The new assembly met on 1 March 1727, and like the preceding body declined to consider the
draft, by a vote of 26-4.133 Instead, they offered a new revenue bill, drafted principally by
Beckford junior and Arcedeckne, which reduced the grant to twenty-one years. 134 In response to
the uncompromising stance offered by the draft bill, which Ayscough and the crown’s party had
reinforced, the opposition had stiffened their own posture. Ayscough therefore dissolved the
assembly after only two and a half weeks. 135
The next assembly of 25 May was even more belligerent, electing Thomas Beckford as
their speaker, throwing aside the draft bill without even a vote, and reintroducing their twentyone year revenue bill.136 The opposition also accused previous governors of deliberately
weakening the militia, “intending thereby not only to render the two independent companies
more necessary, but also to introduce a greater standing force, thereby to disquiet the people, and
endanger their liberties.”137 It was an argument fresh from the 1690s, raising the specter of
arbitrary power with the electorate while castigating the Whig government for allowing such a
betrayal of principle. The next day, a message drafted by Arcedeckne informed Ayscough that
the assembly did “not conceive that his gracious majesty ever intended to impose the draught
[…] although your honor, in a former speech as well as this, would tie them down to it.” 138
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Ayscough had no way of knowing that the assembly’s views on the subject now aligned with the
crown’s policy. Therefore, faced with another impasse, he prorogued the assembly after scarcely
a week.
Ayscough wrote the board that the opposition were making conscious use of their
leverage. They said, he alleged, “that if a governor don’t yield to their desires, they will grant no
supplies, and that if the government can subsist without money they can do so without laws.” 139
The fiscal crisis must indeed have become acute. The assembly had passed only one small
money bill since March 1726, the subsistence for the soldiers had run out in November 1726, and
the debts due to the government were proving as hard to collect as ever. 140 Yet Ayscough
pleaded with the board not to “recede from the draught of the bill.”141 If they backed down, he
predicted bitterly, “my successor will be very easy for the first year in his government.” 142 But
thereafter, he said, “once the assembly have got their laws made perpetual, and […] a sufficient
revenue is not therein provided for the support of his Majesty’s government equal to the annual
charge, a governor must be dependent upon them, and continual broils will ensue.” 143
He had almost certainly grasped the opposition’s intentions. The foremost weapon in
their arsenal for defense of their material and ideological interests remained the power of the
purse. The permanent establishment of their basic legal framework would avail the Jamaican
elite little if the governor and council had the fiscal independence to act as they wished. They
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would therefore endure technical and temporary lawlessness in order to ensure the long-term
capability to defend their rights and interests. The crown, for its part, had already accepted that it
could not win complete fiscal independence for Jamaican government, and had therefore
separated the soldiers’ subsistence from the rest of the perpetual revenue bill. This retreat from a
full-throated defense of the prerogative opened room for a negotiated settlement, but it remained
to be seen whether the opposition would consider it sufficient.
Resolution, 1727-1729
In the end, Hunter did not arrive until 29 January 1728. 144 He swiftly called elections, and
the new assembly met on 28 March 1728, again electing Thomas Beckford for their speaker. 145
They were, however, rather less truculent than the previous assembly. They were no longer
dealing with Ayscough, against whom many of the assembly either bore an old grudge from the
Hamilton days or a new one developed in the course of his presidency. Moreover, the island had
now been without its laws for over a year, and perhaps some were having second thoughts about
the wisdom of persistence.
Most seriously, the threat to planters’ property and persons from the Maroons had grown
considerably stronger during Portland’s government, as plantation expansion in the northeast of
the island “hemmed in [the Maroons] on all sides.” 146 Though the assembly and Portland had
agreed on large sums for repeated expeditions against the Maroons, the parties had enjoyed no
more success than previously, and the hostilities now verged on full guerrilla warfare. 147 The
144

Hunter to board of trade, 10 February 1728, CO 137/17/40. The delay was caused by the death of George I on 11
June 1727.
145

JAJ, II, 620.

146

Rugemer, Slave Law, 130.

147

Ibid. In 1724, for example, the assembly raised £6,000 for parties against the Maroons, fifty percent larger than
any previous appropriation. JAJ, II, 494.

278

planters’ primary interest was always their continued military dominance over the Black
population of the island, free and enslaved. Some in the assembly therefore likely thought it best
to settle with the crown, both to devote their attention to the problem of the Maroons and to
make a more convincing case for metropolitan aid in that struggle.
To ease the assembly’s path further, Hunter took a conciliatory tone, speaking of
“expectations” rather than “commands.”148 The experienced governor also assured the assembly
he would continue to seek their good in Jamaica as he had in Britain, “not barely as it is my duty,
but as I take it to be the most effectual method to recommend myself to […] royal favor and your
good opinion.”149 In response, the assembly passed the perpetual revenue bill, an additional duty
bill, the deficiency bill for the soldiers’ subsistence, and a bill for a £6,000 lump sum payment to
Hunter for his future supplemental salary within the next two weeks. 150 Hunter assented to all
these bills as they came to him, and then prorogued the assembly on 18 April 1728, thanking
them “for the dispatch […] given to the many matters of importance recommended to you.” 151
As this sudden munificence indicated, the price tag associated with colonial government
had never been the issue for planters that were rich and getting richer, their strategic “dubious
claims of poverty” aside.152 When faced with a perceived threat to their society’s very being like
the impending Maroon Wars, they were willing to reach into their deep pockets. Even that fear,
however, might not have been sufficient to overcome their equally deep-seated fear of executive
arbitrary power. But Hunter had not merely smoothed the way to settlement with encouraging
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words. He had continued the practice of permitting the assembly to make the receiver general
responsible to them as their own commissioner in the aids to the revenue. He had also granted
the Jamaicans the maximum allowable concession on the soldiers’ subsistence, as the deficiency
bill provided for only a single year’s allowance, and the perpetual revenue bill made no mention
of the soldiers. Hunter told the board that he “could not possibly prevail with the assembly to
pass it for a longer time,” though it is doubtful that he made any serious effort at a long-term
settlement.153 Rather, he recognized the need for cooperation with local elites, as he had in New
York, and knew better than to overplay his hand.
Ever the astute lobbyist, Hunter sympathetically reported the assembly’s reasons in
practical terms. He doubted that they would ever stop subsisting the soldiers, “because the
soldiers are useful in guarding the fortifications at Port Royal and keeping guard in the town,
which the inhabitants would otherwise be obliged to do.” 154 He noted also that such annual
provision was “most agreeable to the common practice in England,” and that the Jamaicans
“therefore desire to assimilate themselves as near as may be to their mother country.” 155 Hunter
had done his best to work out a settlement the Jamaicans would accept, and to argue that it was
one imperial authorities could approve without real loss. The question was whether his superiors
agreed.
The board received Hunter’s 16 May letter enclosing the acts on 23 July 1728, and
referred them to the law officers, who finally sent their report to the board on 9 May 1729. 156
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That report contained only two major complaints—the lack of provision for the receiver general
to account with the auditor general, and a broader description of the English laws confirmed in
Jamaica than the draft bill had provided. 157 The board decided that these objections, while valid,
were not important enough to forestall a settlement of the crisis, and that Hunter’s reasons for his
actions were satisfactory. They represented to the king on 14 May that since “the people of
Jamaica have already been for a considerable time in a state of anarchy for want of laws,” and
the assembly had passed a bill that agreed in substance with the draft, the bill ought to be
confirmed.158 The confirmation of the 1728 perpetual revenue bill by order in council followed a
week later, and with it, the fifty-year conflict over the perpetual revenue and the confirmation of
the laws in Jamaica came to an end.159
Nevertheless, the larger conflict between the rights and interests of the Jamaican elite and
those of the crown continued. The ground of the battle shifted somewhat, with regulation of the
Atlantic economy taking a more prominent position from 1729 onwards, but the old debates did
not disappear.160 The perpetual revenue proved immediately and predictably insufficient, and by
the 1750s provided for less than a sixth of the expenditures of the government. 161 The conflict
with the Maroons swelled into a war that lasted until 1739, and the crown sent over regiments to
help at the Jamaicans’ request, but the assembly still balked multiple times at paying an
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additional subsistence.162 And once that war was over, the Jamaicans renewed full opposition to
the crown’s prerogative measures, spiritedly resisting suspending clauses on revenue bills in the
1740s and 1750s. Indeed, they reached heights of defiance not seen since the Poynings’ Law
crisis in the privilege controversy of the 1760s, and resisted repayment of the treasury for
subsisting the soldiers in terms Hamilton and Lawes would have found painfully familiar. 163
The conflict persisted, in terms now familiar across nearly a century, because it could not
be resolved within the framework of the colonial governance of the first British empire. The
mutually exclusive interests of crown and assembly prevented any lasting compromise
settlement of the basic issues at stake. Nor could the assembly exercise leverage on the crown to
redress the balance of de jure and de facto power, as Parliament had done for centuries, and at an
accelerating rate after 1688. The assemblies did have leverage over the governors, and used it to
good effect. The crown itself, however, did not require funds from colonial assemblies in the
same way that it needed financial support from Parliament, and so could resist the assemblies’
demands far more effectively. However, neither could the crown realize in practice its great
theoretical powers in the colonies, as it had neither the will nor the means to compel assemblies
to raise money for its colonial governments. The metropolitan authorities could trade the royal
assent to bills in exchange for colonial concessions, but rarely were the colonists desperate
enough for that assent to give up anything the crown really wanted. And even when practically
the perfect situation obtained in the 1720s—Jamaica’s laws about to expire, and requiring crown
assent to continue—the most the crown could wring out of the Jamaicans was £8,000 per annum,
insufficient the day it was passed. The conflict between crown and assembly was thus like a
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rather more amicable Western Front, with both sides mired in stalemate, far better able to stand
on the defensive than take the offensive. Resolution would require a fundamental change in the
nature of the transatlantic British polity.
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Chapter VII
The Prerogative Sinks Ever Lower: New York, 1720-1732
New York did not have a contest between the prerogative and the rights of Englishmen
between 1720 and 1732 like the contemporaneous perpetual revenue crisis in Jamaica. Although
New York, like Jamaica, was a conquered colony, its fundamental laws were never at issue after
the permanent establishment of the assembly. Instead, William III had confirmed the
fundamental laws passed in the 1691 assembly in the mid-1690s, and the colony had thereafter
proceeded upon a reliable legal basis. 1 In consequence, the metropolitan authorities had no
leverage to force major concessions, such as a long-term revenue settlement, from the New York
assembly. The lack of major controversy can also be attributed to New York’s lesser importance
in comparison to Jamaica. New York’s strategic position in North America, though it had
elevated affairs in the colony to matters of imperial concern repeatedly between 1689 and 1713,
did not matter enormously in a period of relative European quiescence. Nor did New York have
the revenue potential of Jamaica. Though New York’s White population of 40,000 was five
times as large as that of Jamaica, New York raised less than half as much in taxes as Jamaica did
in the 1720s. And, though New York flour and beef helped sustain the Caribbean colonies, and
thus contributed indirectly to the customs revenue the crown took from sugar, New York’s own
exports directly to Britain were of little fiscal significance. 2 Confrontation in New York simply
did not promise the same prizes to the victor as in Jamaica.

1

Alan Tully has argued that New Yorkers were “frightened by the implications” of the conquest, and so “rarely
addressed the issue and collectively tried to brazen their way to safe ground.” Tully, Forming American Politics,
216. However, he cites no sources for this belief before the 1750s, and then only presents two.
2

The total value of New York’s exports to Britain by 1770 was still less than the customs duties paid on, let alone
the total value of, Jamaica’s sugar crop in 1730. Compare Rugemer, Slave Law, 131 with McCusker and Menard,
The Economic History of British America, 198-9.

284

Historians have, in response, tended to minimize the significance of the period in itself.
Ahead they have seen, as the historical actors themselves could not, the stormy years of William
Cosby’s governorship, the Zenger libel trial, and a bitter factional contest that produced a new
political alignment in the colony.3 In consequence, the whole period, especially the first half of
the 1720s, is treated as a prelude.4 Even those historians who treat the period on its own terms
rarely consider the conflict between the assembly and the crown, and indeed almost never accord
the metropolitan authorities any agency in the period at all. More typical is Patricia Bonomi’s
concentration on “the contest between factions in New York […] for power.” 5 This is
understandable, given these historians’ concentration on an American colony, but it is also
necessarily incomplete. The British colony of New York did not cease to exist in a transatlantic
context for twelve years, and neither did the metropolitan authorities’ attempts to govern it.
Amy Watson has helpfully argued for both continuity and Whitehall’s agency in this
period. She remarks that “despite narratives describing the 1710s to 1730s as a political era
devoid of ideological stakes, transatlantic partisan ideas continued to have a measurable impact
on New York politics.”6 Moreover, she sees in the political controversies of the 1720s “the long-
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standing Whig agenda to take more direct control over the justice system in New York […] to
bolster ministerial finances and executive authority.”7 I disagree with Watson’s assessment of the
particular issues. However, I wholeheartedly agree that in this period, New York elites struggled
with the colonial executive and with the metropolitan authorities in a transatlantic political
context, as they had done since the 1680s.
Though the fundamental conflict between the imperial government and the New York
elite did not reach the heights of Hunter’s early tenure, neither had it ceased. Throughout the
period, each side initiated battles over the power of the purse that inevitably also pitted the rights
of Englishmen against the prerogative. Indeed, the ministry won a victory in one of these,
enforcing the auditor general’s rights and extracting the payment of his fees in the mid-1720s.
Even this minor success, however, was secured only at the cost of the crown’s other interests in
the colony, and the imperial government was the loser in the rest of the fiscal contests in this
period. The crown retained, as ever, the right to strike down laws that infringed on its rights and
interests, and employed it during this period. However, with no independent method of financing
the colonial executive, and without the leverage it possessed in Jamaica, the crown had perforce
to permit most of the New York assembly’s fiscal infringements on the prerogative. And without
the power of the purse, the prerogative was hollow and fragile. Though there were no great
controversies, nevertheless, by the end of the period the prerogative was weaker in New York
than it had ever been in Jamaica.
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A New Governor, Imperial Ambitions, and the Auditor General, 1720-1724
Hunter’s replacement as governor was the thirty-two-year-old William Burnet, who
landed in New York on 16 September 1720. 8 Burnet was an administrative and political
neophyte, who held the undemanding post of comptroller of the customs. His father, Gilbert
Burnet, was a Scottish cleric and historian who was one of William III’s few close confidants,
and had become Bishop of Salisbury. William Burnet owed his position to his father’s Whig
connections, and maintained the network after his father’s death in 1715. Like Hunter, Burnet
was also scientifically inclined, and the two had become friendly after running in the same
circles since at least 1705, when Burnet was inducted into the Royal Society. Hunter certainly
wanted his successor not to criticize him to the metropolitan authorities or try to undo his
measures, as most of New York’s previous governors had sought to do to their predecessors, and
indeed as he had done to Cornbury. His choice evidently lit on Burnet, and in 1719 they
engineered an exchange of posts, which the ministry approved early the next year.
Burnet would face the same central challenge as had Hunter, for the one-year
continuation of the revenue that Hunter had secured was soon to expire when he arrived. And,
just as Hunter had, Burnet claimed the revenue was between two and three thousand pounds
short of the government’s expenditures. 9 Another struggle over the financial independence of the
colonial executive loomed.
Burnet also faced two challenges that Hunter had evaded. The first was a controversy
over the power of the purse. George Clarke, the deputy auditor general of the plantations for
New York, and Abraham de Peyster, the assembly-appointed treasurer, had been at loggerheads
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for years over de Peyster’s refusal to let Clarke audit his accounts. De Peyster and the majority in
the assembly had no interest in a royal official peering into their disposition of money, either
from an ideological or a material standpoint. They also quite rightly feared that Clarke sought to
collect the “ancient and established fees” due to the auditor general from the money the colony
had raised, which had not been paid since Cornbury’s time.10 Governor, council, and assembly
all had an interest in frustrating Clarke by retaining that money for official use, particularly since
the assembly’s treasurer already collected a commission on the revenue.
They could have defied Clarke alone with little trouble. But behind Clarke stood Horatio
Walpole, the auditor general of the plantations and the younger brother of Robert Walpole,
whose star was on the rise again after his resignation from the ministry in 1717. The younger
Walpole had launched a blistering attack on the assembly’s proceedings just before Burnet had
departed. He argued in a memorial to the treasury that the assembly had “tak[en] into their own
hands the sole management of the revenues raised for the support of his majesty’s civil
government, and entirely exclud[ed] the officers of the crown.” 11 Hunter, he believed, had been
forced to acquiesce to these “illegal and arbitrary proceedings” after several years of resistance,
because there had been “no effectual remedy applied from hence.” 12 If “something of effectual
weight” were not done, Horatio Walpole worried that inaction might erode the “natural
dependence which that colony ought to have on the government here.” 13 Of course, Walpole did
not say what might be “of effectual weight” to redress this fundamental problem, for there was
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nothing Whitehall was able or willing to do that would roll back the fiscal gains made by
colonial assemblies in the two decades of war with France. The smaller issue of Walpole’s fees
could, however, theoretically be addressed through a use of Burnet’s authority to disburse salary
warrants, if Burnet were willing to seek extra funds from the assembly or to sacrifice his own
salary. The younger Walpole, with little concern for the mechanics of imperial government in
New York, was probably hoping for such a resolution.
Fortunately for his own sake, Burnet received no instructions on the auditor general issue
before departing, which permitted him to commit no further than instructing de Peyster to
account with Clarke.14 The second challenge, however, was one Burnet had determined to bring
to the fore. The metropolitan authorities had naturally charged every governor of New York with
the defense of the frontiers. But Burnet was particularly spurred on by his “intense Whiggery
[…] sometimes indistinguishable from Francophobia” and Robert Livingston’s advice on policy
to embrace a larger goal.15 Burnet dreamed of a network of forts stretching from Albany to
Niagara and beyond, eventually leading to a huge web of indigenous alliances across the interior
of North America, and British dominance of the entire Great Lakes fur trade. 16 His enthusiasm
for the project, and the breadth of his imperial vision, exceeded that of all of his predecessors.
Indeed, Burnet would make securing funds from the assembly for his imperial aims his mission
throughout his governorship.
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Motivated by both pragmatism and his natural sympathies with the Morris-Livingston
party, Burnet retained the same assembly that had been elected under Hunter in 1716, believing
they would “be more tractable than ever in order to be continued.” 17 The opposition complained
that Burnet had violated precedent by refusing new elections, but in the short-term his decision
seemed to be justified. The assembly demanded nothing remarkable, and voted a new five-year
revenue without complaint. Then they passed two bills in aid of Burnet’s plans for the frontiers.
One was a bill “to prohibit the exportation of Indian goods to Canada, and to prevent a trade with
the French of that country,” and the other was a 2% duty on European goods to support
expenditures on the frontiers.18 Burnet declared the former act would be “the means of restoring
our influence over the five nations, and drawing new nations of Indians […] to trade with and
depend on us,” since the French would be deprived of the comparatively cheap English goods
that they traded to indigenous peoples for furs. 19 Meanwhile, the latter act, though it did lay a
burden on British material interests, had precedent. The duty on imported European goods had
existed in one form or another from 1692 to 1709, until it was discontinued because, as Burnet
had heard, “my Lord Clarendon made so ill a use of the public money.” 20 Burnet thought it a
small price to pay for beginning his network of forts, but just to be safe, he had made sure that
the assembly inserted a clause suspending it until royal determination could be had. 21 New
York’s new governor had made a remarkably auspicious start.
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Burnet believed he had been so successful because he had “adher[ed] firmly to Brigadier
Hunter’s friends,” rather than “giving way to a party that has gathered strength by his absence.” 22
Hunter’s “indefatigable enemy,” the merchant and councilor Adolph Philipse, had tried his
hardest “to sour the minds of the people against a support of government,” and had brought five
of the council, most prominently the former president Pieter Schuyler, along with him. 23 Burnet
had successfully intimidated some of them into quiescence, but asked for Philipse’s and
Schuyler’s removal.24 Their replacements, as per Burnet’s request, were Cadwallader Colden and
James Alexander, Hunter’s Scottish protégés who shared Burnet’s ambitious imperial vision. 25
However, just as Hamilton had earned himself powerful enemies in Jamaica by ousting Chaplin
and Blair from the council, so had Burnet with Philipse. Like his Jamaican near-contemporaries,
Philipse would add enduring personal spite to material and ideological interests as motives for
his opposition.
Moreover, the central infringement on the prerogative in Hunter’s time went
unchallenged. Burnet had not dared to propose an alteration of the deal on the revenue the
assembly had reached with Hunter. The salaries of the crown’s officers were enumerated in the
journals once again (albeit at the same levels dictated by custom or the instructions). The
assembly’s treasurer still received and disbursed the money, rather than the crown’s receiver
general. By repeating the terms of the arrangement, Burnet and the assembly together
strengthened the precedent of the assembly’s control of this vital element of the power of the
22
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purse. Horatio Walpole’s warnings had gone unheeded, as the assembly continued in their
determination to conform their rights and institutions to those the metropole had won in the
Glorious Revolution.
Over the next two years, the conflicts of interest became even clearer. The treasury wrote
directly to both Burnet and Abraham de Peyster junior, who had succeeded his father as the
assembly’s treasurer, in August 1720 demanding that de Peyster junior account with the deputy
auditor and that Horatio Walpole be paid his fees. 26 The assembly, in the spring 1721 session,
refused to honor Walpole’s claim of a 5% allowance from all the revenues raised, and backed de
Peyster junior in declining to account until the 5% claim was dropped. William Blathwayt had
previously secured that allowance from New York when he was the auditor general, but the
assembly rejected the precedent, placing the 5% “among the many extravagancies of those times
[…] easily complied with here by receivers of the revenue entirely at the governor’s disposal.” 27
No doubt aware that Walpole had made a larger attack on the distribution of fiscal powers in the
colony, the assembly also broadened the scope of their counterclaims. They noted that only “her
late majesty’s indulgence in admitting us a treasurer of our own made it practicable to retrieve
the public credit,” since the “treasury [had been] imprudently emptied by those entrusted with
the management of it.”28 The only alternative would have been “an excess of royal munificence”
in paying the colony’s debts back from the crown’s treasury.
This was the assembly’s argument for the power of the purse couched, somewhat
disingenuously, in terms that could be amenable to the crown’s interests. Neither governors nor
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the crown’s officers, they warned, could be trusted, given the powers the former enjoyed and the
pressures under which the latter struggled. The assembly, however, could be trusted to ensure
that the taxes they raised on themselves were not misspent by the executive. The clear
implication was that this assurance would redound both to the colony’s benefit, since it would
not be plunged into debt, and the crown’s, since the money would actually be spent on the ends
for which it was granted.
However, the argument was not one that Whitehall would accept. Though the assembly
had made no mention of the fact in their address, it was clear that they were willing to pay fees
on the revenue, for they had done so to the treasurer for years. They simply were unwilling to
pay those fees to the auditor general, who was weighty in metropolitan affairs but, unlike the
treasurer, mattered little to New Yorkers in a political sense. Moreover, the assembly had
composed almost a perfect colonial exemplar of the ‘country’ tradition in metropolitan politics.
They had assumed executive corruption as a matter of course, and asserted that only an
unprejudiced assembly would have the wisdom and virtue to check it. In the metropole, however,
the ‘court’ persuasion was very much in the ascendancy in 1721, and there was no ideological
sympathy in the ministry for such contentions. 29
Metropolitan policymakers for the colonies were now caught in an uncomfortable
position. They would naturally have preferred, as Walpole insisted, to have the revenue in New
York routed through the receiver general and reviewed by the auditor general, and had indeed
repeatedly backed Hunter on the former point. Equally, they would rather that the fruits of
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colonial officeholding redounded to the benefit of metropolitan elites with whom they shared a
common identity and ties of patronage, rather than to local elites in the colonies. However,
metropolitan policymakers also wanted funded, functional government in the colonies, and there
was no way to achieve that end without cooperation from local elites. If local elites were
frustrated in their own quest to secure their rights and interests, then they would withdraw that
cooperation, as they had done starkly in New York and Jamaica in just the past decade. Imperial
authorities, therefore, had tacitly accepted some infringements on the prerogative as the price of
functional colonial government. But now Walpole’s demands forced a choice between gratifying
a major metropolitan political figure, or keeping the New York elites happy. There was no
pleasing both.
A dispute in New York between governor and assembly suggested a third way. Burnet
refused to pass the assembly’s 1721 bill for easier partition of lands held in joint tenancy or in
common, which described most of the large land grants in New York. 30 He did so largely on the
advice of Cadwallader Colden. Colden suggested in two representations on the bill that it was in
fact merely cover for the settling of tenures in a manner that would defraud the crown of its
rightful quit-rents, much like the quieting possessions bills in Jamaica. 31 The board eagerly
seized upon his assertion that “if justice were done to your majesty” in the quit-rents, “this
province might produce a sufficient revenue for the support of your majesty’s government there
without doing injustice or hardship to any person whatsoever.” 32 It was the dream of the
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metropolitan authorities: a revenue not dependent on the whims or demands of an assembly, but
merely on the due execution of the law, which could support colonial prerogative government to
the fullest.
However, the means the board proposed in the autumn of 1722 demonstrated the
fundamental quixotry of their project. They noted that “there is not much redress to be hoped for
from […] proceeding in the courts of law, where it would be difficult to impanel a jury that are
not concerned in the consequence of these trials.” 33 Having just acknowledged the unlikelihood
of cooperation in New York, they then recommended that Burnet “should be instructed to
procure another act to pass the council and assembly […] for vacating all the exorbitant grants
remaining.”34 Should the people who would not cooperate with the law not provide their support
through legislation, the board then recommended another tired old expedient. If the assembly
would not pass the bill, then the crown would “be obliged to have recourse to the legislature of
Great Britain for justice against such unreasonable frauds and encroachments.” 35 The board well
knew that no such threat would ever be substantiated, and after their experience under Hunter’s
government, the New York elite knew it too. But like Walpole in 1720, the board had no feasible
solutions to the problem of prerogative weakness.
At the same time as the board developed their flaccid scheme for securing an independent
revenue in New York, they did seek to gratify some New York interests. Their lawyer (and
Burnet’s brother-in-law) West had reported positively on the 2% European goods duty bill,
concluding that though it did “affect the trade of Great Britain,” the inclusion of a suspending
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clause prevented the act from setting any worrying precedent. 36 The board concurred,
representing in the bill’s favor to the crown on 5 June 1722. They wrote to Burnet that though
they were “extremely averse” to such acts generally, they had “consider[ed] the present
necessities of your government, as well as the services to which the produce of the said act is to
be applied” in representing for its approval. 37 They also studiously avoided making any
determination in the auditor general controversy, though the assembly gave them occasion to
make some remark by denouncing Walpole’s claims once again in summer 1722. 38
As Ian Steele has written, however, by this time there was an “increasing distance
between the Board of Trade and the executive power in the British Government,” and policy
decisions on New York reflected that reality. 39 Backed by the influence of his elder brother
Robert, who was now first lord of the treasury and effective prime minister, Horatio Walpole
bypassed the board and secured instructions from the treasury to Burnet to be paid his fees “out
of the first money due or to become due to his majesty.”40 Metropolitan politics had once again
proven its primacy over colonial concerns. Meanwhile, the 2% duty bill did not receive royal
approval, a rare fate for a bill with the board’s imprimatur. Nine days after the board’s
representation, the bill was referred to the committee of the privy council for hearing appeals
from the plantations. It languished there for nearly two years, until it was finally rejected on 30
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April 1724.41 Perhaps the crowning humiliation was that the board’s eighteen-folio
representation on the quit-rents and the revenue in New York never received any formal
consideration whatsoever. The board was the only body in the British administrative apparatus
that could be relied upon to concern itself with colonial information and policy, and it was now
being ignored more starkly than ever before. 42 Metropolitan policy towards the colonies,
inconsistent and of variable effectiveness even when the board was heeded, was likely to suffer
even further.
At least partially aware of this reality, Burnet had pressed on with his own measures. He
told the assembly in May 1722, at the same time West was voicing approval of the 2% duty bill,
that the bill “never will” be confirmed. 43 He sought instead only a one-year allowance for his
project on the frontiers, and received the paltry allowance of 1,250 ounces of plate in October. 44
Burnet would have liked to seek more money from the assembly when they reconvened in May
1723, but by then he had received the royal orders for the payment of Walpole’s fees. He
therefore had instead to secure a bill for over £2,000 to be raised “to supply the deficiencies in
the revenue” created by issuing warrants for Walpole’s payment, which came with only a paltry
sum for promoting Burnet’s frontier plans. 45 In the summer of 1724, since the assembly had not
raised the full amount of Walpole’s fees, and because the payment of Walpole’s fees had pushed
41

Order in council, 30 April 1724, CO 5/1053/177-8.

42

Steele, Politics of Colonial Policy, xiv.

43

Burnet’s speech to the assembly of New York, 31 May 1722, JNY 470.

44

JNY 485. This was raised, as most extraordinary levies for military and frontier expenses were, by a land tax.
Tully suggests that the willingness to raise land taxes belies the landowner-merchant factional opposition that
Bonomi has identified. See Tully, Forming American Politics, 219; Bonomi, A Factious People, 95. I agree with
Tully that the factional alliances were not generally so simple as landowner versus merchant. But Tully ignores here
that the Morris-Livingston party had sought to finance the frontiers with a tax on trade, and only turned to land taxes
after the metropolitan authorities rejected their bill.
45

JNY 495, 499-500.

297

the salaries of other officers into arrears, Burnet had to ask for a further £2,521 to discharge
warrants in the revenue. He received it, but the repairs of the fortifications at New York and his
imperial ambitions on the frontiers paid the price. Only £2,000 was allotted to the New York
fortifications, which was hundreds of pounds less than the minimum estimate the assembly’s
own members had made, and a mere £200 went to Burnet’s frontier project. 46 With no remaining
avenue to raise the funds by taxes on trade, the Morris-Livingston party reluctantly raised the
sums “on estates real and personal.” 47 Metropolitan political concerns had both hindered
imperial aims and frustrated the governor’s allies.
However, the assembly did defy the crown in the manner of raising the funds, and not
simply by the usual direction of the money to their treasurer. Their 1723 and 1724 aids to the
revenue, and indeed all the funds raised since Burnet had arrived in the government, were
supported by paper money. In their reluctant approval of the 1717 debts act, the board had
inveighed against “the further increase of paper credit,” which all future governors, including
Burnet, were not to support.48 Their worry, as always, was that paper money not controlled by
the metropole would lead to the cheapening of debts owed to British merchants through
inflationary pressure, which would clearly damage British interests. However, the New York
assembly had never offered Burnet any ready revenues in specie, but only paper money up front,
which would then theoretically be sunk by the collection of the taxes.
Burnet might perhaps have been able to minimize the issue of paper money if he had only
required funds for the regular support of government. But Walpole’s fees and Burnet’s imperial
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vision together swelled the sums required beyond what the assembly would ever have been
willing to provide in cash up front. Moreover, for Burnet the interests of British merchants
placed a distant third to his plans for the frontiers and the support of government in any case. He
was consequently not only ready to violate the board’s directions on the preservation of those
interests, but to defend paper money to the board. Indeed, in a letter of November 1724, he went
so far as to make the analogy to Parliament himself, arguing that “frequently a sum of ready
money is wanted, which it would be an intolerable tax to raise at once, and therefore they are
forced to imitate the Parliament at home in anticipating upon remote funds.” 49 The metropolitan
authorities liked this instance of “political mimesis” no more than the assembly’s other efforts in
the same vein.50 However, they could not force the assembly to raise money differently, and
could not afford to reject the acts if the colonial government were to be funded. The 1723 and
1724 revenue aids were therefore studiously ignored in London.
Despite those acts for payment, the auditor general controversy would not be resolved
until 1725. The 1723 act had deliberately frustrated Walpole by providing only for “the officers
residing in the government,” which Walpole clearly did not.51 Burnet interceded with the
assembly to strike those words in the second act, but then connived with de Peyster junior to
delay Walpole’s payments, since both had better plans for the money in question. 52 Only after
Newcastle, the secretary of state for the south, wrote sternly to Burnet to defend “the prerogative
of the crown […] so apparently concerned in this affair” in June 1725 did Walpole at last receive
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his full fees, which were in excess of £2,500. 53 Though Clarke continued to write Walpole
complaining of the treasurer’s grudging and partial compliance, the issue was finished as one
that would trouble metropolitan policymakers. 54
I have, in this dissertation, insisted on the intertwining of material and ideological
motivations for the actions of the metropolitan authorities, governors, and colonial elites. But it
is hard not to be cynical about the metropolitan authorities’ conduct in this particular episode.
Horatio Walpole had argued repeatedly that the prerogative, and even the crown’s control over
New York, were at stake, and Newcastle had echoed those concerns in his letter to Burnet.
Seeking to return the revenue into the hands of the receiver general, however, would have
required hard work and consistent attention, and might well end in failure. Therefore, despite
their rhetorical mobilization in defense of the prerogative, the metropolitan authorities never
seem even to have contemplated any action to restore the crown’s rights in this regard. Nor did
the auditing of the accounts by Walpole or his deputy alter the crown’s actual exercise of
authority, since the accounts had consistently been given to the governor and dispatched to
London to be reviewed.55 The only substantive victory in the controversy for imperial authorities
was the enrichment of Horatio Walpole, to the tune of £2,500.
The price imperial government in New York paid, however, was a heavy one. It is
unlikely the assembly would have appropriated that £2,500 to the frontiers in its entirety.
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However, it seems probable that Burnet could have secured more funds to further British
imperial interests in the contest with France had he not been compelled to seek payment of
Walpole’s fees. The payment of this unexpected extra £2,500 also necessitated further recourse
to paper money, which the metropolitan authorities otherwise vigorously opposed. 56 Moreover,
though Burnet’s complaint to Clarke in 1725 that “all the interest he has lost in the assembly has
been by his adhering so strenuously to the king’s pleasure concerning [Walpole’s] office” was
surely histrionic, it contained more than a grain of truth. 57 Burnet had to expend significant
political capital to get Walpole paid—especially since no one politically important in New York
stood to gain by that payment—instead of using it for ends that could have served broader
interests. The crown had won a symbolic victory for the sake of metropolitan political concerns.
But in so doing, both Whitehall and the colonial governor had been forced to sacrifice other
important imperial interests, with long-term consequences. 58
Struggles with the Opposition, 1724-1728
Burnet found himself in need of the political capital he had used on Walpole’s behalf in
1725. The revenue was once again due to expire, and the assembly had grown colder to him over
the course of his government. In addition, the board had charged him with revising his “Indian
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trade” acts.59 Merchants in London had complained that the 1720 act “hath proved very
pernicious to the British trade in general, and to the interest of New York in particular” by
increasing prices, causing the French to export their own goods to North America, and damaging
relations with the Haudenosaunee.60 Burnet and the council of New York seized upon glaring
factual inaccuracies in the complaint to discredit the merchants’ conclusions, but they could not
so easily dismiss observations on the severity of the acts. 61 West had noted that the 1720 act gave
“exorbitant” search and seizure powers to county officers in Albany, and that the 1722 act
provided for “very extraordinary” administration of oaths “left entirely to the discretion, ill will,
or malice” of the officers.62 These were attacks on the rights of Englishmen as blatant as any
made by the crown. Therefore, despite Burnet and the council’s assertion that “no penalties can
be too severe to prevent a trade which puts the safety of all his majesty’s subjects of North
America in the greatest danger,” the board disagreed.63 They decided that the acts ought to be
repealed due to the “methods prescribed for the execution thereof.” 64 However, believing that the
aims of the laws were beneficial, the board recommended that Burnet get a new “Indian trade”
act passed that was not liable to their previous objections. 65
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When Burnet met the assembly on 31 August 1725, he discovered that the MorrisLivingston majority on which he had relied had finally evaporated. Thanks to a series of deaths
and by-elections, a merchant-led party opposed to his measures now held the majority, and they
elected Burnet’s old nemesis Adolph Philipse as speaker. 66 Burnet then contrived to make
matters worse by contesting the qualifications of the prominent merchant Stephen de Lancey,
who had served in assemblies off and on for the past thirty years, and then retreating after Morris
declined to support the challenge wholeheartedly in an opinion as chief justice. 67 The assembly
then proceeded to make a grant of the revenue for only two years, while reducing several of the
salaries, and came to no agreement on a new “Indian trade” bill. 68 For the first time, Burnet had
encountered the very sharp limits set by an assembly that controlled the power of the purse and
disliked the governor. And, like Hunter before him, he refused initially to accept the assembly’s
terms, instead rejecting the bill and proroguing them.
After two more sessions, Burnet finally secured an adequate revenue renewal in the
spring of 1726. It was, however, much reduced from the previous two grants in 1715 and 1720.
The opposition majority “would not be brought to continue the revenue for five years, so that I
was obliged to take it for three,” as Burnet wrote to the board. 69 They reduced many of the
salaries, most especially that which their enemy Morris drew as chief justice. They also reshaped
the streams of income, removing several import duties and replacing them with property taxes
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that were likely to produce less money.70 Burnet did get his new “Indian trade” act, but at the
cost of agreeing to lifting the prohibition on the trade with the French. Instead, the act laid a
double duty on “Indian goods” going to Canada, and a single duty on those headed west. This,
Burnet wrote, was “the best expedient” he could use, given the determination of “the people of
Albany to evade the laws […] and screen one another.” 71 It was also the most he could get
through an assembly in which opponents of the last decade of tax and frontier policy dominated.
With no leverage and no political capital, Burnet had been forced to accede to their demands.
Burnet thereafter dissolved this assembly, which had sat for nearly eleven years, hoping
to win a return of a crown’s party majority in the new elections. The new assembly that met in
autumn 1726 disappointed his expectations, electing Philipse once again for their speaker and
refusing to raise the salaries of the officers of the government back to their prior levels. Instead,
they insisted that Burnet issue no warrants for salaries other “than those particularly expressed in
the resolutions abovementioned.”72 Burnet recoiled at the assembly’s attempt to force explicit
compliance with the deal agreed implicitly in 1715 and 1720. Instead, he determined to issue the
warrants at the same levels as he had previously. He would thereby run the revenue further into
debt, while directly challenging the assembly’s control of the power of the purse. Like Hunter, it
seems that Burnet, when confronted by opposition control of the assembly, made the best of a
bad situation by trumpeting his resolve to defend Whitehall’s interests. He ostentatiously wrote
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the board that he had “engaged myself in a contest with the assembly to support his majesty’s
prerogative […] at the risk of their dissatisfaction, though it should be ever so much against my
private interest.”73 Perhaps he had. But he had also ensured that the opposition majority would
resent him for violating their arrangement, which they still believed necessary to limit the
governor’s fiscal independence and protect them from corruption and arbitrary power. He had
done the equivalent of unilaterally increasing the size of the civil list, and it would exercise his
enemies in the New York assembly just as it had stoked resentment in the House of Commons
only six years before.74
Moreover, in the service of his imperial vision, Burnet had also made a few concessions
not so amenable to the power of imperial government. The assembly strengthened the last
“Indian trade” act, provided for further repairs to the fort at New York, and made a small
appropriation for building a fort at Oswego. In exchange, Burnet agreed to a new partition bill,
and a bill allowing the speaker to issue instructions to the colony’s agent in London. 75 Indeed,
Burnet lobbied for the partition act to the board, telling them that its passage would “be the
greatest means of keeping the assembly in good humor.” 76
Upon meeting a new assembly in 1727 that remained stubbornly opposition-dominated,
Burnet again had to accept infringements on the prerogative. 77 He had run vastly over the £500
the last assembly had appropriated for the construction of the fort at Oswego, and needed
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reimbursement for his expenses. The assembly, for their part, wanted a bill passed to prevent
prosecutions by information, which the majority felt the attorney general had “carried on either
to serve some extravagant fees and charges from the people, or to frighten them into
unreasonable compositions.”78 They also certainly resented that the prosecutions had touched on
quit-rents, and had interfered with the administration of regular county business by justices of the
peace.79 Richard Bradley, the attorney general, alleged that the governor and council had
opposed the bill until some leading assemblymen told them “that unless this bill were passed,
they would not pass a bill for raising money to defray the costs of a trading house at a place
called Oswego.”80 Given that the assembly did not in fact pass the appropriation of £1,612 for
reimbursing the Oswego expenses until the council had agreed to the anti-information bill,
Bradley’s accusation has the ring of truth.81 Burnet had sacrificed the prerogative in exchange for
the funds to help realize his imperial vision.
Burnet’s concessions of elements of the prerogative had been necessary to ensure that
New York government was funded and functional, and to advance Burnet’s idea of Britain’s
imperial interests in North America. The mechanism was exactly as Cadwallader Colden
described it in his 4 December 1726 letter to Alured Popple, who had succeeded his father
William Popple junior as secretary of the board of trade. The need to renew the revenue made
“the officers become almost entirely dependent on [the assembly],” and put the governor and
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council “under such difficulties in refusing or amending bills that the balance designed by our
constitution to keep that house within bounds is very much weakened.” 82 In order to win the
assembly’s support, therefore, governors were “forced […] to fall upon the many expedients to
obtain a support that have not been well approved of in Great Britain.” 83 Bradley was less
forgiving, contending that resisting the assembly’s efforts at aggrandizing power did not “consist
with [Burnet’s] own private interest, which […] seems to have been almost the only thing
intended.”84 But both agreed that “a resolve of the house of representatives [might] be looked on
as of more force than his majesty’s most positive command,” and that New York was tending
towards “being independent on the kingdom of Great Britain.” 85 This hysteria about the
weakening of colonial “dependence” starkly illustrated the central conflict. Imperial authorities
regarded the colonists’ efforts to reduce transatlantic institutional dissonance as fundamentally
misguided, if not actively disloyal. The colonists, on the other hand, sought to secure what they
believed to be their rights as Englishmen, as enshrined in the Glorious Revolution settlement. No
compromise existed that could satisfy two such disparate views of the same phenomenon.
Indeed, for all their perspicacity in identifying the problem, Colden, Bradley, and their ilk
had no good ideas for solving it. Colden sounded the same note as he had in his memorials of
1721, suggesting that full and proper collection of the quit-rents would render the executive
independent of the legislature.86 This was no more practicable in 1727 than it had been in 1721,
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and this time did not receive a favorable hearing from the board. Bradley, for his part, did not
offer any solution until 1729, when he suggested that the salaries be “settled by act of
Parliament.”87 Nothing beyond these two worn-out suggestions was offered to or by the board.
And, as ever, there were no concrete suggestions for enforcement. Colden vaguely alluded to
“sufficient force to put it in execution,” but what that meant neither he nor the metropolitan
authorities knew.88 With no alternative to securing the cooperation of local elites, Whitehall’s
hand-wringing would continue, and so would the assembly’s consolidation of the power of the
purse.
However, the metropolitan authorities could still defend the status quo from legislation
that did not raise money for colonial governments. The partition act was repealed on 15 February
1728, and the anti-information act met the same fate on 6 November 1728, with the latter act
termed a particularly “high encroachment upon your majesty’s undoubted prerogative.” 89 Of
course, the appropriations acts for which Burnet had traded his assent to these infringements on
the prerogative remained in force. Since the Poynings’ Law crisis, it had always been the
metropolitan authorities’ policy to recognize as few explicit negotiations as possible, and to
cancel anything objectionable in the deals their governor made. The New York assembly would
have tried to expand its powers in any case. However, repeated reminders of the metropolitan
authorities’ refusal to honor their governor’s agreements probably reinforced the desire to play
hardball with every revenue bill, which the metropolitan authorities could scarcely afford to
repeal. As in the case of Jamaica in the first decade of the eighteenth century, Whitehall’s

87

Bradley’s representation to the board of trade, 22 November 1729, CO 5/1055/129.

88

Colden to Alured Popple, 15 December 1727, CO 5/1054/260.

89

Order in council, 15 February 1728, CO 5/1054/234; Order in council, 6 November 1728, CO 5/1054/290;
Representation of the board of trade to the king, 8 October 1728, CO 5/1125/120.

308

insistence on defending every inch of the prerogative made sacrifices of some of the crown’s
interests inevitable.
A Modus Vivendi? 1728-1731
The death of George I also brought an end to Burnet’s government in New York. George
II appointed John Montgomerie, an army officer and one of his confidants, to the post in August
1727. In addition to his charge to renew the revenue, which was to expire in 1729, Montgomerie
departed Britain with three new instructions. They were the first changes in the instructions for a
governor of New York in thirty years, and all enjoined against practices the metropolitan
authorities had found deleterious to the interests of imperial government. Montgomerie was not
to assent to any law repealing one still depending before the king, not to assent to any law
establishing paper money without a suspending clause, and to compel “takers-up of land to
cultivate the same.”90 Of course, Montgomerie had no power to execute the last. And, though the
first two sought to limit the agency problem of the governor, Montgomerie would still find ways
to compromise on the spirit of his instructions to secure funds from the assembly.
Montgomerie arrived on 15 April 1728, and met a new assembly on 23 July. 91 Philipse
was once again elected speaker at the head of another majority for his party, while Lewis Morris,
Hunter’s able manager in the assembly, had lost his own election. 92 The assembly also met with
unresolved grievances. At the very end of Burnet’s last assembly, they had made blistering
resolutions against the court of chancery, terming its establishment “without consent in general
assembly […] unwarrantable, contrary to the laws of England, a manifest oppression and
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grievance to the subjects, and of pernicious consequences to their liberties and properties.” 93
Burnet believed Philipse had spurred this on in retribution for Burnet’s ruling against him in the
court “only two days before.” Burnet noted also that the court had “raised a pretty general
clamor” through his rulings in favor of the crown on quit-rents, which naturally cut against his
enemies’ material interests.94 However, as Alan Tully points out, anti-chancery sentiment was
longstanding in New York and had genuine backing across factions and classes, because the
court, in which the unqualified governor was sole judge, was “a symbol of the personal,
unfettered power of the chief executive.”95 Moreover, as Amy Watson argues, the New York
elite were well aware that the court could “bolster ministerial finances” in the colony, by
granting the governor a source of income independent of the assembly. 96 For New Yorkers to rid
themselves of the chancery court would be to defend their material interests, guard against
arbitrary power, and promote identity of political institutions across the Atlantic.
Since the elections had made little change in the assembly’s membership, Montgomerie
“had some reason to fear that this assembly would begin where the other ended.” 97 They did not,
however. Instead, the assembly swiftly passed a five-year revenue bill, which Montgomerie
complained was likely to be insufficient, and a small support for the fort at Oswego. 98
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Montgomerie credited this restraint to an appreciation of his intention “to support his majesty’s
prerogative […] with the greatest zeal,” but it became apparent there were weightier reasons. 99
Having lobbied for the now-repealed partition act when he was in London, he asked the board
“what alterations would make such a bill acceptable,” evidently with an eye to gratifying the
New York elite.100 He had also implicitly acceded to the assembly’s demands in their chancery
resolutions by desisting from holding the court at all. His excuse to the board was that he feared
the consequences of executing that duty “since I found the people here so divided, and at the
same time stubborn in their opinions.”101 Bradley preferred to term it “that great caution that has
been […] used not to displease assemblymen.” 102 It was good colonial politics, but bad
prerogative politics.
Most importantly, Montgomerie had done what Burnet would not, and conformed to the
assembly’s enumeration of the salaries in their journals. This emerged in the summer of 1729.
Lewis Morris junior, who had been a councilor since 1721, objected to Montgomerie issuing a
warrant for his father’s salary at the reduced £250 level. He complained that Montgomerie “has
thought it his interest to comply with the assembly in everything,” and by doing so had been
complicit in “resolutions having […] a manifest tendency to render them independent on the
British crown and government.”103 Montgomerie countered that he had done no such thing.
Instead, he claimed that Burnet’s practice of issuing warrants in excess of the assembly’s
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allowances had “soured the assembly, and made them look back on their former sufferings from
the mismanagement of the revenue.”104 Montgomerie consequently believed that he had “to
proportion the expense so as to make the revenue answer it accordingly.” 105 Otherwise, he
warned, the next governor might face “insuperable difficulties” when the time came for
renewal.106 “Insuperable” was an exaggeration, but Hunter’s experience in the early 1710s
strongly suggested that a heavy debt load and the perception of mismanagement would move the
assembly to make aggressive inroads on the prerogative.
The board did not censure Montgomerie for this accommodation, though it was obviously
a violation of the prerogative. Instead, they approved his suspension of Morris junior from the
council, while saying nothing whatsoever of the exchange he had made. 107 And an exchange it
was, despite Montgomerie’s preposterous protestation that he had “gained the assembly’s
confidence, without ever giving them any assurance that I would comply with the application of
the revenue.”108 Far more plausible was Morris junior’s argument that “his promises, if not
direct, were what they understood to be tantamount.”109 The board could not disavow this
arrangement, because then the government in New York would be without funds, and therefore
not functional. They would have preferred the money to be routed through the receiver general,
in a permanent grant sufficient for all the fiscal needs of the colonial executive. But imperial
authorities did not have the leverage to enforce such concessions on the assembly, and had
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already allowed the assembly’s control of the power of the purse to slide into precedent. And, as
long as Whitehall remained unwilling and unable either to confront the assembly or to fund the
colonial governments from the metropole, the assembly would only continue to gain fiscal power
at the expense of the imperial authorities.
Throughout the rest of his government, Montgomerie had little trouble with the assembly,
because he asked so little of them. In 1729, he secured £1,400 for Oswego, half of it borrowed
from other appropriations and half of it raised by new taxes on the “Indian trade.” 110 In 1730, he
had news from Britain that the “Indian trade” acts had at last been repealed, and that he was not
to assent to acts taxing the trade. 111 The majority in the assembly were deeply irritated by this.
Resolutions penned by Robert Livingston’s son Philip argued that Oswego ought to be supported
“by those who reap the only benefit of it,” and not by a general tax. 112 The assembly then
proceeded to lay a flat £1 tax on everyone who departed Albany to trade with indigenous people
anyway, supported by a three-shilling tax on everyone “that wears a wig or peruke.” 113 Only
£500 was appropriated for Oswego. In a further concession to the assembly of the power of the
purse, all the rest was to be distributed afterwards as the assembly saw fit.
It soon became apparent, however, that the majority in the assembly did believe they
reaped a benefit from Oswego—they were simply unwilling to pay for it. In a representation to
the metropolitan authorities, the present assembly declared that though they had raised a paltry
tax, they were “in no wise able to answer for the conduct of future assemblies, who […] will
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hardly be inclined to burthen their constituents.” Since seventeen of the assembly’s twenty-six
members came from counties “little or not at all concerned in any trade or navigation,” and
distant from the frontiers, the representation advised the imperial authorities that this
disinclination would be structural. But Oswego, the assembly warned, was a crucial bulwark for
the security of Britain’s empire in North America, including New York, and abandoning it would
signify “cowardice, weakness, and poverty.” The only possible solution, therefore, was to lay a
tax on “those only to whom so great and manifold advantages and considerable fortunes and
estates arise” by the more secure “Indian trade.”114 It was a spectacularly disingenuous argument,
even by the standards of colonial free-riding on imperial defense. But the central grain of truth
was unavoidable. The assembly, empowered by control of the purse, had implicitly warned the
crown that it had to choose between its preferred method of taxation or funds for its imperial
ambitions.
Montgomerie did not contest the assembly’s arguments. Instead, he openly backed the
address to the board. In his letter of 21 December 1730, he repeated the assembly’s main points,
and asserted that “no arguments will ever persuade the assembly to support it any other way.” 115
Disagreement with the assembly would result in Oswego going unfunded, while Montgomerie
might find himself engaged in a tiresome and unending contest in which he had no personal
stake. Agreement, on the other hand, meant funding for Oswego and avoiding any unpleasantries
about his salary or other funds in the future. Though supporting the assembly defied the spirit of
the crown’s own instructions, it had probably been an easy choice for Montgomerie to make.
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The board came to a similar conclusion in the summer of 1731. They let the assembly’s
tax on the traders stand, and said that they would allow such a “duty by way of license” for the
future.”116 The board did complain “that the assembly […] should think the province so little
concerned with the success of this settlement at Oswego as not to contribute cheerfully to the
support of it without throwing the burthen entirely upon the trade.” 117 This was a feeble protest,
however, and all parties would have known it. The tax on the trade was against Britain’s
interests, and flew in the face of the crown’s repeal of the “Indian trade” acts in 1729. But
without any leverage, and knowing that the assembly were perfectly willing to engage in
brinksmanship on fiscal issues, the metropolitan authorities had little choice. Britain’s mercantile
interests, and respect for the prerogative, would have to suffer a little at the hands of the New
York assembly for the sake of imperial competition.
By 1731, therefore, the power of the prerogative in New York had reached a low ebb.
This was partly due to Montgomerie’s nonconfrontational attitude, and partly due to the Walpole
administration’s slightly less insistent approach in colonial affairs. Mostly, however, it was a
predictable result of the structural conflicts in the British transatlantic empire. New York elites,
like all the other colonial elites, wanted to enjoy the rights of Englishmen, to exercise the powers
of English elites, and to increase their material wealth. In their assembly, therefore, they had
relentlessly contended for the power of the purse, in analogy with Parliament, and had struck at
the restraints of the prerogative whenever the opportunity offered. Without either the will or the
means to coerce the colonies or to fund their administration from the metropole, imperial
authorities had no alternative. They had to accede to the New York assembly’s most central
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demands, or else see the colonial executive become nonfunctional due to lack of funds, and the
empire fall behind in the race against the French. Attempts could always be made to revise the
status quo, since the metropolitan authorities had never formally accepted the treasurer’s control
over the revenue, or indeed the rest of the assembly’s inroads on the prerogative. But as long as
the colonial executive in New York depended on the assembly for funds, those attempts would
always fail, and the assembly would continue their slow, informal quest to bring the Glorious
Revolution settlement across the Atlantic.
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Conclusion
As the 1730s dawned, the fundamental conflict between the colonial assemblies’ rights
and interests on the one hand, and the crown’s on the other, stubbornly persisted. Neither side
had achieved the ends they had sought decades before. The assemblies had lessened the power of
the prerogative, but the crown still retained judicial and administrative powers in the colonies
unlike those it held in the metropole. The assemblies had won victories over the crown in
regulating the Atlantic economy and sharing the burden of imperial defense, but the crown had
scored its own successes. Metropolitan authorities had denied the assemblies the formal cession
of the rights of Englishmen colonists so desperately wanted. However, the assemblies had
greatly expanded their share of the power of the purse, with the New York assembly gaining
almost complete control. With that power, the assemblies would continue to chip away at the
prerogative. The crown, for its part, still had the right to review colonial laws and to instruct its
governors, and would continue to employ both in efforts to revise an unstable status quo to
which it had never formally consented.
The half-century struggle had, however, wrought one major change. In the metropole and
in the colonies, there was now a history of this transatlantic political conflict. The bitterness of
the battles between crown and assembly would have accumulated in the political memory of any
society. But early modern English political culture, with its immense valorization of precedent,
was particularly susceptible to the growing resentments such conflict produced. Tensions did
lessen after the end of each transatlantic dispute. Like the rising tide, however, they never
receded to their previous level. Each confrontation after the first had higher stakes than it would
have in isolation, because all parties arrived remembering the contests of the past. The conflict

317

drew ever closer to the boundaries of what the empire’s structures would permit, but the catalyst
for the radical transformation required to resolve the crisis still had not appeared.
Then, in the 1760s, major structural change came at last. Metropolitan authorities decided
to abandon the principle for which they had fought the colonial assemblies since the Restoration.
The aim of colonial policy was no longer to preserve prerogative government in the colonies, and
to use the prerogative to exert metropolitan control across the Atlantic. Instead, in the wake of
the Seven Years’ War, the metropolitan authorities sought to impose the king-in-Parliament’s
fiscal and political authority on the colonies, so that Britain could enjoy a more stable and
prosperous empire. The explicit involvement of Parliament in the transatlantic constitutional
conflict, so studiously avoided in the past nine decades, now became the mode of metropolitan
imperial policy.1
Sustaining the prerogative across an ocean against colonial demands for the rights of
Englishmen had been difficult enough in 1675, when the crown’s three kingdoms were more
than twenty times as populous and wealthy as the colonies. By 1764, when the colonies had
closed the gap by an order of magnitude, the prerogative had only shrunk on both sides of the
Atlantic. Metropolitan policymakers probably did not consciously make this calculation, but it
was true all the same. By the 1760s, the crown was barely treading water in the struggle against
the demands of colonial English elites for political rights and power commensurate with their
ever-growing wealth and numbers. It would have been impossible for the crown alone to impose,
through the prerogative, the control that metropolitan authorities so desperately wanted after the
Seven Years’ War. However, the choice to make Parliament central to the transatlantic
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constitutional conflict was self-defeating to the prerogative. The crown had surrendered, and
bequeathed its interest to Parliament.
There was continuity in the transatlantic political struggle, for a metropolitan entity was
still asserting its right and power against that of the colonial elites and their assemblies. But now
the metropolitan entity was Parliament, which did not share the crown’s constraints. Parliament
did not have to fear its own involvement; could deploy resources on a scale that might force the
conflict to a resolution; and was not susceptible to the old seventeenth-century discourse against
monarchical tyranny. The colonial assemblies could not, therefore, erode parliamentary authority
as they had worn down the prerogative. Nor could they rhetorically oppose only a part of
metropolitan authority, and a weaker part at that, as they had done with the crown over the past
decades. Parliament’s involvement left colonists in New York and Jamaica, and indeed all the
British Atlantic, with a starker choice. If they wanted to continue their fight for their material and
ideological interests, they would have to oppose the united whole of metropolitan authority in a
contest of sovereignties. This conflict could not persist in unstable stalemate. For the colonists,
the alternatives were submission or open defiance.
In the crisis that became the American Revolution, the Jamaican elite’s nexus of material
and ideological interests broke apart. They were, as Trevor Burnard writes, “reliant on the
imperial state for defense and, more important, for supporting the Atlantic slave trade.” 2 When
forced to a choice, the Jamaican elite opted for the material benefits of imperial loyalty over the
greater powers only achievable through outright antagonism. New York, by contrast, was much
less materially reliant on the imperial government, and so the ideological and material interests
of the dominant minority of the New York elite remained aligned in the crisis of the 1760s and
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1770s. Choosing independence was easier for them, and at the crucial point, that was the
decision they made. New York and Jamaica had walked together on the path of transatlantic
constitutional politics since the seventeenth century. Now, at last, they finally diverged.
The conflict I have described in this dissertation thus ended in the American Revolution.
There were, of course, other possibilities. Before Jamaica turned off the path of confrontation in
the late 1760s, and even probably after, there were off-ramps available to both sides. However, I
do suggest that, in Britain’s eighteenth-century Atlantic empire, there was neither an available
solution to the fundamental transatlantic constitutional conflict nor the means permanently to
suppress it. The American Revolution did not have to happen. But some revolution was
inevitable.
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